WINNING THE BATTLE FOR BASRA

A DEFINING MOMENT
Con Coughlin
National Post, March 31, 2008

This time President George W. Bush has got it right. He describes the latest flare-up in the oil-rich southern city of Basra as a "defining moment in the history of a free Iraq", and no one can argue with that.

Since its official hand-over, much of Basra has remained under the control of radical Islamic militias and criminal gangs. In the past five years America has suffered 4,000 combat deaths and spent the astronomical sum of $3 trillion trying to get post-Saddam Iraq to a position where an elected Iraqi government is capable of running the country on its own.

At the time of Saddam's demise, the general assumption within the British and American governments was that it would take about three years to get Iraq back on its feet. The country needed a new constitution and the opportunity to elect a government for the first time in its history. But it also needed military and security resources, and they basically disintegrated after Mr. Bush had given his blessing to the disastrous de-Baathification program that removed military and security personnel who had held office under Saddam.

While tangible progress was possible on political reconstruction—the constitution was approved and a government duly elected—providing Iraq with the means to protect itself and enforce the rule of law has been deeply challenging, and the burden of preventing the insurgent and terrorist groups sabotaging the Pax Americana has mainly fallen to the US-led coalition.

Until, that is, last week, when for the first time since Saddam's overthrow, the Iraqi government made what could prove to be the historic decision to assert its authority by laying down a direct challenge to the lawless militia groups that have turned large swathes of Iraq's second city into a no-go zone. In military terms, Basra has been a confrontation waiting to happen since British troops withdrew from the city centre to the air base last September. Formal control of the city was returned to the Iraqis in a short ceremony at the air base last December, but much of Basra has remained under the control of a combination of radical Islamic militias and criminal gangs….

The activities of the Iraqi kidnap gangs in Basra, which almost daily abduct victims at will for either financial gain or political advantage, was one of the many issues [Iraqi military commander] General Mohan [al-Furayji] told me he was keen to confront as soon as he had the manpower available to deal with the militias. "The lawlessness in Basra is an insult to the Iraqi people and an insult to the Iraqi government. It simply cannot be tolerated," he said.

The coalition may have succeeded in its goal of establishing a democratic, pro-Western government in Baghdad, but not everyone in Iraq is happy with this arrangement, particularly radical Shia leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Mehdi Army is in the vanguard of the resistance to the Iraqi government's forces in Basra. Al-Sadr and his supporters, who receive military and financial support from Iran, are fiercely opposed to the current political status quo, and want to see the creation of an Iranian-style Shia state in Iraq, which would not at all be in the West's interests.

The big difference between the Iraqi government and the Mehdi Army is that the former has been elected, while the other seeks to impose its hardline anti-Western ideology on the Iraqi people who, in Basra at least, have no say in the matter.

The battle for Basra is a test of both the Iraqi government's legitimacy and virility. If General Mohan and his colleagues can prevail over the militias who pose the greatest threat to Iraq's survival as a democratic entity, the Iraqi people can look forward to taking charge of their own destiny—and the coalition's troops can start planning their withdrawal in the knowledge that their mission has been successfully accomplished.

MALIKI VS. SADR
Editorial
National Review Online, March 31, 2008

The Iraqi government’s battle against Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army in Basra is playing in the U.S. as a blow to progress in the war over the last year. But viewed from the perspective of recent Iraqi history, it is a welcome development. It used to be that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki blocked U.S. forces from taking on Sadr’s militia in Baghdad, and it was a plausible fear that Sadr would take over Iraqi security forces from within. Now, Iraqi security forces have been directly battling the “outlaw” elements of Sadr’s army and al-Maliki compares Shia “gangs” to al-Qaeda: “It’s unfortunate that we used to say these very words about al-Qaeda, when all the while, there were people among us who are worse than al-Qaeda.”

At the operational level, the picture is murkier. Maliki’s drive into Basra appeared precipitous, and Iraqi forces encountered stiffer resistance than they seemed prepared for. But the Iraqis independently massed 30,000 troops in the city, and with our help — especially from the air — inflicted damage on Sadr. If this were to be a climatic battle against Sadr — rather than one in a series of two-steps-forward-one-step-back confrontations — we would have to back Maliki to the utmost, including with ground forces.

The backdrop to events in Basra is the shameful British abdication in the city. Cutting a deal with Sadr, the British evacuated the city last year and repaired to their air base outside the city, where they have been routinely attacked with rockets from radical elements of the Mahdi army and done nothing about it. Not content simply to have retreated from Basra, the British dissembled about the consequence of their exit. They have insisted that things were fine in Basra — even as militias battled for control of the city’s resources and the Iranians steadily increased their influence.

What the British effected in Basra was a version of the Democrats’ preferred strategy of a premature withdrawal on the premise that Iraqis will then sort things out themselves. While the Iraqi government is still weak (as it will be for some time), this sorting out will constitute a competition between armed groups with the Iranians likely benefiting, as we’ve seen in Basra. Although the Brits were content to look the other way, the Iraqi government wasn’t.

Are Maliki’s motives completely pure? Of course not. Sadr is a threat to perform well in the October 1 provincial elections at the expense of Maliki’s Dawa party and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council with which it is allied. The Supreme Council has its own Iranian links and its own private army, the Badr Corps. Maliki is playing favorites by targeting Sadr’s militia. But the Iranian-backed “special groups” of Sadr’s militia have become one of the main threats to peace in the country, ignoring Sadr’s cease-fire that has helped reduce violence in recent months. There can be no long-term stability in Iraq without eventually taking them out.

Whatever the flaws in his execution, Maliki has at least has been displaying a decisiveness that hasn’t been a hallmark of his prime ministership. He is not content to watch the jewel of the Shia south slip out of his government’s control and into the hands of a foreign country. Sunnis can only be heartened that he is standing up to Iran, and acting — his political self-interests aside — in a non-sectarian manner by taking on a Shia group.

On Sunday, Sadr called for a ceasefire, which is what he always does when his forces have been hurt. The history of Sadr’s confrontations with American or Iraqi forces is that he usually takes a beating militarily and/or politically as ordinary people recoil from the resulting disorder. In terms of his political standing, he is a shadow of his former self when he was directing uprisings against the U.S. in 2004. No one can know exactly where this latest episode is headed, but if Sadr stands down, it will be a sign that he is reluctant not just to take on U.S. forces directly, but Iraqi forces as well. That’s progress. And Nouri al-Maliki now finally might be the ally against Sadr we’ve always wanted him to be.

THE BASRA BATTLE: SIGNS OF IRAN
Amir Taheri
New York Post, March 31, 2008

It was bound to happen and may well be happening right now: a war between the Islamic Republic in Iran and the new Iraq. Much of the media have portrayed the latest battles for Basra, and attempts by armed groups to undermine the recently improved security in Baghdad, as a power struggle among rival Shiite factions.

In this analysis, three Shiite factions—the Fadila (Virtue), the Dawa (The Call) and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq—that support Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's coalition government are trying to disarm the remnants of the Mahdi Army of the elusive mullah Muqtada Sadr.

But that explanation has several problems. To start with, it is the regular Iraqi army—not any Shiite armed faction—that is doing the fighting in Basra. To underline that point, Maliki went to Basra to supervise operations personally. And the kind of fighting witnessed in Basra is different from the usual militia operations. This is a war of position, with units acting as detachments of a regular army trying to deny the Iraqi government forces control of specific territories. The fighters defying the Iraqi army may be Iraqi irregulars, even nominal members of the Mahdi Army—but those leading them are acting as textbook regular-army commanders.

At least some of the officers in charge of the rebel units may be seconded from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as part of a broader plan to control the Basra region, and thus the lifeline of the Iraqi economy. …

The type of weapons used in both Basra and Baghdad also suggests at least some outside involvement. The rebels in Basra are using a large number of armored vehicles to move men and materiel around-- something no other Shiite militia, and certainly not the Mahdi Army, had ever done. They're also using heavy artillery, mobile rocket launchers and a sophisticated communications system unavailable to militias.

Elements of the Mahdi Army may provide the visible face of the rebellion, but there is no evidence that the militia (supposing it even still exists as an organized force) is the sole star of this show. Sadr, after all, has extended the ceasefire he declared six months ago--and, in a recent letter, admitted that he had failed to "liberate" Iraq and create an "Islamic society." Last week, he issued another statement calling for a political settlement in Basra--a far cry from the bellicose noises made by these rebels with the help of Iranian state-owned media.

Spending most of his time in Iran, Sadr is now preparing to claim a theological position within the Shiite hierarchy--an ambition that cannot be realized through gunfights in the streets of Basra and Baghdad.

One other notable fact: Whoever is running the show on the rebel side has been able to devise a battle plan that included simultaneous attacks along a north-south axis that includes Baghdad, al-Amarah and Basra. No other Iraqi militia group, Shiite or Sunni, has had the resources to stage such a campaign before.

The rebels are trying to retain areas that connect Basra, a vast urban sprawl, to the Shatt al-Arab, an estuary that forms part of the border between Iran and Iraq. If the Iraqi government is kept out of these areas, Iran would control both banks of the strategically vital waterway. Iran has already occupied several islands in the waterway facing Basra, using them as advance observation posts.

Finally, the design of this operation recalls an Iranian plan, drafted in 1983-84, to seize control of Basra and parts of the Shiite-majority areas of southern Iraq. According to Ibrahim Yazdi, once a top adviser to the late Ayatollah Khomeini, the "Basra Plan" was devised as a compromise. The ayatollah wanted the war with Iraq to continue until the fall of Baghdad, after which he hoped his armies would march on Jerusalem. His advisers, including Yazdi, knew that Iran could not win such a war and tried to placate him by offering him Basra.

Visitors to Basra since Saddam's fall have often been struck by the massive "Iranian" presence there. Much of this consists of large numbers of Iraqi Shiites, known as mua'aweddin (returnees), who have come home after years of exile in Iran. There are also those who hold both Iranian and Iraqi nationality. Known as muzdawajun (double nationals), they are often accused of being loyal to Shiism rather than any secular concept as a nation state.

Why has Basra, a relatively calm place for the last five years, heated up now? One reason may be the British decision last year to withdraw from the city. This left a vacuum that the new Iraqi army and police were unable to fill immediately. Iran may have seized the opportunity to try to grab as much influence and presence as it could - both via Shiite militias (including the Mahdi Army) that it has financed for years and by sending large numbers of operatives across the border.

The prospect of losing control of Basra may have prompted the Maliki government to act. Whoever controls Basra could influence the outcome of next year's crucial local-government elections. Basra and the Shiite south represent the backbone of support for the Maliki coalition; without them, the coalition couldn't retain control of the central government in Baghdad.

At a time when US commanders in Iraq, including Gen. David Petraeus, openly accuse Iran of having joined the Iraqi imbroglio, the fate of Basra appears important for another reason. If there were a war between the United States and the Islamic Republic, one likely early US objective would be seizure of Iranian oilfields. To do that, America and its allies would need advance bases in southern Iraq -- the key to which is Basra. Iran, on the other hand, could extend the defensive perimeter of its oilfields by annexing Basra.

Both sides may simply be interested in testing the waters at this stage. But the war over who will shape the future of Iraq, indeed of the Middle East as a whole, is in its early stages.

For additional perspectives on the battle in Basra, please visit CIJR’s Picks of the Week page.

Also, check out the last issue of ISRAZINE at http://www.isranet.org/Israzine/israzine_Home.htm.

JOHN MCCAIN

“THE NATURE OF THE ENEMY IS HYDRA-HEADED”
Herb Keinon & David Horovitz
Jerusalem Post, March 20, 2008

Each of the three standing US presidential candidates has developed an almost larger than life persona: Barack Obama, The Messiah; Hillary Clinton, The Wife Of; and John McCain, The American Hero.

And then you meet one of them in person and are faced not with the brushed-over televised image speaking in sound bites or soaring rhetoric, but rather someone who talks in run-on sentences, is not an expert or authority on all matters, and reveals - through humor and non-verbal signs and signals - little bits of himself. That, at least, is what happened during the Jerusalem Post's interview Tuesday with McCain in a lounge at Jerusalem's David Citadel Hotel….

It was clear that in granting a 30-minute interview to The Post during a whirlwind visit to the country, the Arizona senator was keen on reaching out to the American Jewish voters, voters who historically vote overwhelmingly for the Democratic candidate. McCain arrived with two staunch supporters: Senators Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, arguably America's senior Jewish politician and a man widely respected in the Jewish community, and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina.

It was also clear that McCain, in one brief interview, could touch on only a fraction of the issues of concern to the pro-Israel and Jewish voters. As a result, he didn't go into much detail, preferring to speak in broad strokes about how Israel is a unique partner; how support for Israel is not only about Israeli interests, but also American ones; and how the West is engaged in a titanic struggle with an extremist foe. …

You have an ethos about not declaring a war unless you are prepared to win it. How do you apply that in a world where warfare is very different now, and where—in the Israeli case—we are fighting these asymmetrical missile wars, launched from civilian neighborhoods, where hitting back necessarily affects civilians?

I can only put it into the broad statement that we are in a titanic struggle, and will be for the foreseeable future, between radical Islamic extremism and the forces of freedom and democracy and everything we value and treasure. The nature of the enemy is hydra-headed, it is multi dimensional, and the struggle is military, diplomatic, intelligence and ideological.... We're going to have to succeed in all these areas.

Iran is a threat to the region. The latest information is that they are arming and training extremists that come out of Iraq in Teheran and sending them back in. They are obviously supporting Hizbullah. They are obviously pursuing nuclear weapons. They continue to have an influence in the southern part of Iraq, as we all know. The influence they appear to have over Syria is very apparent; so the challenge of Iran is a very large one. And I have said we have many areas and ways to pursue this part of the struggle….

[W]e can…not afford to have Iran with nuclear weapons [because of] the threat to Israel, the nuclearization of the region, proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region, the threat it poses to other nations as well as Israel. We know they have ambitions that are not just aimed at Israel, [such as] destabilization of the entire region upon which United States national security interests rest.

And by the way, how do you define victory? In counter-insurgencies, and Iraq has turned into a counter-insurgency, you win over time and you succeed gradually.... There's no peace-signing [ceremony]. There's no Camp David accord. There's a gradual reduction of the influence and strength of the enemy...

Let us ask some specifics about our struggle. First of all, in Gaza, the Palestinians voted for Hamas and they are now in full control. Are there strategies that Israel can effectively pursue? How do you win an ideological struggle when the [Hamas] government is encouraging the extremists?

It is extremely difficult, but one of the lessons here is that if the government is not responsible to the people [it will fail]. And we've seen that through history. Fatah, as we all know, did not provide social services and help the people the way Hamas did. Chairman Mao said first you feed the stomach, and then you feed the brain. I'm not the greatest admirer of Chairman Mao, but he was pretty smart in some ways. Shouldn't Fatah have understood the lesson here and taken care of the people?

So all I can say is that we have to try to regain the ideological high ground on Gaza. I do not know how exactly you do that. I've been involved in these issues for 25 years, but I can't give you a formula and say this is how you get Gaza back to some kind of government that is amenable to a peaceful outcome of this situation. I can say that we ought to help Abbas and ought to help Fatah, but we also ought to make it very clear to them about the need to take care of the people who are living in very bad conditions, as we all know.

Should Israel engage with Hamas?

I don't think so. But let me say this. I don't think I am the person to make that decision… My job as a senator, and in any position of leadership I might hold, is to work with the government of Israel, not dictate to the government of Israel what I think is the solution.

My personal feeling is that no [Israel should not talk to Hamas], because someone is going to have to answer me the question of how you are going to negotiate with an organization that is dedicated to your extinction. That is my personal view. But I am not going to tell the government of Israel, which may see an opportunity, [what to do]. But I don't see it myself.

The Palestinian argument to counter what you said is that they are trying to improve things, but that Israel, with settlement expansion, is making it very hard for them, that the Israelis are playing into the hands of the extremists?

I've heard and listened and been briefed 200 to 300 times throughout the years, and I understand and agree with our government spokesperson who urges "restraint," which is what the Bush administration recently said.

But I also understand that there are some isolated settlements that will also be closed down. That's a tough decision for the [Israeli] government. I've seen the film when they go in and remove people from settlements, and it is a democracy.

My job is not to make a decision as to whether the settlements should be expanded or not, but rather my job, I think, is to try to create conditions that would lead to negotiations and a settlement grounded on the belief that it is not just [about] my commitment to the state of Israel. If Hamas/Hizbullah succeeds here, they are going to succeed everywhere, not only in the Middle East, but everywhere, and Israel is not the only enemy. They are dedicated to the extinction of everything that the US, Israel and the West believes and stands for. So America does have an interest in what happens here, far above and beyond our alliance with the state of Israel.

Do you agree with the tactics Israel is using to stop the rocket fire in the south? Is the military doing what it should be doing?

I have great respect for Ehud Barak. I think he is one of the great military people I have ever seen and had the opportunity of knowing.

I can't give you a good answer as to how you respond to these rocket attacks. But I can tell you that I believe that if rocket attacks came across the border of the United States of America, that the American people would probably demand pretty vigorous actions in response. I think I know my constituency in the state of Arizona, and they would be pretty exercised if rockets came across our southern border, which will never happen, but they would demand a pretty vigorous response.

I would like to speak in the broadest terms in saying that when you look at all the factors that are at play here, when you look at the multitude of the challenges and the nature of the enemy, including a nation that is developing nuclear weapons and is dedicated to Israel's extinction, then from my standpoint Israel is probably at greater risk than perhaps it has been since 1947.

Does the National Intelligence Estimate -- the problematic NIE, from Israel's point of view -- remove support that might be necessary for military intervention in Iran, if everything else fails, or do you believe that as president you could muster that support?

I was critical of the NIE at the time. The director says now he wouldn't do that again, but I think the damage that was done by weakening the resolve of our European allies was serious.

This latest round of sanctions that was passed at the UN is remarkable in its weakness. I don't even know how you call them sanctions. So I believe the NIE was damaging, but I do have some optimism particularly where [French President Nicolas] Sarkozy is concerned. I'm glad the [German] chancellor is here in Israel.

Over time we may be able to gather more European support as the evidence becomes clear, as it will, that Iran is progressing on the path towards construction and acquisition of nuclear weapons. Perhaps [we may be able to] implement what I've been advocating for a long time - that is a League of Democracies, since it is clear that China and Russia, particularly Russia, will block real meaningful sanctions against Iran. That League of Democracies would be countries that share our values, our principles, our philosophy and our appreciation of the challenge that Iran poses to stability in the Middle East, and maybe we could act in concert.

It is European financial institutions that are extending unlimited lines of credit to the Iranians. It's European institutions, and aspects of our European Atlantic alliance, that are not as vigorous in their response as perhaps we could be if we all acted in concert.

How could you as president get them to be more active? And domestically, could you muster support for the necessary use of force if push comes to shove?

I'm confident that our European allies will come to appreciate the threat that Iran poses. They also understand the destabilizing effects of a nuclear-armed Iran throughout the region…. I am guardedly optimistic that the major democracies of Europe will side with us at the end of the day in imposing meaningful sanctions on Iran.

Will it be easy? No. Will it require consultations and sharing of info and intelligence? Yes. But I am confident we can do that. And I don't place all my eggs in the French basket, but it certainly does make a difference when the French president has a different attitude toward America and our alliance than his predecessor did.

You said earlier today that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Does that mean there should be no sovereign Palestinian presence anywhere in Jerusalem as far as you are concerned?

That status is something that is hard for me to be specific about, because I think it is part of the negotiating process... I believe that the [US] embassy should be moved to Jerusalem.

Do you see a distinction between Israel building in new neighborhoods in east Jerusalem, and building in the settlements?

[Long pause] I really don't have a good response to that question. I really think that we should understand that the US and Israel are partners. Israel is not a client of the United States of America, they don't do our bidding, they have a freely elected government…. Some people say, too often, "We should tell the Israelis what to do." But we are partners. And if you are true partners, then you don't dictate what you think the terms of the survival of a nation should be.

Doesn't saying something like that, which is very forthright and will be very welcome in Israel, complicate your potential of being accepted as an honest partner for the Palestinians?

I hope not, because I would be more than happy to treat Fatah as a partner as well, if they were committed to a process that resulted in peace. We all agree there [needs to be] a two-state solution….

But a little straight talk: we do have a unique relationship [with Israel]. We have a unique relationship with the British; that doesn't mean we can't be partners with the French or anybody else. We have a unique relationship between the United States and Israel, but that doesn't mean we would discriminate against a Palestinian state if it were created, and Israel and the US are committed long-term to a two-state solution.

Regarding the three kidnapped Israeli soldiers, Israel has this history of making massively asymmetrical prisoner exchanges, with people then released sometimes committing further terrorist acts. What would you suggest to the government, to the parents, from your particular perspective [as a former prisoner of war]?

All I can say is that [Israel's readiness for such exchanges] is a commentary on the value that the Israeli people place on every single individual citizen who serves the country…. I know [the soldiers’ families] also understand that the government cannot agree to something that could put additional lives of brave young Israelis in danger. In other words, [it could not] make an agreement that would somehow compromise national security….

Our hearts go out to [the families, and they have] our sympathy. I think they just need constant reassurance that there is no effort spared by the Israeli government, and especially the military, to bring them home safe and sound.

There are whispers about the role former secretary of state James Baker has in your campaign, and is likely to have in your administration. Could you comment on that?

I admire and appreciate secretary Baker. He not only was secretary of state, he was chief-of-staff to president Reagan, he was secretary of the Treasury, he was a campaign chairman. He has a long list of accomplishments. All I can tell you is that I haven't even picked a vice president - or a nominee for vice president - much less picked a person who I would want to represent the United States [as a special Middle East envoy].…

What role, if any, do you foresee for Senator Lieberman in a possible McCain administration?

…Senator Lieberman came to support my candidacy [before the New Hampshire primary] at a time when it was certainly not clear whether I was going to win this nomination or not... It was a critical moment in my candidacy.

I believe that Joe is man who is probably admired and respected by Democrat and Republican alike - in a most unusual way in the American political scene today. And I know many ways that he can serve this country, with or without me as president of the United States...

CIJR IS LOOKING FOR VOLUNTEERS! CIJR is looking for several talented people in the Montreal- area to help us with our Programming needs, some Fundraising initiatives, and light data-entry. Interested persons are asked to email Jackie Douek, CIJR’s Assistant Director, at cijr@isranet.org.

Please visit CIJR’s latest issue of ISRAZINE at http://www.isranet.org/Israzine/israzine_Home.htm.

Shabbat Shalom to all readers.

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IRAN

HOW NOT TO DEAL WITH IRAN
Arthur Herman
New York Post, March 14, 2008

…In dealing with rogue states, diplomacy can never be a substitute for, or even the alternative to, force. It can only be effective as the extension of force—force that is a credible threat because it will be decisive if unleashed, and because it plainly will be unleashed should diplomacy fail.

The pointlessness of "pure diplomacy" was on display last week, with the new UN "sanctions" against Iran's nuke builders. The White House and State Department have been pushing for these new sanctions for nearly a year—even though the UN's own International Atomic Energy Agency has revealed that none of the sanctions adopted so far have even slowed Iran's progress toward developing nuclear weapons.

Yet these new "sanctions" turn out to be nothing more than a call for "vigilance" in dealing with the two Iranian banks involved in the country's nuclear program. Oh, the UN also calls for inspection of ship and air cargos to Iran that might include bomb-making materials that are banned under existing sanctions - but only if those goods are being shipped under Iranian colors.

This means that Iran's two main nuclear enablers, Russia and China, can still send whatever Iran needs to complete its uranium-enrichment efforts.

In other words, the Bush administration's long drive to bring diplomatic (as opposed to military) pressure to bear on Iran—to stop the nuclear program before it destabilizes the Middle East or worse—has been a complete waste of time. Worse, while we've diddled with diplomacy, Tehran has had five years to forge ahead with its plans. …

In January, the US intelligence elite joined the appeasement chorus by releasing a National Intelligence Estimate that essentially white-washed Iran's nuclear program—sending a clear signal to the Iranians and everyone else that any preemptive US military strike against Iran, like the one against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, was off the table. Meanwhile, the IAEA's latest (Feb. 3) report revealed that Iran isn't only forging ahead with its uranium-enrichment program but is also working on key components for detonating a nuclear device. These include high-voltage detonation equipment; wiring for multiple exploding "bridgewire" detonators, and a 1,300-foot underground shaft in which to set off those detonators—once Tehran has enriched enough material to make a test bomb.

Nothing in the current sanctions will prevent this from happening. Only a full-scale military confrontation will now do that—the confrontation the United Nations, our intelligence elite and State Department thought they were working to avoid, but which they've made even more inevitable.

Some have hoped Israel would do the job, but Israeli strikes would probably only delay, not halt, Tehran's program. That leaves the United States armed forces as the one power with enough muscle and will to enforce the world community's rules, and (we hope) protect that community from the results of its own irresponsibility. …

Force without diplomacy is sheer brutality, the law of the jungle. But diplomacy without force, or the threat of force, is an invitation to chaos—no law at all. It's the lesson Western democracies learned in the 1930s. It's the lesson Israel is now learning in dealing with Hamas in Gaza. It's the lesson we all should have learned dealing with Saddam Hussein in the '80s and '90s, but didn't.

Five years after Operation Iraqi Freedom, people wonder how we ended up going to war with Iraq in the first place. The answer is: a decade or more of trying to use the United Nations to ward off a threat to regional stability until war was the only option left. Future historians will show this is where we are heading with Iran, as well….

(Arthur Herman's latest book, "Gandhi and Churchill: The Epic Rivalry That Destroyed an Empire and Shaped Our Age," hits stores in April.)

IRAN'S NUCLEAR THREAT
Zalmay Khalilzad
Wall Street Journal, March 4, 2008

The United Nations Security Council has passed another resolution concerning Iran because its nuclear program is an unacceptable threat. Iran's violations of Security Council resolutions not only continue, but are deepening. Instead of suspending its proliferation-sensitive activities as the council has required, Iran is dramatically expanding the number of operating centrifuges and developing a new generation of centrifuges, testing one of them with nuclear fuel….

The United Nations Security Council has voted to impose more sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program. The move was made after Iran refused to suspend nuclear enrichment and other sensitive activities.

The latest report from the IAEA states that Iran has not met its obligation to fully disclose its past nuclear-weapons program. On the core issue of whether Iran's nuclear program is strictly peaceful, the report showed no serious progress.

The IAEA presented Iran with documents assembled over a period of years from multiple member states and the agency's own investigations. The documents detailed Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear warhead, including designs for a missile re-entry vehicle, and showed other possible undeclared activities with nuclear material. Iran dismissed these documents as "baseless and fabricated." But the IAEA does not share that conclusion.

The latest IAEA report also states that Iran is not suspending its proliferation-sensitive activities. For almost two years now, the Security Council has required Iran to suspend all of its enrichment-related, reprocessing, and heavy water-related activities. I want to ask the Iranian leaders, "If your goal is to generate nuclear power for peaceful purposes, why do you court increasing international isolation, economic pressure and more, all for a purported goal more easily and inexpensively obtained with the diplomatic solution we and others offer?"

I want the Iranian people and others around the world to know that the United States recognizes Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They should know that the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany have offered to help Iran develop civil nuclear power, if it complies with the Security Council's demand -- a very reasonable demand -- to suspend enrichment.….

The international community has good reason to be concerned about Iran's activities to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability. The present Iranian regime, armed with nuclear weapons, would pose a greater potential danger to the region and to the world. The Iranian government has been a destabilizing force in the broader Middle East and beyond. Contrary to its statements, Iran has been funding and supporting terrorists and militants for operations in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Iraq and Afghanistan. Their lethal assistance has harmed countless innocent civilians. The president of Iran has made many reprehensible statements -- embracing the objective of destroying a member state of the United Nations.

Because of all these factors, the international community cannot allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons. If Iran continues down its current path, it would likely fuel proliferation activities in the region, which, in turn, could cause the demise of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime itself.

The U.S. remains committed to a diplomatic solution. If Iran shares this commitment, it will suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities and let diplomacy succeed. We call on Iran to engage in constructive negotiations over the future of its nuclear program. Such negotiations, if successful, would have profound benefits for Iran and the Iranian people.

The message from the U.S. to the people of Iran is that America respects you and your great country. We want Iran to be a full partner in the international community. And as President Bush has said, if Iran respects its international obligations, it will have no better friend than the United States of America.

(Zalmay Khalilzad is U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.)

IRAN'S FEAR - IRAQ'S CHANCE
Amir Taheri
New York Post, March 11, 2008

“I have lost hope of liberating Iraq and turning it into an Is lamic society." So said Muqtada al-Sadr in an open letter to his followers published last week. The young Shiite mullah once claimed he would lead Iraq "back to true Islam," but he has been in Iran for at least the last six months. He had been expected to announce an end to the cease-fire observed by his Mahdi Army since 2007. Instead, he voiced a litany of woes that ended with an implicit pledge not to reactivate his death squads.… The 32-year-old ex-militia leader ended his letter by announcing that he is withdrawing from public life to pursue clerical studies "in accordance with the will and testament of my late father," Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr.

Muqtada now lives in Tehran but spends part of each week in the Iranian "holy" city of Qom, where he's taking a crash course in Shiite theology under the guidance of Ayatollah Nasser Makarem-Shirazi, a pro-government mullah with extensive business interests. Iranian sources say Tehran has decided to transform Muqtada into a genuine mullah who could be presented as a religious leader for Iraq in the next five to 10 years.

The real reason for Tehran's decision to withdraw Muqtada from active politics, however, may lie elsewhere. In recent months, Tehran policymakers have begun to understand a crucial fact about Iraq: Any weakening of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government now could persuade the United States to throw its support behind an alternative, anti-Iranian coalition of Arab Sunnis, Kurds and secular Shiites openly hostile to Iran.

Thus, Tehran and Washington have a joint interest in keeping al-Maliki's coalition in power—at least until next year's Iraqi general election. A worsening of Iraq's situation would increase the pressure on the next US president to start disengaging from what many Americans already see as a dicey adventure. And a US departure would produce a gap that only other outside powers would be able to fill.

The conventional wisdom in many places is that the key outside power likely to fill that gap is Iran. Iran does wield immense influence in Iraq, yet it's in no position to dictate Iraq's future political course. Even the Iraqi Shiite factions who look to Iran as the ultimate guarantor of their safety don't wish to see Iran as the dominant influence in Baghdad.

An early US withdrawal could lead to the disintegration of the Shiite-Kurdish coalition that is at least not hostile to Iran. As President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's disastrous visit to Iraq this month showed, a good segment of Iraqi opinion regards the Islamic Republic as a troublemaker if not an outright enemy.

So we have a paradoxical situation in which the Islamic Republic actually fears that a precipitous US departure from Iraq could enable anti-Iran elements to come to power with the help of Arab Sunni states and Turkey. Thus, the decision to leash Muqtada is part of a broader Iranian scheme to buy time. In the meantime, Tehran wants the Americans to keep on bleeding but not so profusely that the next president disengages from Iraq.

Tehran is also developing its ties with anti-US Sunni groups, especially by supplying them with sophisticated explosive devices. The idea is that, at some point, Tehran would be able to put together a coalition in Iraq transcending the Sunni-Shiite cleavage in the name of a common struggle against the American "Great Satan."

While Washington decision-makers are forced to think short-term, from one election to another, Tehran's powers take a longer-term view. In the case of Iraq, they are thinking for the next decade or so, just as they did in the case of Lebanon and, later, the Palestinian territories.

The Iraqi government and its coalition allies shouldn't stand idly by and watch the Islamic Republic impose its strategy on Iraq. Maliki should acknowledge the importance of the constituency that once backed Muqtada. (In the last general election, it won 11-plus percent of the votes.) With Muqtada deciding to go to school, millions of poor Shiites, especially in Baghdad's slums, are left leaderless and vulnerable to the siren song of criminal gangs. Maliki could build a bridge to them by offering them jobs, better health care and, above all, security against racketeers and other criminals.

Numerous former Muqtada associates are prepared to work with the government locally and nationally. But many are shut out of power circles because of old rivalries with the largest Shiite political faction, led by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, a mid-ranking mullah with a history of family feuds with Muqtada al-Sadr. …

Muqtada shattered Shiite unity when, encouraged by Tehran, he rose in revolt against the elected government in Baghdad. With him out of the picture, no one knows how long the opportunity to rebuild that unity will last. The re-inclusion of Muqtada's followers in the political process will make it easier for Maliki to hold long-overdue local and municipal elections sooner rather than later. These elections are necessary to allow the new leadership groups that have emerged at the grass-roots level all over Iraq to find their proper place within the decision-making process.

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FATAH, HAMAS & THE PALESTINIANS

PALESTINIAN POLITICS: ONWARD AND DOWNWARD
Barry Rubin
Jerusalem Post, March 23, 2008

A recent Washington Post column entitled "Let's Help the Good Guys in the West Bank," provided what it thought of as good news: "Fortunately, there is a smart and honest leader of these forces: Salam Fayad, an apolitical economist (with a doctorate from the University of Texas) who is prime minister of the Palestinian Authority." The tip-off is the word "apolitical," which in this case means: completely lacking any political base or armed support and thus totally ineffectual.

Unfortunately, Fayad is not Palestinian politics' future. Those who really control Fatah, shape Palestinian public opinion and carry guns are not impressed by Fayad's diploma.

For many in the West, moderation is like gravity: It is impossible to reject. Yet that's precisely what Palestinian politics do. Three factors fuel this trend. First, Fatah and the PA continue to be corrupt, incompetent and incapable of self-reform.

Second, given the cult of violence and total victory dominating Palestinian political culture, Hamas is inevitably seen as heroic because it fights and rejects compromise. Based on underestimating Israel (always seen on the verge of collapse) and overestimating its own forces (heroic martyrs aided by history and deity), it expects to win. Compromise is treason; moderation is cowardice. This is the daily fare of Palestinian ideology and politics, purveyed by leaders, clerics, media and schools.

Abbas tells his people and others that, as he said recently to an Islamic summit, Palestinians "are facing a campaign of annihilation" by Israel. The US State Department merely calls this "overheated political rhetoric," not comprehending that such talk by Abbas incites terrorism and forecloses his own options….

Third, due to its own weakness and the strong political culture it never challenges, the current leadership cannot make peace. It knows, contrary to Western claims, that negotiating a political solution would destroy it, and acts accordingly.

Even so, Fatah is undergoing a radicalization process which may not displace Abbas, but will install his successor. Public opinion is also more extreme, with support for terrorism zooming upward. Fatah both heeds and feeds the trend. Ahmad Dahbour, a former high-ranking PA Culture Ministry official, now top writer for the official PA newspaper, explains: "The treacherous Zionist enemy will never permit us to lessen our revenge towards him or stray from our confrontation against him, until he is wiped off this land, which is saturated with the blood of the martyrs."

What is significant is not the language's bloodthirstiness, but its open use by someone at the heart of "moderate" institutions. Both Fatah's Aksa Martyrs Brigades and the PA newspaper defined the killer of eight Jewish students in Jerusalem as one of those heroic martyrs.

We are now seeing the birth of a new Fatah all right, but not the one heralded by such people as former British prime minister Tony Blair or Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. It is rather an even more extremist version, coming from those who wield guns, not pens, namely the Aksa Brigades. Contrary to much reportage, this is not an "offshoot" but an essential part of Fatah. Its leader, Marwan Barghouti, would be Fatah and PA head within two years if he were not in an Israeli prison for past terrorist activities. …

One reason why many Westerners misunderstand the conflict and countries adopt ridiculously irrelevant policies is ignorance of how extremism is attractive in its own right. After all, Westerners reason, if people are all alike and universally pragmatic, Palestinians must want to end the conflict and get an independent state through negotiation and compromise. Why go on suffering? No "rational" person would act that way.... Whenever Palestinian leaders reject peace it must be because they were not offered enough. Westerners think Fatah and the PA merely need to raise Palestinian living standards and get a state to show their people that Hamas is a failure and the PA a success. Naturally, everyone prefers success.

Well, it depends on how you measure success. As horrible as it sounds, in Palestinian politics success is still measured by the number of Israelis killed and by who never gives up the chance for total victory and Israel's disappearance some day. Sad, regrettable, but also true….

Given the strategic realities, Israel must deal with the PA and try to keep Fatah in power on the West Bank. But there should be no illusions. Solving the conflict won't happen. Putting it atop Western governments' agenda, blaming Israel for Palestinian intransigence and romanticizing Fatah and the PA is a big mistake.

IRAQ, THE PALESTINIANS AND POLITICAL DEBATE
Caroline Glick
Jerusalem Post, March 20, 2008

…As Bush acknowledged this week in his address marking the fifth anniversary of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the decision to change the US strategy in Iraq was borne of desperation. By the end of 2006, with the Democratic victory in the Congressional elections, it was simply no longer possible to hide the fact that the US was surrendering the country to the jihadists….

Gen. David Petreaus, who commands coalition forces in Iraq, has frequently warned that military success in Iraq is not a long-term strategy for stabilizing the country. While inarguable, the fact is that without military success, which to date has enabled some 62% of Iraqis to say that they regard their security situation as good, there would be no way for Iraq to become politically stabilized. The fact that today the Iraqi people are feeling optimistic about the future of their country is a consequence of the US's new surge strategy….

The positive trends being seen today in Iraq are made all the more apparent when they are viewed against the situation in the Palestinian Authority.

Whereas Iraqi support for attacks against US forces has been declining steadily for the past year, in the PA, support for attacks against Israelis is at an all-time high. So too, while Shi'ite support for Shi'ite militias has dropped from 36% last spring to 22% today and support among Sunnis for the anti-al-Qaida "Awakening Groups" stands at 73%, support for terrorists among the Palestinians is steadily increasing: 84% of Palestinians support this month's massacre of yeshiva students in Jerusalem; 64% of Palestinians support the missile campaign against southern Israel.

In Iraq, the presidency council was forced by the US to accept the provincial election law to stabilize the country. The law is the result of a grassroots initiative of the Iraqis themselves. In contrast, in Palestinian society, leaders jockey for public support by increasing their radicalism. Fatah leader and PA President Mahmoud Abbas is today attempting to gain public support by adopting policies that are openly hostile to Israel and are based on a rejection of peaceful coexistence between Israel and a future Palestinian state.

This week the Jerusalem Post reported that Abbas has approved a plan to call for so-called Palestinian refugees to besiege Israel's borders with Lebanon, Gaza, Syria and Jordan on Israel's 60th Independence Day in May. The plan also calls for Americans, Europeans and Canadians of Palestinian descent to converge on Israel by air and sea that day in an attempt to force Israel to accept millions of foreign-born Arabs into the country.

This plan makes clear that as far as endgames are concerned, Abbas envisions a future without Israel that bears little distinction from Hamas's strategic aim of destroying the Jewish state. Not surprisingly, then, Abbas and his associates in Fatah are intensifying their efforts to reinstate a Fatah-Hamas government throughout Judea, Samaria and Gaza ahead of the Arab League summit in Syria scheduled for March 29.

In the midst of all of this, the Democratic-controlled US Congress approved a Bush administration request to transfer $150 million to the PA's treasury. This move was a reflection of the bipartisan support enjoyed by the Bush administration's efforts to oversee negotiations between the Olmert-Livni-Barak government and Abbas towards the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria, Gaza and Jerusalem by the end of the year.

The root of the great disparity between Bush's willingness to gamble on the surge to prevent failure in Iraq and his unwillingness to change course on his policy towards the Palestinians when it is clear that his strategy of establishing a Palestinian state is only strengthening jihadists is found in the absence of public debate in Washington on the feasibility of the US Palestinian strategy. The fact is that for the past 15 years, since the US first embraced the PLO as a peace partner for Israel, there has been no significant political debate in the US regarding the reasonableness of the strategy of appeasing the Palestinians by pressuring Israel not to defend itself from attack and empowering the Palestinians with financial assistance and military training. And, of course, the same is true in Israel….

One could say that the tentative progress of democracy in Iraq is the consequence of an engaged, democratic debate in America that forced people to make decisions and forced the administration to contend with reality. It is similarly due to the absence of such a debate about the failure of the US's attempts to appease the Palestinians that forces of terror and tyranny are on the rise in Ramallah and Gaza as Israel debates mindlessly about whether residents of the South will just have to live with daily missile attacks in their living rooms and kindergartens and massacres in their schools, or whether something lasting might be done about it.

EDUCATION FOR WAR…
Arlene Kushner
Israel Resource News Agency Newsletter, February 22, 2008

The American Jewish Committee, in cooperation with The Institute for Monitoring the Impact of Peace and Tolerance in School Education (formerly known as CMIP), will soon release a cutting edge report on Palestinian Authority textbooks most recently published.… In interview, Dr. Arnon Groiss, Director of Research for the Institute, has provided an advance view of the material that will be offered in the report, as well as an over-view of the Institute’s findings regarding all of the textbooks previously reviewed.…

[I]n 2000, the Palestinian Authority began to produce new textbooks for all subjects. From 2000 through 2004, books for grades 1 through 10 were published, two grades each year. They were reviewed in a series of reports issued by CMIP. … The textbooks were published and revised by the PA during four different political time periods:

1) In the early years of the PA, Yasser Arafat was firmly in charge. It was under his administration that the books for grades 1 through 10 were published. They rigidly delegitimized the presence of Jews in Israel; demonized Israelis and Jews; presented a biased view of the conflict; and focused on the violent struggle, emphasizing jihad and martyrdom, with an absence of advocacy of peace with Israel.

2) In November 2004, following Arafat’s death, Mahmoud Abbas assumed the presidency of the PA. It was following this change, in 2005 and early 2006, that texts for grades 11 were produced. These texts reflected a small measure of moderation over what had been produced previously, with regard to how the “other” is presented and the issue of peace. It must be remembered, however, that this is with reference only to texts for one grade and that the texts produced in Arafat’s time continue to be in circulation.

3) In 2006, Hamas gained ascendancy in parliamentary elections in the PA, and it was following this that the grade 12 texts were published. All the beginning signs of moderation disappeared from these texts.

4) In 2007, Hamas routed Fatah from Gaza and President Abbas then reconstituted the PA government with Salam Fayyad as prime minister. It was after this that the reprint operation took place. The changes that have been noted are mostly in format and not in content. There have been some minute changes with significance.

Themes Noted in the Texts
Delegitimization. Palestinians are represented as the only rightful possessors of Palestine. They are seen as descendants of the Canaanites, who are said to be Arabs who immigrated to Palestine in 3,500 BCE. A 2004 text describes the Canaanites as having made the most significant contributions to mankind. …

We are witnessing a myth in the making. In older books used in the PA schools (from 1996), Jewish holy sites were referred to as such: the Kotel (Western Wall), the Machpelah (Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron), Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem. By 2000 this had changed in PA texts and the Jewish connection to these places had been erased. Rachel’s Tomb, for example, is called the Mosque of Bilal Bin Rabbah. …

Israel is not recognized as a sovereign state, either in text or on maps. An example: A 2001 text lists the countries of the Levant as Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. In maps – e.g., a 2002 Atlas – the whole is Palestine.… The establishment of Israel is not recognized. Israel is referred to as the occupation from 1948…. Cities within the Green Line such as Haifa and Jaffa are referred to as Palestinian.

Palestine is referred to as a country that already exists, its declaration of independence having taken place in 1988.

Demonization. There is no objective information provided on the history and culture of Jews or Israelis. The exception is a reference to the Jewish Bible in an 11th grade text. Individual Jews are never mentioned, only groups. Jews are thus denied their humanity and seen as threatening aliens.

Jews in Israel are represented as evil and without a single positive trait. Jews commit treaty violations, use tricks, kill people, are seeking to expel and exterminate Palestinians. From a grade 8 text: “Your enemies kill your children, split open women’s bellies, etc.” From a 12th grade text there is a poem in which Jews are compared to snakes.

A total of 22 “crimes” committed by Jews has been counted in the texts: destruction of the environment, occupation, expulsion, oppression, aggression, massacre, assassination, racial discrimination, desecration of holy places, promoters of drug use and family violence in Palestinians, and on.

Zionism is defined as a racist, western imperialism. A grade 10 text produced in 2004 represented the Protocols of the Elders of Zion as true. After the Belgian government, which had provided support for these texts, protested, a reprint of the book was done in 2007 that left this out. There is no evidence, however, that the version of the book that alluded to the Protocols was removed from all schools….

Violence. The focus in the texts is on violence. There is no open support for peace based on reconciliation. Where “peace” is mentioned, it is in the abstract. “Liberation” of all of the land of Palestine is encouraged and praised. “Return” is seen as a violent process, part of the liberation. The emphasis on the violence of the struggle is intensified because of focus on the traditional Islamic ideals of jihad and martyrdom. Martyrdom is sometimes described as a “wedding party.”

From a grade 7 text: “Hearing weapons clash is pleasant to my ears. And the flow of blood gladdens my soul.”…

[T]here is an abundance of implicit support for terrorism via the use of terms such as “martyrs,” praise for those in prison and those in Palestinian armed groups (called Fidai). And never is terror actually denounced.

These texts nurture hate education and do not foster peace. They prepare the students for perpetual struggle.…

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IRAQ: FIVE YEARS ON

NO SURRENDER
Fouad Ajami
Wall Street Journal, March 19, 2008

"I am the same man and do not alter, it is you who change, since in fact you took my advice while unhurt, and waited for misfortune to repent of it . . . But you must not be seduced by citizens like these nor be angry with me -- who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves." —Pericles's funeral oration, The Peloponnesian War by Thucydides.

Wars have never been easy to defend. Even in "heroic" cultures, men and women applauded wars then grew weary of them. This Iraq war, too, was once a popular war. It was authorized and launched in the shadow of 9/11. During the five long years that America has been on the ground in Iraq, the war was increasingly forced to stand alone.

At a perilous moment in early 2007, when the project was in the wind and reeling, the leader who launched this war doubled down and bought time. The polls—and this might be the war most endlessly measured by pollsters—tell us that two out of every five Americans are now willing to stick with this endeavor.

The tipping point came with "the surge." The new policy was marked by stoicism and an acceptance of the burdens of this war. For once, there was no promise of easy success. "Victory will not look like the ones our fathers and grandfathers achieved," President George W. Bush said when he announced the new policy some 14 months ago. "There will be no surrender ceremony on the deck of a battleship."

In Iraq, America was surrounded by enemies who were sure from the start that the great foreign power was destined to fail. They could not be given the satisfaction of a hasty American retreat. The stakes had grown: We were under the gaze of populations with a keen eye for the weakness of strangers. It was apt and proper that the leader who launched this war did not give up on it.

Speaking in Nashville, Tenn., to the convention of National Religious Broadcasters on March 11, President Bush defended, yet again, the war in Iraq: "The decision to remove Saddam Hussein was the right decision early in my presidency; it is the right decision at this point in my presidency; and it will forever be the right decision."

Mr. Bush made freedom in Arab-Islamic lands his cause. He rejected laments that Arabs do not possess a freedom gene, and that they are fated to tyranny. "The liberty we value is not ours alone," he told this Nashville convention. "Freedom is not America's gift to the world; it is God's gift to all humanity."

This has been Mr. Bush's wager ever since the hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq ran aground, and the war and its sacrifices had to be defended and fortified. Grant Mr. Bush his due: He upheld his belief that liberty can stick on Iraqi and Arab soil, in the face of great doubts and misgivings….

For our part, we did not always fight this war most wisely and skillfully. It took us a while to get the right commanders and envoys on the scene. We did not have the linguists we needed, for the 1990s had not prepared us for wars of ideology and culture. Even the bureaucracy itself—the State Department, CIA—was full of people who doubted the wisdom of this war and second-guessed it at every turn. Some of the very people dispatched to Baghdad were no friends of this project….

In those five years, the scaffolding of the war came under steady assault. People said that there was no connection between al Qaeda and Saddam, that no "smoking gun" had been discovered, and that the invasion of Iraq had turned that country into a breeding ground of jihadists. But those looking for that smoking gun did not understand that the distinction between secular and religious terror in that Arab landscape was a distinction without a difference. The impulse that took America from Kabul to Baghdad was a correct one. Radical Arabs attacked America on 9/11, and a war of deterrence had to be waged against Arab radicalism.

Baghdad was the proper return address, as a notice was served on the purveyors of terror that a price would be paid by those who aid and abet it. It was Saddam Hussein's choice—and fate—that he would not duck and stay out of harm's way in the aftermath of 9/11. We have not fully repaired the ways of the radicals in the intervening years. But the spectacle of the dictator's defeat, and the sight of him being sent to the gallows, have worked wonders on the temper of the Arab street.

So we did not turn Baghdad into a democratic city on a hill, and we learned that the dismantling of Sunni tyranny would leave the Arab world's Shiite stepchildren with primacy in Iraq. A better country has nonetheless risen, midwifed by this American war. It is not a flawless democracy. But compare it to the prison it was under Saddam, the tyranny next door in Damascus and the norms of the region, and we can have a measure of pride in what America has brought forth in Baghdad….

There has been design and skill in recent American endeavors. The Sunnis had all, but wrecked their chances in the new order. The American strategy in the year behind us worked to cushion the Sunni defeat. The U.S. now sustains a large force of "volunteers," the Sons of Iraq, drawn mainly from the Sunni community. This has not met with the approval of the Shiite-led government, but the attempt to create a balance between the two communities has been both deliberate and wise.

In the same vein, American power has given the Kurds protection and a historic chance in a neighborhood that had hitherto snuffed out all their dreams. But a message, too, has been sent to the Kurds. The condition of this protection is a politics of sobriety and a commitment to the federalism of Iraq. We have not re-invented that old, burdened country, but this war is the first chance Iraqis have had to emerge from a history of plunder and despotism.

In the past five years, the passion has drained out of the war's defenders and critics alike. Our soldiers and envoys are there, but the public at home has moved onto other concerns. Still, the public is willing to grant this expedition time, and that's for the good. There is no taste in this country for imperial burdens and acquisitions in distant lands. But Americans also know that the lands and sea lanes of the Persian Gulf are too vital to be left to mayhem and petty tyrants.

(Fouad Ajami, a Bradley Prize recipient, teaches at the School of Advanced International Studies
at Johns Hopkins University.)

IRAQ PLUS FIVE: WHAT WENT RIGHT
Amir Taheri
New York Post, March 21, 2008

Judging by the way much of the Western media is dealing with the Iraq War's fifth anniversary, we're still fighting the acrimonious debates of 2002 and early 2003. Focusing on the past, however, may prevent us from understanding what's happening in Iraq today and its effect on the broader region. The war had three objectives:

-To dismantle the regime of terror created by Saddam Hussein and his Tikriti clan.

-To restore to the Iraqi people the power that the Tikritis had usurped.

-To help Iraqis build a new system that might, in time, become a model for other Muslim countries.

The first two objectives have been achieved. The Tikritis are gone. Iraqis have regained their usurped power and exercised it in two general election