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Then What?
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December 15, 2010 • Volume 28 • Winter 2011
By Charles Bybelezer
By definition, a solution solves a problem with the implication of near-immediate resolution. This creates a conundrum when considering the notion of "the two-state solution". How can it be that the 'solution' to an issue of this magnitude- the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that has been festering for decades-remains unimplemented? The reasons for this seeming delay emerge when examining potential scenarios pertaining to
what should be termed "the two-state suggestion".
It is one thing to intellectualize "the two-state suggestion" as "the best of several undesirable alternatives". It is quite another to have that 'undesirable' option materialize and then have to address its ramifications. As the direct talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority remain stalled, it is worthwhile to explore and increase public awareness of some of the overlooked obstacles that have hindered the actualization of the "two-state suggestion" in the past.
SECURITY: Between 200 I and 2005, approximately 2,500 rockets were fired from Gaza into Southern Israel, mainly shortrange "Qassams" targeting Sderot. Since Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, over 6,000 rockets, including "sophisticated" missiles like the Katyusha, have been fired at Israeli civilian centers reaching as far as Ashkelon, Ashdod, and Beersheva. We can ascertain one of two things: either the "liberation" of Gaza inspired a Palestinian technological renaissance, or reduced Israeli supervision enabled increased smuggling, and subsequent utilization, of advanced weaponry. If we accept the latter interpretation, it becomes obvious that there are major security risks associated with the establishment of a militarily independent "Palestine". Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thus declared that he would only accept a demilitarized Palestine. However, this prospect is unrealistic; part of self-determination includes the right to self-defense and self-armament. The question is therefore, How would Israel go about containing this potential threat?
CIVIL UNREST: Any future Palestinian state would include most of Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank"). Presently, there are over 100,000 Jews living therein. Given Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas' recent statement, "I will never allow a single Israeli to live among us on Palestinian land," there is only one plausible scenario if "Palestine" were created; the mandatory evacuation of all Jewish commumhes in the West Bank. Using the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza as a barometer, we can predict the outcome of this process: chaos of epic proportions, analogous to the forcible relocation of every Jew living in Montreal, half of whom would intentionally chain themselves to their bedposts. Assuming the Israeli government and military could somehow overcome the logistical complications, the resulting political and humanitarian crisis, characterized by armed Jews fighting unarmed Jews, would be catastrophic.
PEACE: Let us assume that "Palestine" is created ... then what? Is it rational to assume that Harnas will renounce Jihad and recognize Israel's right to exist; that our concessions will fashion "brothers" out of the Muslim Brotherhood; that Iran will halt its nuclear program; that Hezbollah- "mission accomplished"-will disband; that the UN will give Israel a pennanent gold star of David; that countries will forevennore flock to the defense of Israel; that Jew-haters worldwide will realize the fault of their ways? This begs the question: Is peace a reasonable objective? Indeed, can there be peace with a Palestinian state, whose citizens elected a terrorist organization, Hamas, which is openly committed to the destruction oflsrael? Furthermore, could this prospective "peace" pave the way for the realization of a "greater", global peace for Israel?
The PROBLEM: To be effective, a solution must address a particular problem. For Israel, it is terrorism. For the Palestinians, it is ... occupation? Given the Palestinian response to Israel's withdrawal from Gaza in 200S-increased violence-it is illogical to consider "occupation" as the essential determining factor.
Perhaps, then, the major concern for the Palestinians has always been the right to democratic self-determination? Unfortunately, this too becomes ambiguous when considering the previous proposals for statehood presented to the Palestinian Authority by Israel and the U.S, dating back to the 2000 Camp David Accords, an offer which was rejected by Palestinian Liberation Organization leader, Yasser Arafat, who refused to make a counter-offer, but incited the second intifada.
Is the problem then an economic one? This too is unlikely considering the amount of aid flowing through Gaza; the highest per capita in the world, and the fact that Gaza has a higher standard of living than neighboring Egypt.
So what then is the problem? Is the fundamental Palestinian problem not the non-existence of "Palestine", but rather the existence of Israel? If so, would the creation of "Palestine" nullify the resistance to the existence of Israel?
There are therefore fundamental concerns about the context in which "the two-state suggestion" has evolved. For the most part, dialogue has focused on what is best for the Palestinians, often disregarding the real consequences to Israel. Accordingly, as events unfold in Washington, it is imperative that all Jews inform themselves of repercussions emanating from such negotiations. It is our responsibility to infuse equilibrium into the peace process by defining it in terms of what is best for Israel. There is indeed, more than adequate justification for doing so.
A version of this article was printed earlier in The Jewish Tribune.
EDITORIAL BOARD
Charles Bybelezer, Publications Chairman (Canadian Institute for Jewish Research)
Alex Enescu, Editor



