Which Iraq will Triumph in Mosul?: Seth J. Frantzman, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 23, 2016— On October 20 the Kurdish peshmerga launched an operation to liberate the town of Bashiqa.
Turkey's Dangerous Moves in Iraq: Burak Bekdil, Gatestone Institute, Oct. 11, 2016— In a span of five years Turkey has had serious political and military tensions with several countries in its vicinity …
Who Will Rule Nineveh After ISIS?: Hassan Mneimneh, Real Clear World, Oct. 24, 2016 — In an ideal world, the ousting of a militant group that has openly committed genocide and engaged in ethnic and religious cleansing ought to be followed by an affirmation of national unity.
The US Must Support a Safe Haven for Persecuted Mideast Christians: Mario Bramnick, Jewish Press, Oct. 25— Great suffering is occurring in Iraq and Syria.
Turkey Barges Into the Mosul Fight: New York Times, Oct. 24, 2016
Disunity as Kurds, Turks, Shia, and Sunnis Fight over Mosul: Jonathan Spyer, The Australian, Oct. 8, 2016
Iraqi Christians Narrowly Escape ISIS: Danny Gold, Daily Beast, Oct. 24, 2016
What Happens After Mosul Falls Will Set the New Status Quo for Region: Matthew Fisher, National Post, Oct. 17, 2016
WHICH IRAQ WILL TRIUMPH IN MOSUL?
Seth J. Frantzman
Jerusalem Post, Oct. 23, 2016
On October 20 the Kurdish peshmerga launched an operation to liberate the town of Bashiqa. They sought to flank the town and surround it and some villages nearby. But the offensive was slowed by tough ISIS resistance and what Kurds said was a lack of enough coordination and air support from the American-led coalition. By nightfall there had been casualties and the operation paused for a day. Bulldozers went to the front and carved out new frontline positions. Farther southeast on October 21 the Iraqi army’s elite counter-terror Golden Division was hammering ISIS in Bakhdida and Bartella, two Christian towns that are 12 kilometers from Mosul. The Iraqi 9th armored division was also involved in trying to take Bakhdida, but the operation was moving slowly.
There is a momentary feeling of a unique alliance in Iraq as Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi, mostly Shia, Arabs from the regular army fight side by side against ISIS. But the alliance is complex. Kurds were surprised to see Iraqi flags fluttering from humvees and trucks moving to the front in early October after the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government allowed Iraqi army transit through the region to get to the front. People wondered why Kurds have fought and died for two years for these frontlines, while the Iraqis now are being transported to them with ease. They wonder whether the American-led coalition wants to use Kurds to fight ISIS but will not stand by Kurdistan when the war is over.
There is a belief among many in the Kurdish region that Iraq is like a shackle weighing down people’s hopes and dreams. One lawyer told me he has difficulty traveling abroad on an Iraqi passport. “It’s the worst passport except for the Somali one.” What benefits does the Kurdish region get from being part of a state that often feels like a failure. No one wants to come on tourism to “Iraq”, but they would come to “Kurdistan.” Oil revenues and state budget have been cut to the Kurdish region by the central government and the Kurd sought to export oil on their own. Trade comes from Turkey, not via Baghdad. New malls glisten in Kurdistan and there is an open, liberal atmosphere. But in Baghdad the parliament passed a ban alcohol sales and importation, reverting to conservative ways.
As the offensive to defeat ISIS creeps toward Mosul it appears essential that the cooperation taking place today between Sunni tribal leaders, Kurds and Shia can present an opportunity for a different Iraq to triumph in Mosul. A Sunni Arab sheikh,and Iraq parliament member who lives in Erbil named Ahmed al-Jarba visited the frontline on October 22 was upbeat that this united Iraq might triumph. “There is good cooperation between Peshmerga and the Iraqi army, including the Sunni tribes that we could not predict before. I want to assure people of Mosul that they will be liberated.” He said that unlike in Ramadi or Fallujah where Sunni civilians suffered, the residents of Mosul will not be harmed by the offensive. Kurdish fighters on the ground said they were also hopeful. “We have good relations with the Iraqis stationed here,” a local officer said as dust from an Iraqi tank driving toward the front from Gwer blanketed them.
There are many signs of cooperation. Christian militias are fighting side by side with the Iraqi army to liberate Christian towns in Nineveh which border Mosul. Even the Shia militia Hashd al-Sha’abi has put out a video showing Christian churches reoccupied with their parishoners. Kurds have worked hard to rescue members of the Shabak minority whose inhabit more than 50 villages that are being liberated from ISIS. Yazidis have gained refuge in the Kurdish region. For a moment it seems like this grand alliance is something unique and special. But none of these forces are united. Christians have three different militias, one close to the Kurdish government and one closer to Baghdad, Iraqi tanks fly Shia flags, Kurds have Kurdish flags.
Some Shia Shabak minorities support Baghdad, whereas Sunnis prefer Kurdish rule. Many groups want their own autonomous areas, with Assyrian Christians, Yazidis, and Sunni Arabs all talking about more rights after the threat ISIS posed. And don’t forget the Turks whose have revived old Ottoman-era connections to Mosul and want a role protecting the Turkmen minority. Unity in separateness might be a good term for what has happened in Iraq. Unity against a common enemy.
The question many are asking is whether this can be maintained after the conflict with ISIS ends. The Kurdish economy was badly affect(ed) by the war. Tourism and development projects were put on hold. Men postponed studies to defend their land. Security has been upped throughout the country with checkpoints on the roads and constant need to track down potential threats.
The international community has been supportive of the Kurds, with the US funding the Peshmerga directly and training and working closely with Kurdish units alongside other coalition countries. When the war is over will that aid and support dry up. The US administration of Barack Obama has been pressing for the Mosul offensive to be finished by the time his term ends. That leaves a new US administration without the “problem” of fighting ISIS in Iraq, but if that administration is not committed to its Kurdish allies and prefers to revert to old form of only dealing with Baghdad, it will find that the same problems that existed before 2014 will return.
TURKEY'S DANGEROUS MOVES IN IRAQ
Burak Bekdil
Gatestone Institute, Oct. 11, 2016
In a span of five years Turkey has had serious political and military tensions with several countries in its vicinity: Israel, Syria, Russia, Jordan, Egypt, Cyprus and Greece. Most recently, Iraq has also joined the club of hostilities surrounding Turkey. Despite the Iraqi government's vehement requests that Turkey withdraw its troops in Iraq, Ankara shrugs it off and says it will maintain its military presence in the neighboring country for "Iraq's stability." What a nice neighborly gesture! Behind the Turkish indifference lies sectarian concerns and ambitions.
On October 1, Turkey's parliament extended the mandate of Turkish troops deployed in Iraqi territory by one more year. The troops are stationed near Bashiqa in northern Iraq — as unwanted guests. That sparked a row with Baghdad and may further complicate the cold sectarian war between the Sunnis in the region, supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and their Shiite enemies, supported by Iran and the Shiite-controlled government in Baghdad.
Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi renewed the call for the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from his country and warned that Turkey's military adventurism could trigger another war in the Middle East. He said: "We do not want to enter into a military confrontation with Turkey … The Turkish insistence on [its] presence inside Iraqi territories has no justification." The Iraqi parliament said in a statement: "The Iraqi government must consider Turkish troops as hostile occupying forces." Baghdad has also requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to discuss the issue. The UNSC should "shoulder its responsibility and adopt a resolution to end to the Turkish troops' violation of Iraq's sovereignty," said Ahmad Jamal, spokesman for the Iraqi Foreign Ministry.
The Turkish move does not annoy only Iraq, but also its Western allies. Col. John Dorrian, the spokesman for the US-led coalition of 65 countries that fight the Islamic State (ISIS), said that Turkish troops in Iraq are not acting as part of the alliance. Dorrian said that Turkey is operating "on its own" in Iraq. He added that the coalition position is that every unit "should be here with the coordination or and with the permission of the government of Iraq."
By October 9, things started to get more annoying. Iraq's Ambassador to Turkey, Hisham Alawi, said: "If we do not reach some result, the Iraqi government will be forced to consider other options, and by doing so, Iraq would be practicing its right to defend its sovereignty and Iraq's interests." Ankara remains defiant. Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said that Turkish troops would remain in Iraq. Turkey's pretext is that its troops are in Iraq to "fight ISIS." That does not convince anyone. Turkey's intention is largely sectarian (read: pro-Sunni) and Yildirim admitted that in a not-so-subtle way when he said that the Turkish troops were in Iraq also "to make sure that no change to the region's 'demographic structure' is imposed by force."
Turkey fears that the aftermath of a planned assault on Mosul, Iraq's second largest city and ISIS's Iraqi stronghold, could see a heavy Shiite and Kurdish dominance in the Mosul area. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said: "Involving Shiite militias in the operation [against IS] will not bring peace to Mosul. On the contrary, it will increase problems." Unsurprisingly Turkey's pro-Sunni Islamists want Sunni dominance in a foreign country. This is not the first time they passionately do so.
The problem is that Turkey's sectarian ambitions come at a time when the coalition is preparing a heavy offensive on ISIS-controlled Mosul. Turkey's primary concern is not to drive ISIS out of Mosul but to make it a "Sunni-controlled city" after ISIS has been pushed out. And this ambition jeopardizes the planned assault on ISIS.
Iraqis think that the offensive to retake Mosul from ISIS is unlikely to begin as long as Turkish troops remain in Iraq. "I think that as long as these Turkish troops remain around Mosul, the operation to control the city will not start, or there must be a new agreement for the Turkish force not to take part in the offensive," said Iraqi lawmaker Abdelaziz Hasan, also a member of the defense and security committee at the Iraqi parliament.
Turkey's sectarian ambitions in neighboring Syria have ended up in total failure and bloodshed. Now Ankara wants to try another sectarian adventure in another neighboring and near-failed state, under the pretext of "bringing stability." Yildirim said that Turkey "bears responsibility for stability in Iraq." That is simply funny. You cannot bring stability to a country that looks more like a battleground of multiple religious wars than a country with just a few hundred troops.
WHO WILL RULE NINEVEH AFTER ISIS?
Hassan Mneimneh
Real Clear World, Oct. 24, 2016
In an ideal world, the ousting of a militant group that has openly committed genocide and engaged in ethnic and religious cleansing ought to be followed by an affirmation of national unity. This sadly is not the case in Iraq’s war-torn Nineveh province.
Many communities victimized by the Islamic State group are now pondering their fate and their place in the Iraq that will follow the liberation of Nineveh, the last Iraqi province held by the terrorist organization. Yazidis, Christians, and Shiite Turkmen generally agree that new administrative arrangements should offer each group a degree of autonomy while recognizing their primacy on the territory they claim. Three questions remain open, however, once the discussion moves from the general to the specific: What would be the geographic extent of the territory? What administrative shape will it take, and how much autonomy might it possess? Finally, which government would claim its allegiance — the central government in Baghdad, or the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil?
Nineveh is the heartland of historical Northern Mesopotamia. Its ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity is the product of centuries of conquests, trade, migration, displacement, and fusion. Competing narratives highlighting the entitlement of the many communities of the region were built upon history remembered, discovered, and imagined, and have co-existed throughout the past century. The recent sequence of tragedies afflicting the region, however, has polarized the narratives and nudged them toward calls for separation.
The Yazidi self-image is one of fierce independence and defiance. Yet it has also been one of proud Iraqi patriotism. A sense of betrayal haunts many in the Yazidi community as a result of the deplorably inadequate reaction from their fellow Iraqis (as well as the rest of the world) toward the abject genocide, enslavement, and rape committed against them by ISIS. Yazidi anger also extends to Kurdish Peshmerga forces amid disputed accusations of abandonment in the course of the ISIS attack. The support accorded by Yazidi militants to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK — the Kurdish secessionist militia operating in southeastern Turkey — reflects a reluctance to align solely with the Kurdish government in Erbil. The grassroots militants’ balancing act between the PKK and the Peshmerga is mirrored at a higher level by an attempt on the part of prominent Yazidi political and cultural figures to maintain parallel relations with Baghdad and Erbil. A yet to be delineated Yazidi-dominated province with the town of Sinjar as its capital is anticipated; and while the KRG would endeavor to strengthen its influence in Sinjar over time, the initial arrangement will likely shape the province as a Baghdad dependency.
Baghdad can also be confident of the allegiance of a Shiite-Turkmen-majority province that has been proposed with the city of Tal Afar as its capital. True to its claim of not discriminating on the basis of ethnic background, the Islamic State subjected Shiite Turkmen to the same treatment it meted out to Shiite Arabs: decimation of the population, obliteration of religious shrines, and dispossession of all property. Having taken refuge in the Iraqi Shia heartland, many Turkmen militants are back in Nineveh as part of the Popular Mobilization Units, or PMUs, which are dominated by Iranian-backed Shiite militias. While the participation of the PMUs in the battle of Mosul is controversial and opposed by many Sunni political and tribal leaders, Tal Afar and adjoining areas have already been assigned to these Shiite forces as their area of operations in the anti-ISIS effort. The putative province that will emerge in the aftermath of the battle will be an unprecedented Shiite administrative entity away from the contiguous Shia provinces in central and southern Iraq. The religious character of this territory, in contrast to an ethnic Turkmen one, may be enhanced through its extension to include the Shabak minority, a Kurdish-speaking Shiite heterodox sect. This province can be expected to be a significant asset for Baghdad in its efforts to complicate the demands for the creation of a Sunni federal region. It should also help the central government curb any KRG irredentism in the soon-to-be former Nineveh province.
Erbil can be expected to mount a vigorous defense of its interests in trying to adjust the claims and desires for a Christian enclave. While comprising a number of sects who observe different rites and stem from different historical and ethnic backgrounds, the Christians of Iraq are united in being a vulnerable population that has suffered severe attrition since the fall of Saddam Hussein. The Christians of Mosul, dispossessed and expelled from the city as an act of “grace” by ISIS, exemplify the existential plight faced by all Iraqi Christians. There seems to be little place to accommodate Christians amid the competing claims of stronger parties. This applies in particular to the Nineveh Plain region, east of Mosul, with its slim Christian plurality. Kurdish leaders, who claim this territory as being within their purview, would be willing to recognize a special Christian status within Nineveh so long as its inhabitants declare their loyalty to Erbil, and not Baghdad. Indeed, both Erbil and Baghdad are well positioned through Christian allies and proxies for an impending competition.
The aspirations of the Nineveh minorities are elements in the tug of war between Baghdad and Erbil, expected to flare up as the battle of Mosul unfolds. The agency shaping the trajectory of events, however, is not limited to Baghdad, Erbil, and the embattled communities. Iraqi Sunnis remain a distinct majority in the province. The disarray that has been inflicted on them may have muted the expression of their interests, but the price of ignoring these interests would be the seeding of certain future conflicts over Nineveh. This would be terrible news for nearly everyone involved, and welcome news for a wounded Islamic State.
THE US MUST SUPPORT A SAFE HAVEN FOR
Mario Bramnick
Jewish Press, Oct. 25, 2016
Great suffering is occurring in Iraq and Syria. The region is ravaged by terror. Millions have been forced from their homes. Hundreds of thousands have been killed. And Christians and other ethno-religious minorities have suffered genocide at the hands of ISIS. The decision to completely withdraw US troops from Iraq left a power vacuum that was filled by terror groups bent on destroying Western civilization.
Now, ISIS is targeting Iraqi Christians specifically because they are Christian, because they stand in the way of the terror organization’s goal of establishing a pure Islamic caliphate in the Middle East and beyond. In March, the US House of Representatives voted unanimously to declare that the Islamic State’s slaughter of Christians in Iraq and Syria amounted to genocide, and, under extreme pressure, Secretary of State John Kerry joined Congress in this declaration.
Yet, while the State Department has brought thousands of Muslim refugees into the country, the plight of Christians had been intentionally overlooked. Out of 10,000 Syrians refugees permitted into the US, only 56 were Christian — though Christians make up 10 percent of Syria’s population.
We must protect our Christian-Arab brothers and sisters suffering from this terrible genocide in Muslim countries. As Reverend Samuel Rodriguez, president of the National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference (NHCLC), has said, “It’s time for the church to help create a firewall of protection against the persecution of Arab Christians.”
Solutions are already being proposed for this effort. Congressman Jeff Fortenberry (R-Neb.) introduced a resolution that provides American support for the establishment of a safe haven province in the Nineveh Plains region of Northern Iraq. “This genocide has been recognized by the full weight and moral authority of the United States and many international entities, and it provides a gateway for further policy considerations,” Fortenberry said when introducing the resolution. “One next step must be the resecuritization and revitalization of the Nineveh Plain, allowing the repatriation of those who had to flee.”
The Nineveh safe haven would provide protection for religious minorities, allowing them to rebuild their homes and restore their cultures without fear of death, torture or destruction. Robert Nicholson, executive director of the Philos Project, which promotes positive Christian engagement in the Middle East, said, “As indigenous people, they have a right to stay. They need protection, especially in places where they were targeted for genocidal elimination. The Iraqi government and the Kurdish Regional Government have recognized the need for the Nineveh Plain Province. It’s time for United States to do the same.”
A protected, semi-autonomous region would also help decentralize the Iraqi government, which is crucial to maintaining stability in a post-Islamic State power vacuum. “If we don’t decentralize, the country will disintegrate,” Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abad said in April 2015. “To me, there are no limitations to decentralization.” As Christian refugees look to return to their abandoned homes in Iraq, they need security guarantees. The province proposed in Nineveh would be a solid foothold in the preservation and restoration of Christianity in the Middle East. As Christians, we support the Fortenberry resolution, H. Con. Res. 152, and hope all Americans will join us in doing so as well.
[Mario Bramnick is president of the Hispanic Israel Leadership Coalition (HILC)—Ed.]
Turkey Barges Into the Mosul Fight: New York Times, Oct. 24, 2016—It’s been clear from the start that the American and Iraqi-led battle to retake Mosul from the Islamic State presented a logistical and strategic puzzle — even a possible nightmare — in which the interests of multiple countries and sectarian groups had to be reconciled and their roles carefully coordinated.
Disunity as Kurds, Turks, Shia, and Sunnis Fight over Mosul: Jonathan Spyer, The Australian, Oct. 8, 2016—Mosul in early autumn looks peaceful from the Bashiqa ridge. The first positions of the Iraqi Kurdish army, the Peshmerga, are here, 12km from the city.
Iraqi Christians Narrowly Escape ISIS: Danny Gold, Daily Beast, Oct. 24, 2016—Monaly Najeeb and the other young women were hiding under their beds when they heard the ISIS fighters enter their house. Machine gun fire had woken them up around 4 a.m. that morning, and they had spent hours huddling in fear, trying to keep quiet and silently praying that the militants wouldn’t enter their house as firefights continued right outside their door.
What Happens After Mosul Falls Will Set the New Status Quo for Region: Matthew Fisher, National Post, Oct. 17, 2016—Initial reports from the battlefield Monday indicate the encirclement of ISIL-held Mosul by Iraqi and Kurdish forces is going according to a careful plan more than two years in the making.
