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Contents:
Is Turkey the Next Terror Target? Observers See Growing Links to Extremism: Stephen Starr, National Post, Oct. 31, 2014— Looming over Istanbul’s financial district of Sisli gleams Trump Towers.
Time to Kick Turkey Out of Nato: Jonathan Schanzer, Politico, Oct. 9, 2014 —To its credit, Ankara did play a significant role in NATO’s operations in Libya by sending aircraft, frigates and other assets in 2011.
Erdogan's Book of Defeat : Burak Bekdil, Gatestone Institute, Oct. 31, 2014 — Shortly after the Arab Spring rocked several capitals in the Middle East, the Turks devised a plan that would enable their country to emerge as the new Ottoman Empire.
Turks Hate Everyone (Except Turks): Lori Lowenthal Marcus, Jewish Press, Nov. 3, 2014 — A new Pew Research Poll found that more Turks dislike Israel than dislike either Hezbollah or Hamas.
How Turkey Went Bad: Daniel Pipes, Middle East Forum, Oct. 13, 2014
Normalization Between Ankara and Jerusalem? Guess Again.: Burak Bekdil, Gatestone Institute, Oct. 30, 2014
Growing Kurdish Unity Helps West, Worries Turkey: Joe Parkinson, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 22, 2014
Hamas Operates Command Center in Turkey: Israeli Defense Minister: I24 News, Oct. 22, 2014
Burying Ataturk In Erdogan’s Castle: Steven A. Cook, Council on Foreign Relations, Nov. 3, 2014
IS TURKEY THE NEXT TERROR TARGET? OBSERVERS SEE
Stephen Starr
National Post, Oct. 31, 2014
Looming over Istanbul’s financial district of Sisli gleams Trump Towers. At 40 stories high, it is one of the city’s brashest and most iconic links with the Western world. But in Sisli’s thoroughfares and alleyways, streets that house the offices of Dentons, the international law firm, as well as the Canadian government’s trade service and its local consulate, would-be jihadists en route to Syria and Iraq have been holing up. For almost three years, Canadians from British Columbia to Montreal as well as Britons, Germans and citizens of a host of Arab countries have all landed in Istanbul en route to their quest for jihad in Syria.
Locals in Sisli say before the Islamic State of Iraq & Al-Sham (ISIS) forces conquered a series of cities in western Iraq last June, they saw foreign men “dressed in jihadist clothing drinking tea on the side of the streets.” The would-be jihadists weren’t acting alone — they didn’t choose Sisli without reason. In a district where grand shopping malls sell the finest French perfume and the latest shoes from New York, some of the conservative locals sympathize with the plight of Syrians being slaughtered by their own government and are happy to discreetly help those passing through. “[The locals] didn’t give the Western guys money, but they would find them apartments to stay in,” said Mehmet, a café owner in the area who asked not to be fully identified.
Many Canadians have passed through Istanbul. After making their way to Syria, several have joined a group known as Jund Al-Aqsa, a small, independent jihadist group operating in Idlib and Hama provinces of western Syria. As recently as last month, Swedish video journalist Tam Hussein went inside northern Syria where he met a Canadian jihadist who he believes has been fighting there for more than a year. “Abu Azzam was a Canadian of south Asian descent belonging to Jund Al-Aqsa. He was very quiet, softly spoken; he appeared middle class, educated,” he said. “He was proud of the fact that his family were devout and he had never really integrated [in Canada] and kept his morals.” Mr. Hussein said Abu Azzam was in his mid-20s but wouldn’t say where in Canada he was from. He thought Canada was a decedent country, according to Mr. Hussein. “He had very little problem with [Canada] except that they were making a mistake siding with the U.S.”
Today, Mehmet says Sisli’s foreign jihadists have gone underground since ISIS captured the world — and Turkish authorities’ — attention last summer. The locals’ empathy, however, remains, spurred on by Turkey’s increasingly Islamist and divisive government. One figure is responsible for this more than any other: When Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan first appeared on the political scene in 2002, polls found Turks were evenly split on the role they felt Islam played in their country’s politics and which for decades has been vehemently secular. Today, according to a Pew Research Center poll, 69% say Islam is the dominant force in political life. In recent years, Mr. Erdogan’s Justce & Development Party (AKP) has introduced laws clamping down on alcohol sales and modified long-standing laws banning government workers from wearing headscarves. Comments from him and leading government figures suggesting pregnant women should not appear in public have added to a sense among many that conservatism has taken hold of political and private life in Turkey like never before.
Emboldened, and against the backdrop of a sectarian war in neighbouring Syria, extremists have stepped forward. In September and again last week, ISIS sympathizers beat up students at Istanbul University who were attempting to hold anti-jihad demonstrations. In the city’s Bagcilar district, a “gift shop” sold jihadist-themed T-shirts, headbands and other items for several months this year before closing recently, while in September a video clip of two men on a city streetcar wearing militant-styled clothing went viral. The growing links to extremism are not only confined to the streets. In January, Mr. Erdogan’s son, Bilal, was accused of meeting a Saudi businessman believed by the United States to be an Al-Qaeda financier. Some observers say the June kidnapping by ISIS of dozens of Turkish diplomats and their families in Mosul, Iraq, forced Ankara to turn a blind eye to the increasing jihadist activity in Turkey and Syria. The hostages were released two weeks ago.
Ankara has been berated for not helping Kurds facing an onslaught from ISIS in Kobani, Syria, and for ignoring extremist activity inside the country, but some observers see this as a wholly intentional policy. As the AKP is deeply rooted in conservative Islam and broadly distrusts the Kurds, it is allowing militant Islam flourish. Others say Turkey’s lax approach to growing extremism among elements of Turkish society may be coming home to roost. “I think the government contributed to the rise of extremism when it employed a harsh discourse against opponents, currying favour with the political Islamist base, and employed anti-Western discourse to survive political scandals,” said Abdullah Bozkurt, a columnist for the Turkish newspaper Today’s Zaman. As ISIS embraces a radical and distorted version of Sunni ideology, there is great risk of radicalization of Turkish youth in a country that is overwhelmingly Sunni. “When the Syria crisis started, the young attracted to radical groups in Syria were in the dozens. It went to hundreds and even thousands now. There is definitely a pattern formed here. Yet we have not seen a comprehensive plan to attack ISIS ideology,” Mr. Bozkurt said. Others see the AKP’s obsession with removing Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad as entrenching Turkey in an unwinnable war. “The AKP provided arms, money, recruits and training to anyone who claimed to be fighting against Assad. This disastrous policy turned Syria into an open field of radical terrorists and similarly increased the appetite of groups like ISIS in Iraq,” said Faruk Logoglu of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). “This dreadful policy has turned Turkey into a country highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks.”
TIME TO KICK TURKEY OUT OF NATO?
Jonathan Schanzer
Politico, Oct. 9, 2014
The Kurdish town of Kobane in western Syria is under siege by the Islamic State. A U.S.-led coalition has hit at the jihadists sieging Kobane…but bombs alone may not suffice. It is the Turkish military, whose tanks are currently sitting on the Syrian border, that may be in the best position to save stave off a mass slaughter. But the Turks refuse to join the fight, even though the Turkish Parliament voted on Oct. 2 to deploy the Turkish army to fight in Iraq and Syria, and to allow foreign troops on Turkish soil. A week after the vote, Turkey has not participated in any U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State.
Turkey’s stock as a Western ally is plummeting. Ankara stubbornly resists joining the coalition unless it broadens its fight to topple Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. Turkey’s 200 or more F-16 fighter jets sit idle as the Islamic State makes alarming gains across Syria and Iraq. This stands in sharp contrast to other Muslim world allies – including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and even Jordan – that have taken part in the aerial campaign against the Islamic State. Turkey’s absence is conspicuous. It’s the only NATO ally among these Muslim world partners. To be clear, the fight against the Islamic State is not a NATO mission, but it serves as a reminder of how little Erdogan’s regime has done to help preserve order in the Middle East.
In many ways, Turkey has made the fight against the Islamic State more difficult. Apart from permitting some unarmed American drones to fly out of its territory, Ankara has refused to allow the West to operate from Turkish airbases. This has forced strike aircraft to fly their sorties from the Al Udeid airbase in Qatar, Shaheed Mwaffaq in Jordan or Al Dhafra in the UAE. As for the Incirlik air base that NATO operates in Eastern Turkey, Ankara has made it clear that for the time being, it is currently off limits for armed operations. But this should come as no surprise. Incirlik has long been off limits. Ankara refused to allow the United States to utilize the air base for kinetic operations in the 2003 Iraq war and its aftermath. Instead, the base has been used for logistics, support and training. Turkey owns the facility, but technically, according to Article 5 of the NATO charter, it cannot restrict the NATO activities on the base in an approved operation. Still, it can restrict U.S. personnel and equipment. And it has consistently done so, to the frustration of American military planners.
Admittedly, one could argue that the Turks were right to hold off on joining America’s ill-fated war in Iraq. But that would be ignoring Turkey’s role in other international conflicts. Take the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan since 2001, where Turkey limited its role to logistics and training and refused to take part in combat. Similarly, Turkey deployed nearly 400 personnel to NATO forces in Kosovo, as well as other personnel to other international operations in the Balkans, but with responsibilities limited to training, observation and support. To its credit, Ankara did play a significant role in NATO’s operations in Libya by sending aircraft, frigates and other assets in 2011. But only on Erdogan’s terms: The Turks had an interest in seeing Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood – the group upon which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) draws its ideological inspiration – emerge as the power broker in Tripoli. Sure, there have been other smaller international operations. But the post-9/11 patrols of the Mediterranean Sea and patrols on the Red Sea to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, or even the Turkish frigate now sailing with a NATO maritime group on a six-month stint, hardly change one uncomfortable fact: Turkey is not a reliable Western ally.
But Turkey’s lackluster record as an active NATO partner cannot be judged upon its military activity alone. After all, NATO has struggled to play a useful role in preserving world peace. The organization has been beset by chain-of-command problems that have made its operations less than effective for decades, to the point that few expect much from it any longer. The competing rules of engagement of the various militaries within the Afghanistan coalition introduced a new level of dysfunction. But membership in NATO still holds significance. The alliance was designed to be an elite group of countries that stood for Western values. The NATO charter, set forth in 1949, holds that member states will protect one and all from attack at the hands of ideological foes. The Turkish Republic, founded and governed as an avowedly secular state, agreed to these terms in 1952, three years after NATO’s founding. Of course, NATO was initially engineered to fight communism. But over the years, the threats to the international system have changed. The latest challenge is a jihadist ideology that fuels the Islamic State, but also al Qaeda and other terror groups and their state sponsors.
Yet, it has become clear that Turkey, once a bulwark of secularism in the Muslim world, is now ambivalent at best, and complicit at worst, about fighting these forces. The fact that the AKP is a splinter of the Muslim Brotherhood provides a good indication of its leanings. More troublingly, it is a champion of the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas and allows several of its senior figures to operate out of Turkey. It has failed consistently to uphold international standards on fighting terrorism finance, including the designation of al Qaeda figures on its own soil. It has been reluctant to even acknowledge that groups like the Nusra Front—which has pledged fealty to al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri—are terrorist organizations. Its dangerously lax border policies have contributed to the rise of the Islamic State. And it has helped Iran, the leading state sponsor of terrorism in the world, evade sanctions at the height of the international community’s efforts to hinder its illicit nuclear program.
Tellingly, in September of last year, Ankara announced that it would purchase a missile-defense system from a Chinese company that was under U.S. sanctions for aiding Iran’s proliferation efforts. Intense U.S. and NATO pressure scuttled that deal. But other troubling Turkish policies continue unabated without a peep from the West. The crisis in Kobane once again brings the challenge of Turkey into sharp relief. Despite the best efforts of Washington and other coalition members to bring Turkey along, it now appears clear: Turkey under the AKP is a lost cause. It is simply not a partner for NATO. Nor is it a partner in the fight against the Islamic State.
Burak Bekdil
Gatestone Institute, Oct. 31, 2014
Shortly after the Arab Spring rocked several capitals in the Middle East, the Turks devised a plan that would enable their country to emerge as the new Ottoman Empire. While deliberately and systematically antagonizing Israel, Ankara would: replace the Shia-controlled Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad with a Turkey-friendly Sunni ruler; support the Sunni in Iraq and Lebanon and boost their political influence; support Hamas in the Palestinian territories and provoke it to violence against Israel; and make sure that the Muslim Brotherhood or their various brethren rule Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. Saudis were already "our Muslim brothers." Eventually, all former Ottoman lands would produce governments subservient to the emerging Turkish Empire.
Nearly four years later, Syria's Assad is comfortably sitting in his presidential palace in Damascus and possibly laughing at the mess the Turks created by supporting Syria's jihadists. These jihadists have only wreaked havoc along Turkey's nearly 900-mile-long borders with both Syria and Iraq. The Shia in Iraq are as powerful as before, and remain obedient to Turkey's regional sectarian rival, Iran. The Shia in Lebanon — where Turks are a high-value currency on the hostage market — are increasingly hostile to Turkey. No one knows who rules Libya after the downfall of Colonel Qaddafi, but none of the warring factions want any Turks meddling in the former Ottoman colony. Meanwhile, a coup in July 2013 toppled the Turks' most-trusted regional ally, Egypt's then president, Mohamed Morsi. Today, not only the Turks but also Turkish products — including even soap operas — are unwanted in Egypt.
With the downfall — ironically, instead of Assad — of their Islamist allies in the region, the Turks recently discreetly moved to win back Egypt, the most populous Muslim nation in the region. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu asked to meet with his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh Hassan Shorky Selim, on the sidelines of the UN summit in September. The Egyptian minister abruptly cancelled the meeting, citing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's "insulting words about [Egyptian] President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi." A statement from the Egyptian foreign ministry called Erdogan's words "lies and fabrication." More recently, Cairo announced that it would not renew a three-year transit trade agreement with Turkey. The decision indicates a further worsening of bilateral ties, which had been downgraded, as in the instance of Israel, to the level of chargé d'affaires. The transit trade agreement, signed in 2012 when Morsi was in power, had facilitated Turkish exports to African nations and the Gulf through Egypt's mainland, via Egyptian ports. Turkish companies previously sent their cargo to Gulf and African customers through Syria, when relations with Syria were normal. After Erdogan chose cold war with Syria, the Syrian route was closed to the Turks. The Turks then signed the transit deal with Egypt to use their ports and mainland as the alternative route. Now that Egypt will terminate this agreement, Turkish companies will be deprived of an easy route to Gulf and African customers.
Ironically, only six weeks before General al-Sisi ousted Egypt's Islamist President Morsi, Turkey had granted Egypt a $250 million loan to finance Turkish-Egyptian joint defense projects. The loan, the first of its kind, was intended to boost defense cooperation and Turkish exports of defense equipment to Egypt. At that time, Turkey was hoping to sell Egypt scores of Turkish-made drones, tactical naval boats and helicopters. Egypt's hostile move was a "shock" to Ankara, but only to Ankara. "Apparently everyone dealing with the Egyptians knew this was coming, except the Turks," said one EU ambassador in Ankara. It was not a secret that Egypt and the Turks' "Muslim brothers, Saudi Arabia" aggressively lobbied against Turkey's failed bid in September to win the seat of the non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The EU ambassador said: "There may be further Egyptian moves to retaliate against Turkish hostilities. After Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon and Israel, Turkey has completely lost Egypt."
That mishap left Turkey's Islamists with one ideological ally in the former Ottoman lands: Tunisia, where the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Ennahda party was in a coalition government — until this past weekend. Ennahda, the first Islamist movement to secure power after the 2011 Arab Spring revolts, conceded defeat in elections that are expected to make its main secular rival, Nidaa Tounes party, the strongest force in parliament. This defeat is a huge setback for Erdogan's Tunisian ideological allies, who had headed a coalition government with two non-religious partners for more than two years. Tunisia was the final chapter in Erdogan's book of defeat. Neo-Ottomanism was a childish dream. It is, now, a "sealed" childish dream.
In the entire Middle East, Turkey now has only two allies: Qatar, which looks more like a rich, family-owned gas station than a state; and Hamas, a terrorist organization. But Turkey has a rich menu of hostilities: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, (discreetly) Jordan, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, (as always) Cyprus, (now) Tunisia, (also discreetly) Morocco and Algeria, and (most warring factions of) Libya. In an April 2012 speech, then Foreign Minister Davutoglu defined Turkey's policy goal as: "On the historic march of our holy nation, the AK Party signals the birth of a global power and the mission for a new world order. This is the centenary of our exit from the Middle East… whatever we lost between 1911 and 1923, whatever lands we withdrew from, from 2011 to 2023 we shall once again meet our brothers in those lands. This is a … historic mission." That was a not-so-covert message of a strategic goal of reviving the Empire. Only nine years before the deadline to "meet our brothers" and the birth of Turkey as "a global power with a mission to build a new world order," Turkey looks rather dramatically isolated.
TURKS HATE EVERYONE (EXCEPT TURKS)
Lori Lowenthal Marcus
Jewish Press, Nov. 3, 2014
A new Pew Research Poll found that more Turks dislike Israel than dislike either Hezbollah or Hamas. In fact, Israel is the most disliked country in Turkey, according to the poll, with 86 percent having an unfavorable opinion of the Jewish state. Of course, Israel is portrayed by the leadership in Turkey as a detestable nation, so it is no wonder that the people share their leader’s view. As Turkey’s leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has grown first slowly and now ever more quickly away from the policies of the secular heavyweight Ataturk, his belligerence and growing Islamic fervor has frequently found expression in his criticisms of Israel.
The most public ugliness between Israel and Turkey was over the Mavi Marmara disaster in May 2010. Erdoğan blamed Israel completely, loudly and with great fervor, despite the anti-Israel, terrorist-supporting Turkish thugs who attacked the Israelis (who were not permitted to use their live side weapons) boarding their ship when it attempted to break Israel’s legal blockade of Gaza. See the video clip at the end of this article. Ten Turks died in the ensuing meleé and Erdoğan, with his buddy Mr. Obama, demanded Israel both apologize and provide compensation.
Surely the Turks look favorably upon the United States. After all, U.S. President Obama has fawned over the Turkey’s leader Erdoğan, referring to his Turkish counterpart as his closest friend in the Middle East. No, nearly two-thirds of all Turks have an unfavorable opinion of the U.S., and that less than loving picture has remained fairly constant for more than a decade. But neither Israelis nor Americans should feel bad. The Turks don’t much like anyone. Other than Turkey. Almost four-fifths of Turks have a positive opinion about their own country.
How do other countries stack up in the opinion of Turks? Not too well. In addition to Israel, the U.S. and Iran being viewed unfavorably by more than three-quarters of all Turks, Russia, Brazil and China are disliked by well more than half of the population. In fact, the only state which almost – almost – half of the Turkish population does not detest is Saudi Arabia, and still, only 26 percent have what they consider to be a favorable opinion of the Saudis. Even NATO, of which Turkey has been a member for 60 years, does not rank high with the Turks. Only 19% of the Turkish population has a favorable opinion about NATO, and 70 percent have an unfavorable one.
But perhaps of greater interest is that well more than half of the population has an unfavorable (66 percent) opinion of the European Union, and only a quarter think favorably about the EU. Turkey has been trying desperately for years to join the EU. No doubt its star has fallen with EU members as well. Another interesting finding is that although Turkey is currently on the hot seat with ISIS gaining strength on its borders, only half of Turkey’s population expressed concern about the growth of Islamic extremism in its country.
What does Israel (sic) really detest? Not so much ISIS. It is the tiny Jewish State which is rock bottom as far as the Turks are concerned. Only two percent of the population of Turkey has a favorable opinion of Israel.
How Turkey Went Bad: Daniel Pipes, Middle East Forum, Oct. 13, 2014 —Only twelve years ago, the Republic of Turkey was correctly seen as a stalwart NATO ally, the model of a pro-Western Muslim state, and a bridge between Europe and the Middle East.
Normalization Between Ankara and Jerusalem? Guess Again.: Burak Bekdil, Gatestone Institute, Oct. 30, 2014—Until Jerusalem is the capital of a Palestinian state and Israel is pushed back to its pre-1967 borders, it will be "halal" for Erdogan to blame Israel for global warming, the Ebola virus, starvation in Africa and every other misfortune the world faces.
Growing Kurdish Unity Helps West, Worries Turkey: Joe Parkinson, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 22, 2014—Kurds in Iraq and Syria set aside long-held rivalries and took steps to unify their forces this week to battle Islamic State, gaining greater international legitimacy but magnifying fears in Turkey that a powerful enemy is on the rise.
Hamas Operates Command Center in Turkey: Israeli Defense Minister: I24 News, Oct. 22, 2014—Hamas has two command centers, one in the Gaza Strip and one in Turkey, Israel's Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon said Tuesday.
Burying Ataturk In Erdogan’s Castle: Steven A. Cook, Council on Foreign Relations, Nov. 3, 2014—What can anyone say about Turkey’s new presidential palace that has not already been said? It is enormous. It is gaudy. It is expensive.
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