Between Alliance and Rivalry: Egyptian-Israeli Relations Remain Solid, If Not Particularly Warm: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Rubin Center, Feb. 16, 2016— The ill-advised declaration on February 6 by Infrastructure and Energy Minister Yuval Steinetz that Egypt had flooded some of Hamas’s Gazan smuggling tunnels at Israel’s request brought attention to an important development…
Three's Company: Israel, Turkey, and Egypt: Yossi Melman, Jerusalem Post, Feb. 5, 2016— Last month, the director of the CIA, John Brennan, held a secret meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his counterpart, the director of Egyptian Intelligence, Maj.-Gen.Khaled Fawzy.
Hamas Is Fracturing, And Israel Should Be Worried: Jonathan Schanzer, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Feb. 25, 2016 — The al-Qassam Brigades, the so-called “armed wing” of the Palestinian militant group Hamas, is reeling from the recent execution of former official Mahmoud Ishtiwi at the hands of his fellow fighters.
No Hope for Gazans: Alex Fishman, Ynet, Feb. 23, 2016— Just like every year, the IDF is getting ready for another violent round of conflict in Gaza this summer.
Israeli Ambassador to Egypt Gives Rare Egyptian Interview: Roee Kais & Itamar Eichner, Ynet, Feb. 24, 2016
Hamas Dances with the Devil: Paul Alster, IPT, Feb. 19, 2016
In Historical Shift, New Egyptian Textbooks to Include Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty: Breaking Israel News, Feb. 18, 2016
Egypt's "Security Threat": Churches: Raymond Ibrahim, Gatestone Institute, Feb. 15, 2016
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS REMAIN SOLID, IF NOT PARTICULARLY WARM
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman
Rubin Center, Feb. 16, 2016
The ill-advised declaration on February 6 by Infrastructure and Energy Minister Yuval Steinetz that Egypt had flooded some of Hamas’s Gazan smuggling tunnels at Israel’s request brought attention to an important development: Israeli-Egyptian relations have over the last two years reached an unprecedented level of mutual understanding and cooperation, primarily on security issues.
To that end, Israel has allowed Egypt to introduce larger number of troops and heavy weapons into Sinai than allowed for in their peace treaty and Egyptian F-16s and Apache helicopters now operate against jihadi insurgents within sight of the Israeli border. The two countries are also likeminded regarding what they both view as the negative behavior of Hamas, the unwelcome efforts of Turkey to play a bigger regional role, and Iran’s power projection in the region.
Egypt’s approach to relations with Israel is two-pronged and contradictory. It is guided by a) strategic, political and economic interests and b) Egypt’s self-perception and view of “the other,” as understood by various domestic actors. It is this latter category that places fundamental limitations on the Egyptian-Israeli relationship, in addition to the continuing differences over the unsolved Palestinian-Israeli issue.
First, the half, or 3/4 full glass: The continued absence of war and extremely low likelihood of war for the foreseeable future. Egyptian military, political and economic elites have long understood that war was not in Egypt’s interest, while peace opened the door to vital American, and other Western aid and investment.
Following the gradual ascent to power of the Muslim Brotherhood following Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow in 2011, Israel’s worst fears – the return of a hostile Egypt ‒ seemed on the verge of being realized. But for Hamas, the Palestinian offshoot of the Brotherhood, it was a false dawn. The Sisi regime, in power since July 2013, has taken off the gloves, accusing Hamas of providing vital support to Islamist militants who are drawing the blood of Egyptian security forces in Sinai.
On the diplomatic level, the improved Egyptian-Israeli relationship is reflected in the fact that both countries are now again represented by ambassadors after a hiatus of some years.
Economically, on the other hand, the level of trade and investment remains low, and the whole issue of newly discovered natural gas fields in both countries suggests that they will be more competitive than cooperative on this matter in the future. On cultural and ideological levels, the dominant view among Egypt’s political classes has long been one that views Israel as an aggressive geopolitical rival and competitor. “Normalization” (“tatbi”) in the social and cultural realms remains a taboo for most Egyptians.
A recent study by Esther Webman of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies highlights another fundamental obstacle to warmer Egyptian-Israeli relations. The image of the Jew as villain, she demonstrates, has been adopted by competing political and religious factions in Egypt and other Arab countries in order to explain the changing circumstances and catastrophes that have befallen Arab societies, particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring.
Examples from Egypt abound: During the Tahrir Square protests of 2011, anti-Mubarak signs included the drawing of a Star of David on the forehead of president Mubarak. Muslim Brotherhood journalists protesting Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s coup in 2013 declared Sisi to be Jewish and that Egypt was now under Zionist occupation. Similar rhetoric has been directed against the Muslim Brotherhood by the pro-Sisi camp, which has created elaborate anti-Semitic conspiracy theories regarding the Brotherhood. They range from the claim that both parents of its founder, Hasan al-Banna were Moroccan Jews and Freemasons, to the Brotherhood’s supposed adoption of the plans of the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” to undermine Egyptian society.
Overall, the gap between Egypt’s self-image and its capabilities is yawning. Israel’s success holds up a mirror to Egypt’s regional and domestic weaknesses, reinforcing long extant tendencies to view Israel in a negative light. Hence, the prospects for long-term improvement in Egyptian-Israeli relations will continue to be inhibited by socio-cultural and political-ideological factors that touch on the fundamental core identity and self-image of the Egyptian polity, even as the two countries quietly deepen cooperation in the security and intelligence-sharing areas. And, of course, peace between Egypt and Israel remains a comforting constant in the turbulent Middle East.
THREE'S COMPANY: ISRAEL, TURKEY, AND EGYPT
Yossi Melman
Jerusalem Post, Feb. 5, 2016
Last month, the director of the CIA, John Brennan, held a secret meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and his counterpart, the director of Egyptian Intelligence, Maj.-Gen.Khaled Fawzy. During the meeting, Brennan promised to increase CIA aid to Egypt to bolster its struggle against Islamic State terrorist activity in Sinai.
Brennan’s visit is yet another indicator that the US administration is making an effort to improve relations with Cairo following a few cool years that were the result of President Barack Obama’s opposition to Sisi’s ouster two years ago of president Mohamed Morsi, who, sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood, was chosen in free and democratic elections.
The Paris-based website Intelligence Online recently reported that, up until now, the Egyptian military has mainly relied on support from Israel and France: France, by supplying Egypt with satellite images; and Israel, with intercepts. The most important signals intelligence body in IDF Military Intelligence is Unit 8200. The Shin Bet and the Mossad also have units that specialize in eavesdropping and the deciphering of information. The Shin Bet also has a special unit that for a number of years has been actively involved in the prevention of terrorism originating in Sinai.
Shin Bet head Yoram Cohen’s fiveyear term is scheduled to end in just three months’ time and it’s not clear yet whether his term will be extended for another year, as is permitted by law. Cohen is a familiar figure in the Egyptian intelligence community, as he visited Cairo a number of times during and after Operation Protective Edge to discuss activity related to Hamas and Gaza.
According to the division of labor of the three branches of Israeli intelligence, the Mossad is responsible for contacts with counterpart intelligence organizations. In the past, there were numerous reports in the media about meetings between Mossad leaders and their Egyptian counterparts, and visits from both sides in both countries were common events. Gen. Omar Suleiman, for example, was known to have visited Israel.
It’s no secret that since Sisi came into power, Egypt and Israel have been coordinating on an extraordinarily high level regarding security issues. As part of the two countries’ joint struggle against Hamas and Islamic State, Israel has allowed Egypt to bring many more troops into the Sinai Peninsula than is stipulated in the peace agreement they signed together in 1979. Egypt and Israel are keen on this cooperation, due to their shared fear of Iran’s increasing strength and its attempts to destabilize Sunni regimes in the Middle East, both directly, through its intelligence agents, and indirectly, through Hezbollah. In the past, Egyptian security services captured a number of Iranian and Hezbollah terrorist networks.
Nonetheless, this intimate relationship is not just a strategic asset but also an obstacle, as it makes it difficult for Israel to progress in its efforts to reach a settlement with Gaza and to improve its relationship with Turkey. It’s in Israel’s best interests to ease the plight of the residents of the Gaza Strip, and to put an end to the siege (or their sense of siege). The people of Gaza are currently receiving most of their supplies and goods from Israel. Every day, about 800 trucks pass through the border crossings. But the border is effectively closed to the movement of people, except for humanitarian reasons, such as for medical treatment; religious reasons, such as for Christians on Christmas, or Muslims going on pilgrimage to Mecca, or students going to study at universities.
The Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt is closed almost all year round. In all of 2015, the Rafah crossing was open to people for a total of less than 30 (nonconsecutive) days. What this means is that the people responsible for restricting Gazans and who are imposing a tight siege on Gaza are actually the Egyptians, not the Israelis.
But this fact has not made things easier for the Israeli authorities. The Israelis’ concern is that in the end, this sense of suffocation will become so great that, against its will, Hamas (Ismail Haniyeh, the vice chairman of Hamas’s political bureau, said this week that his organization has no desire for conflict with Israel) will fire rockets or carry out some other act of terrorism, such as an offensive using the tunnels they’ve been digging under Israeli territory.
The IDF leadership is of the opinion that Hamas does not want to engage in a war against Israel, and that it fears Israel’s strength, which is acting as a deterrence. This, however, is not preventing Hamas from rebuilding its military capabilities and digging tunnels, some of which apparently have come very close to, or possibly even infiltrated, Israeli territory. Hamas is building outposts along the border and producing longer-range rockets with enhanced precision.
What the upper echelons at the IDF fear is that, in the face of this deterrence, and despite the Hamas leadership’s (political and military, local and international) desire to avoid another conflict with Israel, one small incident could create a spark that would ignite the whole area, and then the situation might escalate into a full-fledged war in 2016…
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
HAMAS IS FRACTURING, AND ISRAEL SHOULD BE WORRIED
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Feb. 25, 2016
The al-Qassam Brigades, the so-called “armed wing” of the Palestinian militant group Hamas, is reeling from the recent execution of former official Mahmoud Ishtiwi at the hands of his fellow fighters. Several members of the Hamas fighting force resigned in protest, arguing that Ishtiwi was killed because of internal arguments within Hamas rather than immoral behavior, as was first reported. The schism has produced a new breakaway faction—the Free Qassam Members (al-Qassamiyoun al-Ahrar) which is openly speaking out against the al-Qassam Brigades leadership and calling for an investigation.
The schism amongst Hamas fighters comes at a difficult time for the group. Leaders from the group’s Politburo, its main policy-making body, are also squabbling. It doesn’t help that these figures are scattered across the Middle East, in places like Turkey, Qatar, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and beyond. The exile stems from Hamas’s fallout with Iran and Syria in 2012 over the slaughter in Syria. Hamas had been operating out of Damascus since the 1990s, but elected to leave after President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, with Iranian assistance, began its mass slaughter of Syrian Sunnis and Palestinians in Syrian refugee camps. The rupture not only forced Hamas to relinquish its Syrian headquarters; it also led to a cutoff in Iranian funding.
Yet, not all Hamas members have accepted the divorce with Iran as final. Tehran has continued to provide the al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza with rocket technology to wage war with Israel, and possibly weapons for the group’s underground operatives in the West Bank. Last week, Hamas sent a high-level delegation to Iran to celebrate the Islamic Republic’s 37th anniversary. The delegation included Osama Hamdan, the group’s Lebanon–based head of international relations, Khalid al-Qaddumi, the permanent Hamas representative to Iran, and Politburo member Mohammed Nasser. Their very presence suggests that Iran could yet again gain vast influence over the Palestinian militant group, particularly its armed wing.
But Hamdan and company don’t lead the Hamas Politburo. That distinction goes to Khaled Meshaal, who has been operating out of Qatar since his exile from Syria. Qatar has become a key funder for the group in recent years. The former emir, Sheikh Hamad, was the first world leader to visit the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, where he pledged $400 million in 2012. Qatari aid continues to flow today, including through channels approved by Israel to contribute to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip after the devastating war with Israel in 2014.
Qatar’s assistance, while crucial to the survival of Hamas, is not without its controversies. The Free Qassam Members, who have pledged their allegiance to Meshaal, claim that Ishtiwi’s executioners targeted him for contacting Hamas leaders abroad. This seems to suggest a growing and open rift between the military and political wings of the movement.
Hamas’s various leaders and factions, at the very least, are having trouble communicating. This was made clear with the kidnapping and killing of three Israeli teens in the West Bank in June 2014. That attack was planned and financed by a Hamas leader, Saleh Arouri, in yet another center of gravity for the group—Turkey. It is questionable whether Arouri conferred with his Hamas colleagues before ordering the operation. If he did, his colleagues somehow didn’t foresee that the attack could lead to a brutal war. And brutal it was, lasting 50 days, with Israel responding to Hamas’s nearly 5,000 rocket attacks with punishing reprisals.
The summer 2014 war was one from which the Gaza Strip has yet to recover. Nearly two years later, the Hamas government is under fire from its own constituents for failing to rebuild. The Hamas government has grown cautious—amid the current wave of stabbings and attacks in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip remains uncharacteristically quiet.
True, Hamas exhorts its followers in the West Bank to strike Israelis, but the group is cheering for a war it won’t have to fight. And yes, the al-Qassam Brigades are believed to be digging underground commando tunnels for the next war. But Israel’s leaders have signaled, knowingly or not, that this activity is unlikely to prompt a full-blown conflict.
Thus, while its founding charter has not changed, Hamas appears to be lacking direction. Its military wing and a gaggle of political leaders in exile are locked in a competition. Add to that the public frustration with the Gaza-based government leadership, and it’s hard to pinpoint which faction or which leader is actually steering the organization.
One could argue that this is a positive development for Israel, or even for the overall security of the Middle East. To be sure, a fractured Hamas is a weakened one. But a fractured terrorist organization can also be more unpredictable. Hamas lacks command and control. A single faction could launch a war that the rest of the organization does not want—and one that Israel or Western intelligence might be less likely to predict.
Alex Fishman
Ynet, Feb. 23, 2016
Just like every year, the IDF is getting ready for another violent round of conflict in Gaza this summer. The IDF chief of staff has created a deadline for the IDF to be prepared, focusing on equipment updates and training. No one knows the timing or what will be the direct cause of the next flare up, but it is clear that this near-yearly ritual illustrates the inescapable reality. Yet, this is not only the Israeli mindset.
The residents of Gaza who have left the Strip and spoken to Israelis reveal that this fatalistic mindset is also on the other side. In their opinion, a military confrontation is a certainty. They also believe that it will be a lot more aggressive, that Israel is sick of playing these games with Hamas, and that Israel will do everything to eliminate the organization. Meanwhile, Hamas is planning to surprise Israel with its firepower, and will hit Israel's civilian population in order to break both the status-quo and the blockade. When the two populations are convinced that a flare up will happen, the leadership will not fail to disappoint.
But it seems that the next round being cooked up may surprise the leadership since they will not be in control of the events. It is likely that the confrontation won't start because of some mistake, provocation, or some sort of planned military action based on political logic. There is a high probability that the timing and the intensity of the confrontation will be determined by the Gazan population, which will blow up in Hamas's face, and will spillover onto Israel, the West Bank, and even into Egypt.
Gaza has turned into a human transit camp which every day tests the limits of its population. In Israel, we often see the infrastructure crisis in Gaza – electricity and water shortages, and broken sewage systems. But that only scratches the surface: Gazan society has started to disintegrate.
The number of suicides has reached unprecedented levels. The number of instances of murder within the family has grown: for instance, there is a phenomenon whereby women are stabbing their unemployed husbands. Every third person is on anti-depressants. There has been an increase in drug use and the overall scope of crime has increased, mainly prostitution, as well as the phenomenon of teenagers marrying much older men who are able to support them as a second or third wife. On the other hand, there is no money, young people aren't getting married, and the average age of marriage is rising.
The Palestinian Authority, which is responsible for transfering aid money to the Strip, is not transfering funds for health or education in an organized fashion. In Gaza, there is no proper psychological treatment. There is a rise in the number of children born with deformities – deformities linked with incestual marriages. Due to the current world wide refugee crisis, UNWRA is receiving less money, and fewer families are able to keep their heads above water.
On top of all of this is the constant fear of Israeli airstrikes. For the Gazans, there is no sanctuary – they have nowhere to run, and they have no influence over events. They are mad that Hamas has built for themselves what amount to underground cities, while they are left without bomb shelters.
Young people who are caught trying to cross the fence into Israel say they do it because there is no food at home, or because they are escaping violence in the family. 50 percent of the youth in Gaza have said in different surveys that they want to leave Gaza forever. The IDF is keenly aware of the phenomenon: students who obtain entry permits into Israel through Erez crossing kiss the ground when they leave the Strip. For them, they are free from jail. The ethos of return has been broken – let them leave.
Until the middle of 2015, families who could afford it got themselves smuggled out through the tunnels into Egypt or Libya, and from there take a boat to Europe. Hundreds of Palestinians drowned along the way. The Egyptians succeeded in destroying most of the tunnels, and the route has been cut off.
Now, the number of people falsifying documents "proving" they are sick has grown, and these people are being taken from Gaza to the West Bank for "treatment," but never return. Several people in Gaza have already set themselves on fire in protest. In Tunis, this action led to the "Arab Spring." Gaza is also starting flare up. While it is true that the population is religious, traditional, and more willing to accept its fate, the pot is still about to boil over. When the human time-bomb explodes, there will be no warning, and the shrapnel will hit us all.
Israeli Ambassador to Egypt Gives Rare Egyptian Interview: Roee Kais & Itamar Eichner, Ynet, Feb. 24, 2016 —Israeli Ambassador to Egypt Haim Koren gave a rare interview to Egyptian journalists in his residence in Cairo on Tuesday, and surprisingly, the transcript of the interview was published, and what's more, the journalists were not afraid to expose the fact that they had spoken to the representative from Israel.
Hamas Dances with the Devil: Paul Alster, IPT, Feb. 19, 2016 —The Gaza-based Hamas terror organization has more than its fair share of problems at the moment. Quite likely against its better judgment, it is becoming increasingly reliant on a controversial and dangerous relationship with Sinai Province, the vicious ISIS affiliate in Sinai.
In Historical Shift, New Egyptian Textbooks to Include Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty: Breaking Israel News, Feb. 18, 2016—A history textbook to be used in Egyptian schools will discuss the country’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel for the first time, Israel’s Army Radio reported.
Egypt's "Security Threat": Churches: Raymond Ibrahim, Gatestone Institute, Feb. 15, 2016—On February 1, Tharwat Bukhit, a Coptic Christian member of Egypt's parliament, announced "there are approximately 50 churches in Egypt closed for reasons of security."
