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Tunisia on the Brink: Michael J. Totten, World Affairs, July 29, 2013—Last week an assassin took out left-wing opposition leader Mohammed Brahmi with a 9mm pistol. Ballistics reports indicate the killer used the exact same weapon to murder another opposition leader, Chokri Belaid, last winter. And this week Al Qaeda-linked terrorists dug in on Mount Chambi killed at least eight Tunisian soldiers.
A Critical Time for Algeria: Emily Boulter, Real Clear World, July 17, 2013—Over a two-month period Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika vanished from the country's political scene. He was reported to have suffered a mild stroke and travelled to France in order to receive medical care.
The Monarchy Model: Shadi Hamid, Slate, July 1, 2011—The lesson Arab autocrats seemed to learn from Egypt and Tunisia was almost the exact opposite of what democracy advocates were hoping for. Instead of using less force, leaders across the region have been using more of it, reaching unusual levels of brutality.
Tunisia's Jews: The road to Djerba: The Economist, May 1, 2013—For centuries, the tiny Tunisian island of Djerba played host to thousands of Jews on an annual pilgrimage to the Ghriba synagogue in celebration of the Jewish holiday of Lag Ba'omer. Muslims, eager to share the festivities, joined in too.
The Arab Spring Was a Cry for Capitalism: Hernando de Soto, The Spectator, July 13, 2013
Tunisia's Dark Turn: Joshua Muravchik, Los Angeles Times, July 16, 2013
Is Morocco the Model for Arab Democracy?: Michael J. Totten, The Tower, Aug. 2013
Michael J. Totten
World Affairs, July 29, 2013
Last week an assassin took out left-wing opposition leader Mohammed Brahmi with a 9mm pistol. Ballistics reports indicate the killer used the exact same weapon to murder another opposition leader, Chokri Belaid, last winter. And this week Al Qaeda-linked terrorists dug in on Mount Chambi killed at least eight Tunisian soldiers.
Ennahda, the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, is taking the heat. While they aren’t being fingered as directly responsible, they’re being blamed all the same because they dominate the government and they’ve gone easy on the extremists this past year and have sometimes even colluded with them. Thousands of furious demonstrators converged on parliament this week, yelling, “the people want the fall of the assassins.” Police officers repelled them with tear gas. Prime Minister Ali Larayedh refuses to step down and is blasting the demonstrators as “anarchists.”
Unlike in Egypt, the Islamists won less than half the vote in the election. Tunisians are stuck with them anyway, though, because secularists split their votes among dozens of parties and the Islamists walked away with a plurality. And though they were forced into a coalition with liberal and secular parties, they still got to choose the prime minister.
Ennahda is described as “moderate” in almost every single article published by wire agency hacks, but the only reason it’s relatively moderate is because it’s forced to share power. Tunisia’s Islamists conceded to building a civil state instead of an Islamic state because they face massive resistance and they don’t have enough seats in the parliament to do anything else. Since the police and the army are loyal to the country and not the party, that’s that. If Ennahda had won a majority and had the strength to muscle everything through, we would be looking at a different Tunisia—an Egypt in the Maghreb.
But Tunisia is much more liberal, secular, prosperous, and politically developed than Egypt. Both countries have problems that look similar on the surface, but the difference between the two is enormous. Tunis looks and feels more like France than like Cairo. The northern part of the country, where most people live, is more culturally similar to Europe than anywhere else in the Arab world outside of Beirut, which is almost half Christian.
In Egypt’s parliamentary election in winter of 2011, the Salafists—the ideological brethren of Osama bin Laden—won a shocking 28 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, the Salafist party is still banned in Tunisia, even with Ennahda in the government. It’s a marginal movement that scares the hell out of just about everyone, not just on ideological grounds, but also because it’s responsible for a spree of violent incidents since the Ben Ali government fell, including setting fire to an American school and threatening to kill all the Jews.
Algerian Salafists killed tens thousands of people during the 1990s. Most Americans haven’t heard word one about that horror show, but Tunisians won’t forget it any time soon. Algeria is next door. The border between the two in the Tunisian Sahara is unmarked and wide open. The Salafist Movement for Preaching and Combat is still active on the Algerian side, and terrorists are trickling into the country. The Al Qaeda attack near Mount Chambi this week was the most lethal against Tunisian security officials in decades. I drove to the top of that mountain two years ago. It’s the tallest in the country and from the top you can see into Algeria. The entire south side is a national park, and it’s lovely. But today it’s a terrorist nest. You go there, you die.
Ennahda and the Salafists ostensibly hate each other, but they have things in common ideologically, and they have an on-again off-again modus vivendi that’s no longer a secret. Last year someone leaked a video showing Rached Ghannouchi, Ennahda’s leader, delivering a speech to Salafist youth leaders. He winked and nudged and not-so subtly suggested they were on the same side, and he got busted. “I tell our young Salafists to be patient,” he said. “Why hurry? Take your time to consolidate what you have gained.” That video set the country on fire. The average Tunisian should have known Ennahda was little more than the “good cop” next to the Salafist “bad cop,” but at least they know it now, and it’s one of the reasons Ennahda’s popularity has cratered….
Tunisia is mellow, even pacifist, compared with Algeria. The army is smaller than Egypt’s, and it is not—or at least it has not been—a political player. So I don’t expect a full-blown Algerian-style insurgency or an Egyptian-style military coup. Nor is a Tiananmen Square-style massacre in the cards. Tunisia is not a police state, and Ennahda admits it’s afraid of the army. But tensions are rising, the situation is volatile, the country is more dangerous now than even a week ago, and the region is always surprising. Keep an eye out because even the “moderate” Islamists empowered by the Arab Spring are back on their heels. They thought they owned the future, but they do not.
Emily Boulter
Real Clear World, July 17, 2013
Over a two-month period Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika vanished from the country's political scene. He was reported to have suffered a mild stroke and travelled to France in order to receive medical care. His absence sparked rumors that the 76-year-old president had either passed way or was in a coma. There were widespread calls among opposition parties that Article 88 of the constitution should be invoked. However on June 12, 2013 news footage appeared showing Bouteflika in the French hospital of Val-de-Grace discussing plans for the next cabinet meeting with Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal and Chief of Staff Ahmed Gaid Salah. On July 16, the president returned home to Algeria and it is reported that he will enjoy a "period of rest and recovery".
There is relief from many quarters that a power vacuum has been averted until next year's presidential elections in April. The consensus is that Bouteflika will not run for a fourth term, even though he introduced an amendment in 2008 removing limits on presidential terms. For the moment there are no likely successors, but possible candidates include Prime Minister Sellal, former Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia and even former President Liamine Zeroual. Next year's candidates will have to gain the backing of Algeria's military and intelligence elite and undoubtedly they will need the support of Mohamed "Tewfiq" Mediene, the director of Algeria's intelligence service the DRS. Mediene is considered to be one of the most powerful men in Algeria and it is often said that the DRS truly holds the reins of power in the country.
This year Algeria has needed the aid of a decisive leadership, since it has been marred by a number of crises. On January 16, militants from the al-Qaeda splinter group Al Mulathameen or the Signed-In-Blood Battalion, led by the Algerian-born Mokhtar Belmokhtar attacked the remote gas plant of Tiguentourine near the municipality of In Amenas. The facility is a joint operation controlled by Algeria's national oil company Sonatrach, BP and Statoil. It produces two percent of Europe's gas imports. On the day of the attack, militants dressed in military uniforms singled out foreign nationals and some were forced to wear explosives around their necks. A day later, Algerian Special Forces, under the direction of the head of the Directorate for Internal Security, General Athman 'Bachir' Tartag, launched an offensive to remove the militants. At the end of a four-day siege, at least 38 workers and 29 militants had been killed….
Algeria is facing a tide of problems from beyond its borders and given that 98 percent of Algeria's export earnings come from oil and gas, it is critical that Algeria's government works to eliminate the threat of similar attacks in the future. Due to France's intervention in northern Mali in January, there has been a considerable movement of militant activity towards southern Libya and also into the area of Jebel Chambi on the Algerian-Tunisian border. The Tunisian military has been working to crack down on al-Qaeda operatives in this region. Given the nature of this threat, both countries have formed a military-security liaison and coordination committee to share information on terrorist activities. Since May at least 6000 Algerian troops have been posted along the border with Tunisia. On June 10, Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci said, "the borders with Tunisia and Libya are well secured, thanks to co-ordination with the two countries' governments". During this year's holy month of Ramadan, Algerian security forces have been on high alert due to fears of terrorist attacks. Security has been stepped up at mosques, public venues and at the country's beaches.
This year Algeria's Ministry of Defence has asked for a budget of $10.3 billion in order to face growing security challenges. The elusive militant Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who French intelligence call the "uncatchable" was thought to have been killed by Chadian forces in Mali, but it turned out not to be true. On May 23 he directed a suicide attack against a military base and a uranium mine in Niger, which killed 25 people. Algerian anti-terror forces have spent over five years trying to persuade Belmokhtar to surrender, but to no avail. The Algerian government's determination to lend its support to its neighbors, such as Mali and Niger has also raised the likelihood that al-Qaeda and its offshoots will continue to target Algeria through its porous southern borders. The country is already embroiled in a serious hostage crisis, which began in April 2012 when seven Algerian diplomats were captured in the northern Malian town of Gao by members of the radical Islamist group, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)….
In the wake of January's attack Algeria has been under pressure to attract and maintain foreign investment into the country. Foreign companies are limited to a maximum 49 percent stake in investments, as they are obliged to have a local partner. Algeria's national oil and gas company Sonatrach is given majority ownership of projects. Often foreign companies are reluctant to invest due to past allegations of corruption within the company, as well as a lack of fiscal incentives offered by the government. This is particularly noticeable during licensing rounds….
Algeria's relations with GCC members are giving it reasons to be optimistic. For instance, trade between Algeria and the UAE has been growing at 60 percent annually from 2005. UAE's state investment agency Mubadala launched a power plant in the Berber-speaking town of Tipaza in 2009, adding 20 percent to the country's energy supply. Algeria and Qatar have also signed a number of partnership agreements covering areas such as industry, mining, oil and gas. The former Emir of Qatar visited Algeria in January and both countries agreed to the construction of a steel plant, which will have a production capacity of 10 million tonnes of steel per year. Saudi-Algerian relations have also been improving. In November, Algerian diplomats celebrated the country's national day with Saudi officials in Jeddah and Saudi investors have also shown interest in purchasing Algerian farmland. On June 19, the 6th Algerian-Omani Joint Committee was opened and Algeria's foreign minister said the meeting would "help enhance our economic cooperation and open promising prospects for greater coordination and complementarity and for strengthening brotherly ties and cooperation".
Even though Algeria has foreign reserves worth $200 billion, the country is still suffering under the burden of social inequality. Although the IMF has indicated that unemployment is expected to fall to 9.3 percent in 2013, many consider this number to be skewed in light of realities on the ground. Algeria has seen a spate of protests over unemployment. Earlier this year, there were clashes in the southern town of Ouargla, over unemployment and the lack of housing. Youth unemployment is far greater than the national average and many young men or harragas, meaning "those who burn", try year after year to cross the Mediterranean illegally looking for a better life in Europe.
After the start of the Arab Spring, the Algerian government agreed to lift the state of emergency, offer generous social handouts, low interest loans and cheap housing. Algeria's banks have announced they will finance a $15 billion housing project to complete 250,000 homes by the end of next year. However the Algerian government has committed itself to two major housing construction programmes to construct 1.2 million and 2 million homes since 2005, but both have fallen short of their targets. Nevertheless the government is aware that as soon as tensions start to rise, it can use its resources to placate the population. Recently, an Algerian medical student told foreign journalists: "There is oil here, and every time the people aren't happy the government gives them money".
President Bouteflika will probably stick to this policy until the end of his term in office, and will not play an active role in public, which has been the case since his re-election in 2009. If we are to see a dramatic shift in Algeria's domestic policies, then we will most likely have to wait for his successor. Given that Algeria's neighbors are currently in the midst of enormous political and social upheaval, it is probable that Algerians will want a managed transition, especially in light of the country's brutal civil war. Even so, the departure of Bouteflika from politics will mark a new age for Algerian history, as he is one of the last remaining leaders from its time of independence.
Shadi Hamid
Slate, July 1, 2011
The lesson Arab autocrats seemed to learn from Egypt and Tunisia was almost the exact opposite of what democracy advocates were hoping for. Instead of using less force, leaders across the region have been using more of it, reaching unusual levels of brutality. Shocking reports of mass rape and torture have emerged in Syria and Libya, where thousands have been killed. In Bahrain, a close U.S. ally and home of the Navy's Fifth Fleet, thousands have been arrested or dismissed from their jobs. Indeed, the "Arab spring" has turned into what political scientist Gregory Gause colorfully calls the "winter of Arab discontent."
In a season of growing disillusion—and disastrous televised speeches—the king of Morocco's June 17 national address stood out. It wasn't a great speech, and it fell well short of protesters' demands. But it was a substantive engagement with the opposition. The 47-year-old monarch did not demean his own people or place the blame on foreign conspirators. Instead, he announced a new constitution—one that has the potential to reshape the country's politics. While retaining effective veto power over major decisions, he pledged to empower elected institutions. The prime minister, drawn from the ranks of the largest party in parliament, would have the authority to appoint and fire ministers, as well as to dissolve parliament.
Morocco is offering the rest of the Arab world a different "model." And it is one that other monarchs will be watching closely. It is not a model of true democratic transition toward British-style "constitutional monarchy," as Moroccan Prime Minister Abbas al-Fasi recently claimed. There is little evidence to suggest King Mohammed VI is ready to merely reign and not rule. The Moroccan monarchy has a long history of failing to deliver on its promises of reform.
But this is precisely its appeal: To preserve power, you sometimes have to give some of it up. We can call this the "pre-emptive" model of reform. Here, autocrats take protests seriously. They announce big, high-profile reforms—whether it's moving toward elected governments or re-jigged constitutions. They release political prisoners and appoint real commissions that come up with real recommendations. They give people hope by using all the right buzzwords: change, democracy, reform, institutions, accountability. In doing so, this time around, the Moroccan regime has managed to seize the initiative and steal some momentum from the Feb. 20 protest movement—the loose coalition of leftists, liberals, and Islamists that has brought tens of thousands of Moroccans out into the streets. With a resounding "yes" vote in the July 1 constitutional referendum, the monarchy will be able to say that the mass of Moroccans stand behind the crown, further underlining regime legitimacy in a time of uncertainty.
Pre-emption is a strategy particularly suited to popular monarchies with reserves of historic and religious legitimacy. As the late King Hassan, Mohammed's father, once said, "I will never be put into an equation." The region's monarchs—in stark contrast to the presidents—stand above the fray, acting as umpires rather than partisans. As attractive as such a model may be for embattled autocrats, it is not revolution-proof. Once changes are set in motion, they are difficult to control. With more political space, opposition groups will be in a better position to build support and mobilize their followers. They may be more emboldened to challenge the king directly.…
In Europe, kings and queens were once dominant. But with gradually empowered parliaments, elected officials and notables began to assert themselves at the expense of monarchs. These contests for power became pitched battles. Many of them, unfolding over decades, were punctuated by instability and bloodshed—with Russia's October Revolution and the "Terror" of the French Revolution as only the most prominent examples. More recently, too, the peaceful transformation of monarchies has been a rare event. But just because it rarely happened in the past does not necessarily mean it won't happen in the future.
Prospects for reform in Morocco will depend not just on the king and his generous devolving of power but also on other forces in society that will fight for greater freedom and democracy, eventually turning to challenge the king on his own turf. For now, though, such a scenario is difficult to envision. Morocco's established political parties are careful, timid, and overly deferential to the king. As it stands, then, Morocco's pre-emptive model of reform seems good for autocrats, perhaps less so for those who wish to oppose them.
TUNISIA'S JEWS: THE ROAD TO DJERBA
The Economist, May 1, 2013
For centuries, the tiny Tunisian island of Djerba played host to thousands of Jews on an annual pilgrimage to the Ghriba synagogue in celebration of the Jewish holiday of Lag Ba'omer. Muslims, eager to share the festivities, joined in too. Pilgrims sang songs as they made their way through the streets towards the synagogue, the oldest in Africa. Locals sold almonds and deep-fried savoury pastries called brik.
Tunisia’s two-thousand-year-old Jewish community, which numbered 100,000 when the country gained independence from France in 1956, has now dwindled to around 1,600. Years of emigration, and a suicide bomb attack on the synagogue in 2002 which killed 21 people, have dampened the annual affair. In 2011 it was cancelled for security reasons, following the jasmine revolution which ousted the then-president, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. The occasion drew a few hundred foreign pilgrims last year; but this time the organisers, and Tunisia’s tourism ministry, were determined to stage a revival.
In fact, attendance was only slightly up on last year. Most of those on the three-day pilgrimage, which concluded on April 28th, were locals—Jews (and some Muslims) from Djerba or nearby Zarzis on the mainland. Jewish émigrés, nostalgic for the home country, came mainly from France, but also Canada and Israel. The French ambassador, François Gouyette, made a surprise visit. Surrounded by twitchy bodyguards, he joined the pilgrims’ procession and declared that French tourists should not hesitate to visit the country.
Amid a struggling economy, Tunisia’s government, led by the Islamist Nahda party, was especially keen to show tourists, as well as friendly foreign governments with oil interests in the region, that it has the security situation under control—particularly in the wake of last week’s car bomb attack on the French embassy in Tripoli, the capital of neighbouring Libya. The daunting level of security provided by the government for what in the event were just a few hundred pilgrims, was designed to demonstrate its commitment to defending Tunisian Jews' rights to operate as a community, despite the fact that the country’s proposed new constitution makes no reference to minority rights. The pilgrims, meanwhile, proudly displayed their Tunisian patriotism, waving flags and singing the national anthem.
Most Tunisian Jews say they continue to feel at home here. Yet they remain, to some extent, hostage to international relations. Though the proposed constitution does not mention minority rights, it does refer to Tunisia’s opposition to all forms of racial discrimination “especially Zionism”. Graffiti scrawled on the wall of the tourism ministry in Tunis, the capital, in reaction to the Jewish pilgrims’ arrival, reminded passers-by that Palestinians are still waiting for their “right of return”. Djerbans, proud of their island’s historical diversity, are well aware that their Mediterranean-style convivencia, is, like jasmine, a fragile bloom.
The Arab Spring Was a Cry for Capitalism: Hernando de Soto, The Spectator, July 13, 2013—Two years ago, the West thought it recognised what was happening in the Arab world: people wanted democracy, and were having revolutions to make that point. Now, recent events in Egypt have left many open-mouthed. Why should the generals be welcomed back? `
Tunisia's Dark Turn: Joshua Muravchik, Los Angeles Times, July 16, 2013—While Egypt's revolution devolves into chaos, Tunisia's democratic transition, which until now has been the most promising of any in the Arab world, is also in jeopardy. A bill being pushed by Islamists and their allies in National Constituent Assembly called the "law for the protection of the revolution" seems in reality designed to protect the ruling Islamist party, Nahda, from having to face real competition in the next elections.
Is Morocco the Model for Arab Democracy?: Michael J. Totten, The Tower, Aug. 2013—At the Western reaches of the Arab world, one nation has embarked on a path of incremental progress. Can liberty come without revolution? The Arab Spring is leaving chaos in its wake. Islamization, renewed state repression, and the threat of starvation led to a military coup after the ouster of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak.
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