Latest Tunnel Strike Puts Hamas Leaders in a Tough Spot with Cairo: Avi Issacharoff, Times of Israel, Jan. 14, 2018— Hamas leaders find themselves in a worrisome situation.
ISIS Sets Its Sights on Gaza: Bassam Tawil, Gatestone Institute, Jan. 10, 2018— There is nothing more delightful than watching two Islamic terror groups fight each other to the death.
Egypt Versus the New York Times: David M. Weinberg, Jerusalem Post, Dec. 29, 2017 — The full repercussions of US President Donald Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital have yet to be felt.
Egypt’s Nuclear Deal with Russia: Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Ofek, BESA, Jan. 8, 2018— Egypt is taking its nuclear energy effort out of the deep freeze.
Ancient Egyptian Monastery Closed and Christmas Canceled: Raymond Ibrahim, Breaking Israel News, Jan. 10, 2018
Can Sisi Rival Gain Support of Egypt's Copts in 2018 Elections?: Ahmed Fouad, Al-Monitor, Dec. 18, 2017
Egypt's Al-Azhar University: Moderation or Dissimulation?: A. Z. Mohamed, Gatestone Institute, Jan. 10, 2018
Protecting His Nation From Puppeteers and Belly Dancers: Declan Walsh, New York Times, Jan. 12, 2017
LATEST TUNNEL STRIKE PUTS HAMAS
LEADERS IN A TOUGH SPOT WITH CAIRO
Avi Issacharoff
Times of Israel, Jan. 14, 2018
Hamas leaders find themselves in a worrisome situation. Another of their tunnels penetrating into Israeli territory has been exposed and destroyed. In total, two of their tunnels have been destroyed in about two and a half months (another one, possibly two, belonging to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad has also been demolished), and it seems like Hamas is quickly losing its most significant strategic weapon ahead of the next possible military confrontation with Israel.
Yes, the terror group still has its rockets — and due to the success of the Iron Dome defense system, it has focused on developing short-range rockets with large warheads and mortars. But still, the attack tunnels were considered the crowning glory of Hamas’s military capabilities. Now, it’s becoming clear, that weapon is about to lose its relevance. This could push Hamas to initiate an offensive in the near future in an attempt to utilize its remaining tunnels reaching into Israeli territory.
But the probability of such a scenario is not high. Had Hamas leaders in Gaza, headed by Yahya Sinwar, wanted to do so, they would have acted a long time ago. It is clear that the group’s leaders in the Strip are not interested right now in an outbreak of violence. That could have been deduced from Hamas’s lack of reaction after the March assassination of Mazen Fuqha, its Gaza operative who directed terror networks in the West Bank, and of course more recently after the various tunnels were demolished.
Hamas’s wish to avert a military confrontation at this time can also be inferred from its actions to prevent escalation with Israel, like arresting operatives belonging to “rogue” organizations and the remarkable deployment of “restraint forces” whose job is to foil attacks on Israeli territory. Indeed, rockets are still lobbed from time to time at Israeli towns, but it is now clear that those attacks aren’t being carried out with Hamas’s blessing. The organization is also continuously trying to lower the tensions with Egypt, including cutting its various ties with Sinai Province — the Islamic State’s branch in the peninsula — which led to the latter declaring Hamas a “heretic” group that needs to be fought.
In this context, the route of the tunnel destroyed Saturday is a source of great embarrassment to the Hamas leadership as it seeks to strengthen its ties with Cairo. Less than a week has passed since senior Egyptian intelligence officials toured the border between Sinai and Gaza with Hamas officials, to closely monitor Hamas’s actions to prevent smuggling into and out of Gaza, and also to prevent terror operatives from crossing from the Strip into Sinai. Relations between Cairo and the organization’s elite in Gaza have greatly improved in recent months, with leaders Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh perceived in Egypt as important partners in the significant moves toward inter-Palestinian reconciliation. And yet, it now emerges that under the nose of the Egyptian security system, Hamas has not only allowed the construction of a tunnel that can be used for the smuggling of good(s) and fighters; it has apparently constructed it itself.
One can only imagine the conversation that Hamas leaders will have with Egyptian intelligence officials demanding explanations on the nature of the tunnel, and what they knew and didn’t know about it. The tunnel passed directly under the triple border between Gaza, Egypt and Israel, where the Kerem Shalom border crossing operates. It probably also reached places where it could have been used for attacks on Israeli soil and for entry into Egypt. This isn’t the first and won’t be the last time Hamas is making use of the crossing’s space. The fact that it is the main windpipe for Gaza’s economy doesn’t seem to have had an impact on the group’s military decision-making.
Time after time, we’ve learned how much the suffering of Gaza’s residents could have been mitigated, and how much could have been invested in improving their well-being, if funds were not used for tunnels and rockets. But Hamas, as usual, doesn’t care. At the same time, the terror group is making huge efforts to shift the blame for the humanitarian situation in Gaza onto Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The blows to Hamas’s strategic weapon — the tunnels — could cause the group to focus its efforts on other weapons: drones (as in the incident of the swarm of drones that attacked the Russian base in Syria), commando forces, multicopter drones and more. It isn’t at all easy to change a well-established modus operandi worked on for years with great financial expenditure and physical exertion — but Hamas may do just that in the face of recent Israeli success…
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
Bassam Tawil
Gatestone Institute, Jan. 10, 2018
There is nothing more delightful than watching two Islamic terror groups fight each other to the death. For several years now, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and ISIS in Sinai have been cooperating with each other, especially in smuggling weapons and terrorists over the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. It was a win-win: Hamas supplied ISIS with terrorists; ISIS supplied Hamas with weapons that were smuggled into the Gaza Strip. It appears, however, that the honeymoon between the two terror groups is over.
Last week, ISIS published a video documenting the execution of one of its men after he was found guilty of smuggling weapons to Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The execution of Musa Abu Zmat, a former Hamas terrorist who fled the Gaza Strip to join ISIS, took place in Sinai. A screenshot from the ISIS video, showing Musa Abu Zmat, a former Hamas terrorist, blindfolded and awaiting execution. In the video, the ISIS terrorists accuse Abu Zmat of being an "apostate" for smuggling weapons to Hamas's armed wing, Ezaddin Al-Qassam, in Gaza. They also accuse Abu Zmat of smuggling dozens of people from Al-Arish, in the Sinai, into the Gaza Strip.
The ISIS terrorist who carried out the execution by a single shot to the head has been identified as Mohammed Al-Dajni, who is also from the Gaza Strip but fled to Sinai to join ISIS. Al-Dajni's father, Abu Rashed, is a senior Hamas official who previously held a top position in the health services in the Gaza Strip. Another ISIS operative who appeared in the execution video has been identified as Abu Kathem Al-Makdisi. In the video, Al-Makdisi is referred to as a "sharia judge." He is the one who read out verdict against Abu Zmat before the execution. Al-Makdisi also condemns Hamas in the video and calls on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to join ISIS.
Palestinian sources say that Al-Makdisi's real name is Hamzeh Al-Zamli, a convicted thief who fled the Gaza Strip several years ago. The sources note that he had been convicted of robbing several businesses in Gaza before he crossed the border to Sinai. The families of the two ISIS executioners (Al-Dajni and Al-Makdisi) have issued strong statements condemning and disowning their sons.
Here is what we need to learn from this video: There are many Palestinians from the Gaza Strip who have joined ISIS in the past few years. It is worth noting that ISIS and its affiliates in Sinai have carried out many atrocities against Egyptian civilians and the Egyptian army. Many of the Palestinians who have been joining ISIS are former members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Some even held senior positions in the armed wings of those two terror groups. The business of smuggling weapons and terrorists across the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt has flourished for many years. Until recently, ISIS and Hamas were in full cooperation on the smuggling business and this has undoubtedly facilitated some of the major terror attacks carried out by ISIS in Sinai in recent years.
ISIS is making it clear that it now has its eyes set on the Gaza Strip. By calling on Palestinians to rebel against Hamas, ISIS is hoping to facilitate its mission of infiltrating the Gaza Strip. Previous attempts by ISIS to infiltrate the Gaza Strip have been successfully thwarted by Hamas. Hamas brooks no competition. Ever. It shows that despite its denials, Hamas is involved in smuggling weapons from Sinai into the Gaza Strip. The man who was executed by ISIS last week was accused of smuggling weapons for Hamas's military wing inside the Gaza Strip. This means that he was either a double agent (for Hamas and ISIS) or that he did something to annoy his ISIS cohorts. Hamas has repeatedly assured the Egyptian authorities that it has no links to ISIS in Sinai and that it supports Egypt's war on terrorism. This is quite a statement from a terror group. The Egyptian authorities have taken the claim with a grain of salt and continue to impose a blockade on the Gaza Strip by keeping the Rafah border crossing shut.
To be clear: the latest dispute between Hamas and ISIS is not a power struggle between good guys and bad guys. This is a power struggle between bad guys and bad guys. It is a power struggle between two ruthless Islamic jihadi terror groups who even have much in common regarding strategy and ideology. Both groups want to spread sharia and eliminate the "infidels" and "apostates." Both groups are responsible for some of the most horrific terror attacks and atrocities in modern history. While Hamas is probably the lesser of the evils in this instance, it is far from moderate. Ironically, it is probably Hamas's cooperation with ISIS that has brought Hamas to its current level of deterioration. Hamas wanted help from ISIS to smuggle weapons into the Gaza Strip and they got it. Hamas, in return, allowed ISIS terrorists to cross back and forth into the Gaza Strip and Sinai.
For now, no one knows where this ISIS-Hamas feud is headed. What is certain is that the ongoing attempts by ISIS to infiltrate the Palestinian arena should worry not only Palestinians, but Israel and Egypt as well. If ISIS manages to get a toehold in the Gaza Strip, they will be that much closer to Israel's doorstep, and their jihadis minutes from Israeli towns and cities. For the Egyptians, this means that one day they will have to fight ISIS not only in the Sinai, but also inside the Gaza Strip. The biggest losers, once again: the Palestinians.
EGYPT VERSUS THE NEW YORK TIMES
Neville Teller
Jerusalem Post, Jan. 14, 2018
The full repercussions of US President Donald Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital have yet to be felt. One rather strange little by-product does not seem to have grabbed the world’s attention as yet. It is a story capable of a number of interpretations, not all of them complimentary to the principal players.
The facts are these. On January 6, 2018 the New York Times published an exclusive news item based on four audio recordings that it said it had obtained. The Times report did not vouchsafe precisely how they had come into its possession. These recordings, it said, took place shortly after Trump had startled the world by announcing that the US recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and would move its embassy there from Tel Aviv. They were, it said, recordings of telephone conversations between an officer in Egypt’s Intelligence Service, Captain Ashraf al-Kholi, and four very well-known Egyptian media personalities, three of them hosts of influential talk shows. The TV hosts were Azmy Megahed, Mofid Fawzy, and Saeed Hassaseen. The fourth person contacted by al-Kholi was Egyptian movie star Yousra.
Captain al-Kholi told the four people he phoned that Egypt, “like all our Arab brothers,” would denounce Trump’s decision in public, but that conflict with Israel was not in Egypt’s national interest. He suggested that instead of condemning Trump’s decision, these media personalities should persuade their viewers to accept it. In its report, the New York Times included the interesting information that TV chat show host Azmi Megahed had confirmed the authenticity of the recordings, and had described al-KhoIi as a longtime acquaintance.
The Times article, which was immediately published on-line, raised a torrent of furious commentary in Egypt’s pro-government media and in parliament, where it was denounced as part of an international conspiracy to embarrass Egypt. This accusation was partly confirmed when the very same audio recordings were broadcast by an Istanbul-based television network linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. The suggestion of a connection with the Brotherhood, which Egypt has banned as a terrorist group, added to the outrage from supporters of the Egyptian government.
Once in the public domain, an allegation that Egyptian intelligence had secretly attempted to sway public opinion in favor of accepting Trump’s decision on Jerusalem could not go unanswered. Four days later Egypt’s prosecutor general, Nabil Sadek. ordered a criminal investigation. The New York Times article, he maintained, “undermines Egypt’s security and public peace, and harms the country’s public interest.”
The next developments were as one might have expected. Egypt’s State Information Service (SIS) released a statement denying the accuracy of the Times report on almost every count. No one named Ashraf al-Kholi, it maintained, worked for the intelligence service. Fawzi had not presented any TV programs for years, and Hassaseen’s show had ended weeks before Trump’s declaration, and he was not currently presenting any program on air. As for Yousra, SIS said that she was a movie actress totally unconnected with TV talk shows.
Much of this may be true, but it has little relevance to the high profile enjoyed by those particular individuals among the Egyptian public. And it seems clear that SIS, and perhaps other organs of the state, subsequently subjected them to intense political pressure. It was not long before Megahed publicly retracted his original statement authenticating the recordings and claiming that he was an old acquaintance of Kholi. In an Egyptian television interview Megahed said that the New York Times had misquoted him. “This is the first time I’ve heard of this Kholi man,” he said.
Next, actress Yousra and the other TV anchors denied knowing anyone named al-Kholi or participating in telephone conversations with him. Yousra claimed not to have been in Egypt at the time they were reported to have taken place. The clear implication is that the recordings were faked. Not unsurprisingly, conspiracy theories followed. Pro-government television anchors called on the Times to explain how the recordings ended up with the Brotherhood-affiliated TV channel, and suggested that the newspaper was secretly in cahoots with Qatar. Egypt is one of four Arab nations that imposed a punishing boycott on Qatar last June, accusing it of financing Islamist terrorism and sheltering Brotherhood leaders.
The speaker of parliament, Ali Abdel Aal, went along with this, and said the article proved that the Times was allied with the Brotherhood and with Qatar, and was stoking controversy in advance of Egypt’s forthcoming presidential elections. Finally all the SIS could do was issue a statement asserting that Egypt had repeatedly declared its “inalienable position on Jerusalem,” side-stepping the fact that, in doing so, it was confirming what al-Kholi had said would be the official stance. A stout riposte was provided by Michael Slackman, the Times’s international editor. “Our story was a deeply reported, consequential piece of journalism,” he said, “and we stand fully behind it. The audio recordings were provided to the Times by an intermediary supportive of the Palestinian cause, but we had no agenda other than giving our readers the facts they needed to know.”
This whole episode, true or false, comes at a delicate time for Egypt politically. The first round of new presidential elections is scheduled for March 26. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who is running for re-election, faces only a weak rival since his principal challenger, former prime minister Ahmed Shafik, pulled out of the race (Shafik’s lawyers claimed that officials had pressed him to quit on the threat of corruption prosecutions). All the same, the Egyptian public is unlikely to look kindly on a government-inspired endorsement – even a covert one – of Trump’s Jerusalem declaration. The last thing Sisi wants, come March, is a poor turnout in his presidential poll. The result of the prosecutor general’s criminal investigation into the New York Times report is bound to make interesting reading.
EGYPT’S NUCLEAR DEAL WITH RUSSIA
Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Ofek
BESA, Jan. 8, 2018
Egypt is taking its nuclear energy effort out of the deep freeze. On December 11, 2017, during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Cairo, the two countries signed a nuclear agreement that reflects a convergence of their interests: Russia would like to return to its position as the dominant power in the Middle East, and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi wants to rehabilitate his country’s economy and once again make Egypt a central actor in the Arab world.
The agreement stipulates that Russia’s Rosatom Corporation will build a nuclear power plant at El-Dabaa, about 140 kilometers west of Alexandria. The plant will include four light-water reactors for electricity production, each with a 1,200-megawatt output. Egypt and Rosatom also concluded that a storage depot would be built beside the nuclear plant to hold spent nuclear fuel from the reactors before it is sent to Russia for reprocessing. Test runs of the first reactor are expected in 2022 and its full commissioning is anticipated in 2026. Rosatom estimates that the project will be completed in 2028 or 2029.
Russia will also build factories in Egypt for the domestic manufacture of nuclear plant components, bringing in the required expertise; and Rosatom will service the plant for 60 years. According to reports, the project will cost about $30 billion, with $25 billion to be provided by Russia as a loan to be repaid over 35 years. There are many gas deposits in Egypt as well as oil fields, but the country’s faulty pricing policy and economic crisis have caused the energy industries to collapse. With a population now numbering 104 million, Egypt urgently needs nuclear power to improve its energy sector.
Many in Egypt, from disparate parts of the population, oppose building a nuclear plant at El-Dabaa. Businesspeople want to develop tourism in the area, which is on the seacoast; some are concerned about environmental damage; and the Bedouin tribes in the area claim the land has been stolen from them. In February 2012, amid the chaos in Egypt following the revolution, the El-Dabaa site was attacked by thousands of Bedouin; the costs from damage and the looting of equipment were estimated at $80 million.
Egypt’s plans to build a nuclear reactor go back to the days of Nasser. As Egyptian energy expert Ali Saidi, who served as electricity and energy minister from 1999 to 2001, told Al-Monitor in September 2015: “At first, the nuclear project was stopped because of the 1967 war. It was to be implemented with the Soviet Union at that time … The project was bid upon in the 1970s in a competition between US companies, after US President Richard Nixon promised to provide nuclear plants to both Egypt and Israel. Then a US law was passed obliging countries acquiring nuclear plant technologies to be subject to inspection standards from the country of origin, which was America, so the project stopped.”
Saidi added that in the 1980s, during Mubarak’s presidency, American and French companies competed over the nuclear plant project. He explained that the project was dropped from the agenda for two reasons: negative public opinion in Egypt after the disaster of the Ukrainian Chernobyl reactor (1986), and the discovery of gas deposits in the 1990s. Saidi focused solely on the civilian aspect of nuclear energy in Egypt as a source of electricity production. However, Israeli intelligence has suspected for years that Egypt is interested in covertly building a military nuclear potential – from the crisis of the German scientists, who helped Egypt develop ballistic missiles in 1962, through the Mubarak presidency. Naturally, the issue of Israeli nuclear weapons has had an effect on Egypt’s nuclear development efforts. Egypt’s entry into the nuclear arena was primarily impelled, however, by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab policy and by his view of Egypt as a leading country in the Arab world.
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
Ancient Egyptian Monastery Closed and Christmas Canceled: Raymond Ibrahim, Breaking Israel News, Jan. 10, 2018—Local authorities decided to close down the Saint Catherine Monastery in the Sinai Peninsula, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, on January 5 and January 6, when Christmas church services are held according to the Coptic Orthodox calendar. The general directorate of tourist police further ordered all tourist companies not to lead tours to the historic monastery.
Can Sisi Rival Gain Support of Egypt's Copts in 2018 Elections?: Ahmed Fouad, Al-Monitor, Dec. 18, 2017—Just like in 2012, religious institutions in Egypt continue to influence the actions of candidates running for the 2018 presidential elections. Local press reports from Nov. 30 said that former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq had contacted a number of politicians, including leaders in the Salafist Nour Party, before he announced Nov. 29 his intention to run for the 2018 elections.
Egypt's Al-Azhar University: Moderation or Dissimulation?: A. Z. Mohamed, Gatestone Institute, Jan. 10, 2018—Al-Azhar University seemed to have either an ambivalent attitude or a two-faced, taqiyah [dissimulation] one regarding tolerance towards Christians in particular and Islamic moderation in general, according to a report, "Two Faces Of Egypt's Al-Azhar: Promoting Goodwill, Tolerance Towards Christians In Informational Holiday Campaign – But Refusing To Do The Same In Its School Curricula," disclosed by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI).
Protecting His Nation From Puppeteers and Belly Dancers: Declan Walsh, New York Times, Jan. 12, 2017—In a cluttered corner of his labyrinthine law office, amid dog-eared files and half-empty coffee cups, Samir Sabry stood over a computer screen, his face grave as a stone, watching a clip of a potty-mouthed puppet.
