CONDI’S LESSONS:
Rick Richman
Commentary, February 2012
The following is a review of Condoleezza Rice’s No Higher Honor:
A Memoir Of My Years In Washington (Crown Publishers, 766 pages.)…Condoleezza Rice’s memoir of her service as national-security adviser and secretary of state…covers a decade, starting in 1999 when she joined George W. Bush’s presidential campaign as foreign-affairs adviser.
She has written a straightforward chronological account, providing a great deal of detail but relatively little reflection on the lessons of her experience. The lessons she does draw and that one can draw about her tenure are worth noting, however, particularly on the issue that appears to have been the most important to her personally, to which she devoted most of her last two years as secretary of state and nine chapters (and parts of others) in this book: the Middle East peace process.…
Once Rice became secretary of state, she was no longer simply a broker, but a player. She knew it would mean a different relationship with the president…and a different institutional role, and she decided that before accepting the appointment, she needed to talk with him “as directly as we ever had.” She wanted him to confirm her primacy in foreign policy, and she raised “the one substantive issue that was on my mind.” “Mr. President,” she said, “we need to get an agreement and establish a Palestinian state.” Bush told her, “We’ll get it done.”
The story of how they failed to get it done is an important part of Rice’s book and a fair standard by which to judge her service, since she made a Palestinian state her priority. In 2001, the Bush administration inherited a new Palestinian terror war that began after the Palestinians rejected a state at Camp David. Rice writes that the conflict “dominated our security agenda” in the spring of 2001, as the administration sought to “avoid all-out conflagration in the region” and to develop a new approach to the conflict—one that “relied much more on fundamental change among Palestinians as the key to peace.”
Bush had decided the focus would henceforth not be simply on the contours of a Palestinian state but rather on, in Rice’s words, “what the nature of the Palestinian state would be.” He believed Palestinians needed to establish institutions to end terrorism, govern democratically, and act responsibly toward Israel before they would be ready for a state. Rice describes Bush as frustrated with the “indirect language” of the peace process—he wanted U.S. goals stated clearly.
That led to a 2002 speech in which Bush endorsed a Palestinian state, but conditioned U.S. support on the creation of a “practicing democracy.” Rice recounts that all hell broke loose in the Arab world after the speech, as Arab states failed to credit Bush for committing the U.S. to a Palestinian state and instead engulfed him in criticism for attaching his condition. The experience taught Rice an “important lesson”: “Whatever you do for peace in the Middle East, it is never enough for the Arab parties.”
Then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stunned Rice in 2004 by informing her he was considering a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza if he could get assurances that Israel would retain the largest West Bank settlement blocs. Rice led negotiations to provide the necessary assurances, with her deputies Stephen Hadley and Elliott Abrams going to Israel for long sessions with Sharon, leading to a 2004 Bush letter about accommodating the “already existing major Israeli population centers.” Rice spent three hours with Sharon going over the letter the night before it was issued, and she acknowledges an informal agreement to apply a “Google Earth test” for settlements: no new ones or building outward from existing ones. This effectively permitted construction within settlement blocs that Israel would keep in a peace agreement, without diminishing the land area available for a Palestinian state.
Israel thereafter withdrew from Gaza. Within 18 months, Hamas won control of the Palestinian legislature, took over Gaza in a bloody coup, and escalated its rocket war against Israel. The Palestinians had failed to dismantle terrorist groups; half the putative state was in the hands of terrorists; no institutions of democracy had been built (the Palestinian president had run essentially unopposed in 2005 in a rapid election held six weeks after Arafat’s death, and the Palestinian legislature no longer functioned).
Rice nevertheless decided this was the time for an international conference to launch final-status negotiations on the shape and size of a Palestinian state (Bush was “immediately skeptical”). She faced what she described as a “sticky sequencing problem” in the so-called Road Map to which Bush had committed the United States in his 2004 letter. As she writes: “The original Road Map had a strict three-phase structure. Political negotiations were not to begin until the third phase, when the Palestinians would, in effect, have created all their institutions and defeated the terrorists. That had been a key element in Sharon’s acceptance of the document.”
Rice proposed to take the “original” Road Map and “accelerate” it. She “rearranged the sequence” to move straight to Phase III, converting what had been a principled policy into a euphemistic repetition of the past: Once again the focus was on the contours of a Palestinian state, not on the precondition Bush had set in 2002. The Road Map had not been “accelerated” but disregarded.
Rice’s summary of her efforts to convene a discussion to lay out this new approach is a small classic of unintended diplomatic humor. She thought the time was “particularly propitious” to launch negotiations on “all the big issues,” but it took a long time simply to resolve whether to call the event a “conference” or a “meeting” and to frame an invitation. Bush announced what Rice calls a “conference, meeting, whatever” without a date or location.
Then Rice found that, after years of “begging for a peace conference, the Arabs suddenly had all kinds of reservations, worries, and demands.” She had to go to the Middle East four times to urge them to participate, finding herself “flabbergasted at the seeming lack of enthusiasm.” (Three hundred pages earlier, she had described her inability to get wealthy Arab states to increase financial support for the Palestinian Authority as “my first lesson in how stingy the Arabs could be toward the Palestinian cause that they so zealously championed”).
Ten days before the “whatever” was to convene in Annapolis, “we didn’t have agreement on who would come or what the invitation would say.” She made more than 20 phone calls to Arab countries and finally persuaded them to attend last-minute negotiations.… Rice concludes her chapter on “The Road to Annapolis” with this sentence: “We were ready for the international meeting, which, by the way, had come to be called a conference after all.”
It was a triumph of indirect language: The Road Map had been “accelerated” to discuss “core issues” (the new term for “final-status issues”), which would be resolved but supposedly not “implemented” until the Palestinians met the conditions they had already demonstrated neither the will nor ability to meet. This was to be done with a kickoff meeting elevated to a “conference” to give it an unearned credibility.
Two days before the Annapolis conference convened, there was still no agreement about what the president would announce at it, and his statement was finalized only 10 minutes before it began. The reader cannot help recall one of Rice’s lessons from 400 pages earlier: “Only a fool goes to an important meeting in which the President will be involved without an agreed text.” The Annapolis statement announced that the parties had agreed to agree and had set a one-year deadline for agreement.
At the end of 2007, Rice told Bush she was looking forward to the final year to “tie up a lot of loose ends and maybe—just maybe—declare the creation of a Palestinian state.” The loose ends of Iran and North Korea never got tied up, but Rice stepped up her push for a Palestinian state, traveling to the Middle East monthly, and sometimes even more frequently. In mid-2008, she dined alone with [then-Prime Minister Ehud] Olmert, who presented to her a “remarkable,” “extraordinary,” “unbelievable” proposal: He would offer Abbas 94 percent of the West Bank, with land swaps for the rest, a capital in East Jerusalem, and joint control of the holy sites. He conveyed the offer personally to Abbas in September, but Abbas never returned to discuss it.
In December, Bush met with Abbas alone in the Oval Office and “appealed to him to reconsider,” but Abbas “stood firm, and the idea died.…”
Rice concludes that “in the end, the Palestinians walked away.” The administration ended up without a Palestinian state, much less the practicing democracy that had once been the U.S. precondition for one. As Rice left office, there was an unelected Palestinian entity in the West Bank and a new tyranny in Gaza—and after three years of rocket attacks, Israel had found it necessary to go to war there against Hamas. Rice’s insistence to Bush that “we need to get an agreement and establish a Palestinian state,” with an end run around the Road Map, led to a tenure as secretary of state most remarkable for its pointlessness.
NETANYAHU’S BORDER PROPOSAL:
ISRAEL TO RETAIN SETTLEMENT BLOCS, BUT NOT JORDAN VALLEY
Barak Ravid
Haaretz, February 19, 2012
Three weeks after the end of the talks that took place between Israel and the Palestinians in Amman under the patronage of the King of Jordan, Israeli officials revealed their version of the events, laying the blame for the failure of the talks on Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas.…
The five rounds of talks in Amman were the result of international pressure placed on Abbas [in response to his attempt to obtain a unilateral declaration of statehood at the UN] and immediately after his speech to the General Assembly on September 23, 2011. On that same day, the members of the Quartet—the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations—declared a new outline for talks and called on both sides to respond positively.
After a few weeks, both Israel and the Palestinians responded to the request with a “yes, but…” with both sides presenting a list of reservations. A month after the assembly, delegations from the Quartet arrived [in the Middle East] for first-round talks with Israeli and Palestinian representatives.
According to a top Israeli official, on the day of the meeting, the prime minister’s envoy, Isaac Molho, arrived at the hotel and entered the meeting room only to discover that his Palestinian counterpart, Saeb Erekat, did not make it to the meeting. Mohammad Shtayyeh, a member of Fatah’s central committee was sent in his stead. The Palestinian side did not agree to sit with Molho in the same room, and the envoys were resigned to hopping between different rooms in the hotel in order to hold discussions between the two sides.…
For over a month, the Quarter envoys attempted to bring the Palestinians to the negotiation room, but only when King Abdullah II began to apply pressure did things begin to move. The king came to Ramallah on a rare trip and pressured Mahmoud Abbas. Finally, on January 3, the Jordanians were able to bring together Erekat and Molho in Jordan’s Foreign Ministry in Amman.
First meeting: The blame game
A senior Israeli official said that the January 3 meeting began in a wider forum where Jordanian, Israeli and Palestinian officials were present, as well representatives of all the Quarter members. While speaking in front of no less than 20 people, Saeb Erekat pulled out two documents: one on the Palestinian position regarding borders, and one on the Palestinian position regarding security.… On the topic of borders, the Palestinians called for a return to 1967 borders with an acceptance of land-swaps of 1.9% of the West Bank. On the topic of security, the Palestinians agreed to a demilitarized state (devoid of heavy weaponry), and the stationing of an international force on the border between Israel and Jordan, with no presence of Israeli soldiers.
After the meeting in the general forum, the sides moved to a smaller meeting with only Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian representatives alone. According to the Israeli official, the Palestinians immediately demanded a freeze on settlement building, freeing prisoners and emphasized that from their point of view, the talks would end on January 26 as that was the date that the Quartet set for negotiations on the subject of borders and security.
The Israeli delegation was surprised by the announcement. “We had just begun and you are already threatening to end the talks,” said Molho to Erekat. The Israeli side emphasized to the Palestinians that the talks are only in their beginning stages and that with such a short timeframe it is impossible to hold serious negotiations. At that same meeting, Molho presented a 21-point document that included all the topics Israel is interested in discussing during the talks, including borders, Jerusalem, settlements, security arrangements, Palestinian incitement and more.… The meeting produced very little progress, except for the fact that the two sides agreed to decide on another two meetings that would take place during January.
Second Meeting: Molho asks for clarification
On January 9, a second meeting took place between Molho and Erekat, this time in a smaller forum. Present alongside the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams was Jordan’s Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh and his top adviser. Molho, who went over the documents presented by the Palestinians during the previous meeting, passed along a document with 19 requests for clarification regarding the Palestinians’ positions.
One of Molho’s questions was about the future of the settlements in the Palestinian state. Would they be evacuated or would they be allowed to remain?… “Erekat told us that he prefers not to respond to the question, and until this day we have not received an answer,” said a top Israeli official. Another question brought up by Molho to Erekat had to do with the PA’s relationship to Hamas and the situation in the Gaza Strip. Erekat responded that the Palestinian state will be “a strong democracy,” and blamed Israel for Hamas’ takeover of Gaza.
Molho further asked whether the position on borders was final. The top Israeli official claimed that among the Palestinian delegation there were contradictory positions on the issue. “On the one hand, Erekat told us that the documents are not the Quran and are not holy. On the other hand, Mohammad Shatyyeh told us that the Palestinians had already made their compromise and that a land swap of 1.9% is the maximum they are willing to give,” he said. “In the end, the Palestinian proposals were a step backward from the more progressive positions that they presented in Annapolis.”
Fourth meeting: Israeli general sits outside the room
A third meeting between the two sides took place on January 14, but did not produce any results. During a meeting on January 18, the Israeli delegation brought with it the Head of the Strategic Planning Division in the IDF Planning Directorate, Brigadier-General Assaf Orion in order to summarize Israel’s position on security arrangements. The Palestinians refused to allow him to speak. “We came to the meeting place and were delayed for an hour and a half because the Palestinians were not willing to hear the Israeli general. They said that they are not willing to hear a military person speak,” said the Israeli official.
When both sides finally entered the room, Erekat handed Molho a letter that demanded the release of Hamas member and Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council Aziz Duwaik, who was arrested a few days earlier. A few hours later, the contents of the letter were leaked to the Palestinian media.
The Israeli side also presented documents to the Palestinians, including one on incitement against Israel in the Palestinian media. The document contained quotes from the Mufti of Jerusalem that called for the killing of Jews. Erekat rejected the claims. “The accusations are wrong, and in the end you will have to apologize for this slander,” said Erekat to Molho.
In the meeting that took place afterwards, the Palestinians had understood that they had a problem on their hands, and suggested organizing a joint committee that would deal with the issue of incitement. Head of Israel’s National Information Directorate Yoaz Hendel, who participated in the meeting, told Erekat that instead of organizing a committee, they themselves can take care of the issue of incitement.
Fifth meeting: Molho presents Netanyahu’s proposal on borders
On January 25, a day before the date which the Palestinians threatened to walk out on the talks, the final round of talks took place between the sides. During the discussions, Molho presented Netanyahu’s proposal on the borders of the Palestinian state. Molho presented several principles:
1. The border will be drawn in a way that will include the maximum amount of Israelis living in the West Bank, and the minimum amount of Palestinians.
2. Israel will annex the large settlement blocs, without defining what exactly is considered a ‘bloc,’ nor defining its size.
3. It is necessary to first solve the problem of borders and security in relation to Judea and Samaria, and only afterwards move to discuss the topic of Jerusalem which is far more complicated.
4. Israel will maintain a presence in the Jordan Valley for a period of time. Molho did not mention how long nor what kind of presence.
During the meeting, Erekat asked for clarification regarding the Jordan Valley. Molho referred him to Netanyahu’s speech to the opening session of the Knesset, as well as to that in front of Congress in May 2011. In both speeches, Netanyahu spoke of a “military presence along the Jordan River,” yet he did not demand that Israel maintain sovereignty over the valley. “And if we refuse?” Erekat asked. Molho responded: “You would prefer that we annex the valley?”
Molho did not mention the exact size of the territory from which Israel will withdraw, but according to the principles he presented, it seems that it is similar, if not identical to that which was presented by Tzipi Livni during the negotiations that took place in 2008 after the Annapolis Conference. And although Netanyahu does not admit it, the meaning behind the principles Molho presented is a withdrawal that will cause Israel to give up 90% of its sovereignty.…
Erekat, who understood the principles, asked at the end of the meetings for a series of clarifications: whether Israel accepts the 1967 borders as a basic tenet upon which the two sides can negotiation, whether Israel accepts the principle of territory swaps, how many percentages of the West Bank is Israel interested in annexing, whether Israel has a map with border proposals, whether Israel is willing to evacuate settlements, etc.
“I’d be happy to answer all these questions in the next meeting,” said Molho to Erekat. But the next meeting never took place. A day later, the Palestinians said that they will not resume talks unless Israel freezes settlement building and accepts the principle of 1967 borders.
Israeli officials: Abbas ran away once again
Israelis are now admitting that the talks have come to an end and their renewal is not expected anytime soon, especially in light of the recent reconciliation between Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled Meshal in Doha. Up until two weeks ago, Netanyahu had discussed a series of goodwill gestures toward the Palestinians with Tony Blair and the Americans, in order to enable the renewal of the talks. However, the [agreement] between Abbas and Meshal caused the Israelis to take the offer off the table.
In a briefing to journalists in Jerusalem, Israeli officials blamed the freeze in the talks on Abbas. “For the past three weeks, Abbas has run away from negotiations, and has done the same regarding the talks in Amman,” said a top Israeli official. “We had the willingness to make gestures and we presented a full package, but the Palestinians simply did not want it. More and more international bodies understand that we were not the ones that thwarted the talks. You can see it from the silence on the part of the Jordanians. They did not blame Israel in any way.…”
What now? Officials in Jerusalem are waiting to see which path Abbas will take: reconciliation with Hamas,…a return to the United Nations or, in a more optimistic scenario, a willingness to return to talks with Israel. “It is unclear what the Palestinians will choose, but we believe they will return to their campaign in the United Nations within a few weeks,” said the Israeli official.…
