A
CIVIL WAR IRAQ CAN’T WIN
Anthony H. Cordesman
New York Times, March 30, 2008
EVEN
if American and Iraqi forces are able to eliminate Al Qaeda in
Iraq, there are still three worrisome possibilities of new forms
of fighting that could divide Iraq and deny the United States
any form of “victory.”
One is that the Sunni tribes
and militias that have been cooperating with the Americans could
turn against the central government. The second is that the struggle
among Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen and other ethnic groups to control
territory in the north could lead to fighting in Kirkuk, Mosul
or other areas.
The third risk —
and one that is now all too real — is that the political
struggle between the dominant Shiite parties could become an armed
conflict.
Fighting is now occurring
in southern Iraq and parts of Baghdad between the Mahdi Army,
which is under the control of the populist cleric Moktada al-Sadr,
and a coalition of forces led by Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s
Dawa Party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, a powerful
party led by a Maliki ally, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. This latter coalition
has de facto control of much of the Iraqi security forces, and
Mr. Hakim’s group has its own militia, called the Badr Organization.
Much of the reporting on
this fighting in Basra and Baghdad — which was initiated
by the Iraqi government — assumes that Mr. Sadr and his
militia are the bad guys who are out to spoil the peace, and that
the government forces are the legitimate side trying to bring
order. This is a dangerous oversimplification, and one that the
United States needs to be far more careful about endorsing.
There is no question that
many elements of the Mahdi Army have been guilty of sectarian
cleansing, that the Sadr movement is hostile to the United States,
that some of its extremists have continued acts of violence in
spite of the cease-fire Mr. Sadr declared last summer, and that
some of these rogue elements have ties to Iran. No one should
romanticize the Sadr movement, understate the risks it presents
or ignore the violent radicals in the Mahdi Army.
But it is equally important
not to romanticize Mr. Maliki, the Dawa Party or the Islamic Supreme
Council. The current fighting, which the government portrays as
a crackdown on criminality, is better seen as a power grab, an
effort by Mr. Maliki and the most powerful Shiite political parties
to establish their authority over Basra and the parts of Baghdad
that have eluded their grasp.
Moreover, Mr. Maliki’s
gamble has already dragged American forces part-way into the fight,
including airstrikes in Basra. Striking at violent, rogue elements
in the Mahdi Army is one thing, but engaging the entire Sadr movement
is quite another. The official cease-fire that has kept the mainstream
Mahdi Army from engaging government and United States forces may
well be rescinded if the government’s assault continues.
This looming power struggle
was all too clear when I was in Iraq last month. The Supreme Council
was the power behind the Shiite governorates in the south and
was steadily expanding its influence over the Iraqi police. It
was clearly positioning itself to counter Mr. Sadr’s popular
support and preparing for the provincial elections scheduled for
Oct. 1.
American military and civilian
officials were candid in telling me that the governors and other
local officials installed by the central government in Basra and
elsewhere in southern Iraq had no popular base. If open local
and provincial elections were held, they said, Dawa and the Islamic
Supreme Council were likely to be routed because they were seen
as having failed to bring development and government services.
There was no real debate
over how bad the overall governance of the south was at the provincial
level, how little money the region was getting from Baghdad, and
how poor government-related services were, even in Shiite areas.
Incompetence and corruption are not sectarian. An ABC News poll
released this month showed that only two-thirds of the Shiite
population in Basra had a favorable opinion of the central government,
down from three-quarters last summer, and that only 14 percent
of all residents felt they could move about safely.
The American officials
I met with differed in their views of the size of Mr. Sadr’s
populist base around Basra, but most felt that Mr. Sadr still
had a broad base of support in Baghdad — something indicated
by the huge rallies on his behalf in the capital last week.
As I traveled through southern
Iraq, many people I spoke to were worried about how the October
elections would play out. The first problem is that there are
no real indigenous political parties operating with local leaders.
The second is the framework, which is still undecided. If the
election follows the model of the 2005 vote, Iraqis will vote
for long lists of candidates from the main parties (confronting
many unfamiliar names) and there will be no allowance for the
direct election of members of the Parliament who would represent
a given area or district. Optimists hope that local leaders and
parties will emerge before the election; realists foresee an uncertain
mess.
There were also differences
of opinion over Mr. Sadr’s cease-fire. Was he simply waiting
out the American-Iraqi effort to defeat Al Qaeda before allowing
his army to become active again? Or was he repositioning himself
for a more normal political life? Most likely, he is doing both.
He may be as confused by the uncertain nature of Iraqi politics
as everyone else, and he may be dealing with a movement so fractured
and diverse that effective control is nearly impossible.
In any event, it is clear
that Basra has become a special case. Since the American-led invasion,
it had been under the protection of the British, who opted for
a strategy of not-so-benign neglect. Thus the power struggle in
the city — Iraq’s main port — differs sharply
from that in the other Shiite areas. Basra was essentially divided
up among Shiite party mafias, each of which had its own form of
extortion and corruption. They sometimes fight and feud, and there
are reasons to call them criminal gangs, but they have established
crude modus vivendi.
Basra also feels the influence
of Iran far more than the other Shiite governorates. Iran’s
religious paramilitary force, Al Quds, has been an equal-opportunity
supplier of weapons and money to all the Shiite militias, effectively
ensuring that it will support the winner, regardless of who the
winner turns out to be.
There are good reasons
for the central government to reassert control of Basra. It is
not peaceful. It is the key to Iraq’s oil exports. Gang
rule is no substitute for legitimate government. But given the
timing and tactics, it is far from clear that this offensive is
meant to serve the nation’s interest as opposed to those
of the Islamic Supreme Council and Dawa.
How will it affect America?
If the fighting sets off a broad, lasting, violent power struggle
between Shiite factions, most of the security gains of the last
year could be lost and our military role broadened. There is also
no guarantee that a victory by Dawa and the Islamic Supreme Council
will serve the cause of political accommodation or lead to fair
elections and the creation of legitimate local and provincial
governments. Such an outcome, in fact, might favor a Dawa and
Islamic Supreme Council “Iraqracy,” not democracy.
(Anthony H. Cordesman is
a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.)
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