AFGHAN END GAME – CAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TRUMP INTERNAL TRIBAL DIVISIONS & INDIAN/PAKISTANI/U.S. RIVALRIES?

TWO DIVERGING ROADS FOR AFGHANISTAN

Thomas Barfield

Real Clear World, Jan. 14, 2013

As the 2014 date for the withdrawal of most foreign troops from Afghanistan approaches, the country faces two starkly different futures. One is a return to the civil war conditions of the 1990s that brought disaster and disunity. In this scenario Afghanistan is abandoned by the international community before falling prey to the machinations of neighbours who bankroll conflict between rival ethnic groups, potentially bringing about the country's dissolution as a unitary state. The other is the emergence of a stable, prosperous Afghanistan bankrolled by these same neighbours. In this scenario economic self-interests trump old parochial politics.

But how can two such divergent paths proceed from the same Afghan starting point? The neighbours and rivalries are the same, with the Afghans politically fractured and the West marginalized in both cases. The direction depends on whether Afghanistan breaks its longstanding lack of economic integration with the outside world. Growing Asian economies could make life-transforming investments in Afghanistan, restoring its old role as an overland trade entrepôt and ensuring a new role as mineral treasure house. Instability and violence could derail this process, and the short-term thinking of Afghanistan's current political class presents an almost greater challenge.

The pessimistic path has been well trodden over Afghanistan's past 35 years. Over the past century and a half a series of Afghan rulers cultivated economic isolationism and religious xenophobia as a protective survival response to successive "Great Game" rivalries over their country. Indeed, Afghanistan had the almost unique misfortune of attracting new geopolitical conflict whenever a previous one subsided. In the 19th century British India and Czarist Russia both preserved and clashed over Afghanistan as a buffer state between their respective colonial empires. In the 20th century Afghanistan became a proxy battleground in the Cold War. And Afghanistan opened the 21st century under Taliban rule, hosting Osama bin Laden who organized a terrorist attack on the United States. The culmination of each of these geopolitical rivalries was one or more foreign invasions, foreign occupations and foreign withdrawals, of which the 2014 departure will be the fourth for Afghanistan since 1841.

Many analysts assume disorder will ensue with the American withdrawal and predict quick victory for the Taliban over a weak Karzai government in Kabul. Afghan history suggests otherwise. Insurgents do have a splendid track record in getting foreign armies to leave Afghanistan, but tend to struggle in displacing a Kabul government that retains the patronage of a Great Power. Insurgents' unity against foreigners breaks down when the conflict is only among Afghans. Supporters of Kabul governments also historically replace their feckless, passive rulers with more active ones. Afghan rulers installed by an invading foreign army fail, but those installed by a withdrawing foreign army succeeded. Only in the absence of any Great Power partnership did Afghanistan fall into anarchy, such as the decade-long civil war in the 1990s that brought the Taliban to power. Such devolution into civil war rather than Taliban victory is the more likely scenario if Afghanistan falls into political violence.

It could take a number of forms. Nuclear-armed Pakistan and India could bring their rivalry into Afghanistan to fight a proxy war with Pakistan supporting the Taliban and India backing the Kabul government. Or, Afghanistan regions could revive their militias and turn a two-party war into a free-for-all. Or the Central Asian states, Russia, India and Iran could back a two-state solution that splits the non-Pashtun north, west and center from the Pashtun south and east, leaving Pakistan with a supersized Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

The positive path harks back to long ago when Afghanistan was the prosperous hub of an international overland Eurasian trade network linking China with South Asia and the Middle East. Today's model would have China and India making massive investments in rail systems and processing plants to extract Afghanistan's mineral deposits. Pakistan and India would support construction of pipelines and pylons through Afghan territory to import natural gas from Turkmenistan and hydroelectricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Landlocked Central Asian states would transit Afghan roads and new rail lines to reach ocean ports of Iran or Pakistan.

Few in the West give this possibility much credence, but they have not been following the moves of Afghanistan's neighbours. With the exception of Pakistan, all have already committed large investments and infrastructure that integrate Afghanistan into their economies, motivated not by charity but pursuit of profits and resources.

The list of projects is impressive. In 2008 India completed construction of a 220-kilometer road connecting the Iranian port Chahbahar with Afghanistan's Nimroz Province. As part of a larger billion-dollar-plus Indian-financed transportation network within Afghanistan, the new road ended Pakistan's former monopoly on seaborne transit trade to landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asia. India has also taken a large role in constructing $500 million project financed by the Asian Development Bank to build a 1300-megawatt, high-voltage transmission power line through Afghanistan, across the Khyber Pass into Pakistan.

Despite its suspicion of India, Pakistan is poised to be the greatest beneficiary of a new Central Asia/South Asia Regional Electricity Market. In 2008 China signed a $3 billion mining agreement for a 30-year lease on the rich Aynak copper deposit south of Kabul with an estimated value of $88 billion. China has already begun preliminary site development and announced plans to finance and construct a rail line north to its western province of Xinjiang through the Hindu Kush Mountains. Other mining projects include an Indian-financed agreement to mine 1.8 billion tons of iron ore from the Hajigak deposit west of Kabul, a $14 billion investment that also includes a steel-mill complex and transport links.

Even the long stalled Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Natural Gas Pipeline (TAPI) no longer seems like a pipe dream. Designed to carry up to 33 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, the 1,800-kilometer long pipeline, at a cost of $7.6 billion, would make Afghanistan the primary export corridor for Turkmenistan's enormous surplus of natural gas desperately in demand by energy-poor South Asia.

By way of comparison, the United States has funded $1.6 billion in infrastructure projects since 2006. Significantly, the many projects span multiple economic sectors and Asia's largest emerging economic powers play key roles. The projects do not demand Western financing, nor do all need to succeed for Afghanistan to prosper. As each comes online the risk/reward calculation of making trouble in Afghanistan changes. Pakistan might think twice about supporting attacks in Kabul if the Afghans can turn off the lights in Islamabad. China is unlikely to sit idly by if its investments and engineers are attacked by insurgents. As Afghanistan's neighbors become more dependent on transportation, minerals and energy flows within a common regional market, preserving Afghanistan's peace and stability moves from the realm of goodwill into the matrix of self-interest. For those that think any stability is impossible to achieve in Afghanistan, a similar growing economic interdependence in Western Europe after 1945 proved more successful in preserving peace than any set of political treaties.

The Afghan government plays only a passive role in these developments. Other than balancing out its mineral contracts with both India and China, it has displayed no strategic vision. If Afghanistan wishes to become another Dubai rather than another Somalia, it needs imaginative leaders who offer an economic vision that offers hope to people who have already suffered too much.

Thomas Barfield's is director of Boston University's Institute for the Study of Muslim Societies & Civilization and currently serves as president of the American Institute for Afghanistan Studies.

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PAKISTAN'S TERRITORIAL DISUNITY
STIRS GHOSTS OF A VIOLENT PAST

Sajjad Ashraf

The National (UAE), Nov. 11, 2012

More than 30 years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself sucked into a quagmire from which it is hard to extract itself. Its governance structures, never strong points, are broken. Pakistan is now radicalised to a point where even the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, accuses it of exporting terrorism. Located on historic invasion routes to India, the lands that now constitute Pakistan have had their fair share of border changes. In the process, many kingdoms, sultanates and states have been formed and disintegrated. Perceived discrimination was the basis of independence movements that created Pakistan, and later Bangladesh. And today, three different territorial issues have the potential of seriously altering the current boundaries of the state.

Balochistan, Pakistan's largest province by area, constituting nearly 42 per cent of the country and home to much of its natural resources, is into its fifth military confrontation with the federation since its controversial accession in 1948. Balochis have continued to resent the exploitation of their resources, with little compensation. The current troubles began in 2002, when the army moved in to set up cantonments in Kohlu and Sui districts, which are located in the middle of the country.

The callous killing of the Oxford educated tribal leader, Nawab Akbar Bugti, in 2006, has led the Baloch nationalists and the military into a war of attrition. Thousands of Baloch young men have allegedly disappeared in the process. Many tortured and mutilated bodies have since been found…The [Pakistan] Supreme Court  has ruled that the Balochistan government has constitutionally failed. The military's statement supporting a political solution to Balochistan provided it is "within the constitution" sounds hollow. Yet proposed energy pipelines, critical to the economic growth of Pakistan and Gwadar port's success, depend upon peace in Balochistan.

The second territorial hot spot is Sindh, the only province that voted for a Muslim League-majority government before the partition of India. People in Sindh have not forgiven the Punjab-led army for Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's killing, in 1979 (the Bhutto family traces its ancestral roots to Sindh). To destroy Bhutto charisma, especially in urban Sindh, General Zia Al Haq sponsored the Muhajir Qaumi Movement-MQM (meaning refugee – the descendants of migrants from India, and later renamed Muttahida Qaumi Movement), arguably the first ethnic party in Pakistan. The Karachi-centred MQM has been unable to garner any support in other provinces.

Pashtuns, about 25 per cent of the 20 million people in Karachi, now demand more political space. With MQM unable to augment their numbers, every round of trouble is deadlier than the previous one. To secure a governing coalition, President Asif Ali Zardari, is taking the short-term route of placating the MQM, which is widely believed to harbour plans to divide Sindh. Knowing their value to President Zardari, the MQM demands and receives higher returns every time it threatens to walk out of the coalition. The recently promulgated Sindh local government law, negotiated secretly between Mr Zardari's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the MQM will solidify MQM's control of cities and thus access to huge funds. The Sindhi nationalists and others coalition partners have quit Sindh cabinet in protest. The MQM and the Pashtuns are arming themselves for a possible showdown. With time running against them, the MQM are in a hurry to secure political advantage.

The third territory in crisis is southern Punjab. Some months back the PPP, protesting against discrimination, called for the division of Punjab for "administrative" reasons into a Saraiki speaking southern Punjab province, and a northern Punjab. But the real reason is PPP's inability to break the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz's (PML-N, referring to former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif) stranglehold over Punjab for over a quarter of a century.

For obvious reasons, a call for the division of Punjab, which considers itself as the glue holding the country together, evokes sharp reaction. Dithering initially, the PML-N, mindful of the electoral cost of opposing the idea, demanded Punjab be divided into three parts instead of two. Political sparring has already begun for elections next year, leading to hardening of positions drawing similarities to East and West Pakistan fissures before 1970 elections.  The big issue is the reaction of the Punjab-based military. If trouble spills over to a point where a military solution is sought, a Bangladesh-like situation may arise, which will predictably be the "1971 moment", as some commentators fear. That year, of course, was when Bangladesh earned its independence.

Only a few things, like cold-blooded attacks on teenage girls, anti-Americanism or cricket, seems to unite Pakistanis now. Indeed, on the day Malala Yousafzai was attacked, 13 innocent women and children were killed in a US drone attack. While history will judge the US for its actions, Pakistan needs to shed its own ignorance, elect credible and honest leaders, establish the rule of law and look inward to secure its future.

Sajjad Ashraf is a former Pakistani foreign service officer and an adjunct professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore

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U.S. NEEDS SIGNIFICANT
MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

Ahmad Majidyar

CNN, Jan. 11, 2013

President Barack Obama will meet Afghan President Hamid Karzai today [jan 11] at the White House to assess the progress of the war and discuss America’s future role in Afghanistan. The two leaders are expected to talk about a wide range of issues, particularly concerning security transition to the Afghan lead, reconciliation with the Taliban, and Afghanistan’s presidential elections slated for April 2014. At the top of the meeting agenda, however, will be a discussion over the nature, scope and obligations of a residual U.S. military footprint in Afghanistan after the foreign combat mission there ends next year. Three key issues are likely to be contentious in the talks: legal immunity for U.S. soldiers, transfer of detention facilities to the Afghan government, and Kabul’s request for advanced military equipment.

The immunity issue, which derailed negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and Iraq in late 2011, will be the most sensitive one. A postwar U.S. military presence in Afghanistan is inconceivable unless American soldiers are granted protection from local prosecution. Nonetheless, while Karzai might use the question of immunity as leverage to extract concessions from the White House, the issue is unlikely to be a deal breaker this time. Kabul will be more flexible than Baghdad in negotiating a SOFA with Washington because, unlike oil-rich Iraq, Afghanistan’s economy is almost entirely dependent on foreign aid. Moreover, the Afghan government requires U.S. and NATO help to fund, train, and equip its 350,000 security personnel for many years beyond 2014.

Another sticking point could be Karzai’s demand for transfer of all detainees held by the U.S. military at a facility in Bagram Air Base near Kabul. The U.S. has already handed over more than 3,000 terrorism suspects to the Afghan government since the two sides signed an agreement last March, but Karzai has recently accused U.S. forces of breaching the accord by still keeping some prisoners under custody. Washington believes the Afghans are not yet ready to take over the control of all prisoners, especially ones believed to be too dangerous or affiliated with al Qaeda….

Leaked reports suggest the White House is considering cutting troop numbers by 20,000 to 30,000 this year and keeping as few as 2,500 troops in Afghanistan after 2014, despite requests by military commanders in the field to maintain most of the remaining 68,000 U.S. troops through the next two fighting seasons and a larger post-2014 presence. Ben Rhodes, White House deputy national security adviser, said Tuesday [Jan 8] that a complete pullout by the end of next year is also an option. But while a steep drawdown and keeping a small or no residual force may be politically expedient for the Obama administration, it is a recipe for failure in Afghanistan.

First, without a significant military presence after 2014, Washington risks undoing the gains of the past decade and allowing al Qaeda and the Taliban to reconstitute in parts of Afghanistan. Terrorist groups have already returned to some Afghan areas vacated by withdrawing foreign troops. Residents of eastern Nuristan Province, for example, say about 70 percent of the province is under the de facto rule of the Taliban and foreign militant groups, including al Qaeda and Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT). More remote areas could fall into terrorists’ control if U.S. forces leave precipitously.

Second, a hasty pullout undermines the training and strengthening of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Over the past three years, the ANSF has made remarkable progress in size and quality and is now responsible for security of 75 percent of Afghanistan’s population. But it still remains heavily reliant on the coalition for enablers, such as logistics, air power, medevac, reconnaissance, route-clear equipment and intelligence. A Pentagon study released last month rated only one of 23 Afghan Army brigades as independent. Without coalition’s help, the ANSF’s operational capabilities will decline dramatically. NATO and other allied nations would also not provide sufficient numbers of advisors and mentors for the ANSF if they perceive ambivalence from Washington.

Third, without a post-2014 military presence, the CIA-led drone strikes into Pakistan’s tribal regions will most likely cease. With Washington-Islamabad ties at their nadir, the U.S. drone campaign against al Qaeda and its affiliates in South and North Waziristan is now entirely dependent on bases in Afghanistan. The Navy Seal helicopters tasked with killing bin Laden flew from a base in eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad.

Fourth, a significant post-2014 military presence is needed to send a clear message to friends and enemies in the region that the United States and its allies are not abandoning Afghanistan. The Taliban will not have an incentive to enter meaningful peace talks if they see allied forces on the run. With the ANSF not yet ready to defend against a Taliban return, warlords and minority ethnic leaders would decide to take things on their own hands. Many local strongmen have already begun rearming their militias in preparation for a potential civil war.

The United States has two vital interests in the AfPak region: preventing al Qaeda and its affiliates from reconstituting in Afghanistan and ensuring that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons do not fall into terrorists’ hands. These two objectives cannot be guaranteed without a significant military presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014.

Ahmad Majidyar is a senior research associate at the American Enterprise Institute, focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan. The views expressed are the author’s own.

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