Sisi’s New Approach to Egypt-Israel Relations: Mohamed Soliman, Washington Institute, July 29, 2016— Since the Egyptian military’s entrance into political life and its toppling of former president Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013, there have been questions as to how Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s government will deal with Israel.
Cairo and the Egyptians living in Israel: Haisam Hassanein, Jerusalem Post, Aug. 3, 2016 — Egyptian-Israeli security relations are at their highest point since the signing of the peace treaty in 1979.
In Wake of Coup Attempt in Turkey, Lessons for the U.S. From Egypt’s Military Takeover: Eric Trager, Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2016— In the wake of the Turkish military’s attempt to seize power, U.S. officials have urged President Recep Tayyip Erdogan not to use the incident as a pretext for a broad crackdown.
A Gloomy Egypt Sees Its International Influence Wither Away: Liam Stack, New York Times, Aug. 2, 2016— In a televised speech, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a general turned president, warned Egyptians that they lived in a broken country surrounded by enemies who would never leave them alone.
Egypt Rankled by Hamas’s Burgeoning Ties to Islamic State: Avi Issacharoff, Times of Israel, Aug. 1, 2016
ISIS in Sinai Threatens Jews, Israel and Rome in New Video: Jerusalem Post, Aug. 3, 2016
Egypt and Turkey Following the Failed Coup: The Interrupted Thaw: Ofir Winter &, Gallia Lindenstrauss, INSS, Aug. 2, 2016
Egypt’s Christians Lose Patience with Sisi as Attacks Spike: Heba Saleh, Financial Times, Aug. 2, 2016
SISI’S NEW APPROACH TO EGYPT-ISRAEL RELATIONS
Mohamed Soliman
Washington Institute, July 29, 2016
Since the Egyptian military’s entrance into political life and its toppling of former president Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013, there have been questions as to how Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s government will deal with Israel. Many wondered if the government would continue the current trajectory of relations, as relations underwent a chill during the Military Council and Morsi years, in part triggered by the storming of the Israeli Embassy in Egypt during September 2011. Until recently, relations between Israel and Egypt relied on Washington as mediator in negotiations. However, Sisi’s government has significantly altered this dynamic.
The escalation of the political crisis between Egypt’s secular opposition and the Muslim Brotherhood had largely overshadowed Egypt-Israel relations during the Morsi era. However, the Morsi government still made several steps towards freezing the Egypt-Israel relationship: it sent Prime Minister Hesham Qandil to the Gaza Strip during Israel’s operation “Pillar of Defense” in November 2012 and attempted a rapprochement with Iran.
Shortly after the July 3 military intervention, Israel began unequivocally backing the new regime. Israel launched diplomatic missions in Washington and several major European capitals to support Egypt’s new political situation and prevent a diplomatic blockade on Cairo. Nor were these efforts unrewarded; Egypt-Israel relations have witnessed unprecedented growth during the Sisi regime, often driven by Sisi himself. When Sisi became the country’s de facto leader, his first challenge was the series of terrorist attacks against the military in the Sinai peninsula. Egypt’s security partnership with Israel immediately came into play; Sisi’s government coordinated with Israel, which gave Egyptian forces the green light to deploy in northern Sinai’s B and C Zones to fight armed Takfiri groups with heavy weapons, armored vehicles, and air incursions.
These actions went directly against what is stipulated in the security appendix of the Camp David Accords, and they demonstrated the flexibility and coordination between Egypt and Israel early in Sisi’s tenure. Confronting armed groups in the Sinai has remained one of the most important security issues shared by both countries. Israel itself has conducted a number of aerial intelligence missions to uncover terrorists’ hiding spots. However, in an attempt to avoid controversy Cairo has not made public the nature of its military-security partnership with Tel Aviv.
Sisi has also long been interested in personally involving himself with the peace process. In his first presidential address in 2014, Sisi stated: “We will work to achieve the independence of Palestine with its capital in East Jerusalem.” With this, Sisi seemed to stake his position on the contentious issue of East Jerusalem, dating back to former president Anwar Sadat’s opposition both of Israel’s annexation of the East Jerusalem territory and the claim of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. While Sisi’s support for East Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine caused some diplomatic fallout with Israel, his insistence on a two-state solution also weakened the position his supporters were attempting to build against Islamist groups, Nasserists, leftists, and the Salafist Nour Party – all of whom catered to popular opinion by refusing to recognize the State of Israel and claiming all Palestinian lands as solely Arab.
With Sisi’s emergence as the uncontested leader, none of his supporting political factions have been able to pressure him to change his relatively positive rhetoric about Israel. Sisi has instead turned the former narrative on its head, insisting that Egypt-Israel relations are a necessity in light of their shared regional foe: Hamas, seen as an extension of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, Sisi has shifted Egypt’s role with Israel from that of an “existential struggle” to a partnership of necessity. During Israel’s “Operation Projective Edge” in Gaza, Sisi gained the perfect opportunity to adopt the image of peace mediator in the international community. Sisi benefitted from Israel’s refusal of international mediation for a ceasefire, which led Israel to resort to calling on Cairo to host negotiations with Palestinian factions and sign the ceasefire agreement. The image of Sisi as peacemaker helped in some part distract the international community from the government’s own challenges with domestic unrest.
Sisi’s movement towards public rapprochement with Israel is partially motivated by these experiences with massive domestic crises. Issues from economic stagnation to Egypt’s potentially decreasing share in Nile waters have pushed Sisi to reassert his regional leadership role. He has found an opening by presenting himself as a negotiator in one of the most sensitive international issues: the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. This position bolsters his domestic image as a strongman. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has responded favorably to Egypt’s shifting role as negotiator in the larger peace process, as it presents an alternative to the recent French Initiative. Moreover, further Egyptian involvement could reduce international pressure on Israel over its lack of serious steps towards negotiating with the Palestinians. Indeed, Sisi’s initiative does not cost Netanyahu anything other than more negotiations. Egypt has no clear conditions for negotiations, such as restricting settlement expansion in the West Bank…
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
CAIRO AND THE EGYPTIANS LIVING IN ISRAEL
Haisam Hassanein
Jerusalem Post, Aug. 3, 2016
Egyptian-Israeli security relations are at their highest point since the signing of the peace treaty in 1979. A couple of months ago, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi renewed the call for resumption of the peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis, and even called for closer normalization between the two countries. Moreover, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry became the highest- ranking Egyptian official to visit Israel in 10 years. Amid the fanfare accorded Cairo’s recent closeness to Jerusalem, one issue that can really test Egypt’s intentions for closer normalization is the case of Egyptian citizens living in Israel, on whom the Egyptian authorities have long placed – and still place – heavy restrictions in terms of freedom of movement between the two countries.
Egyptian Muslims and Christians living in Israel are scattered all across the country, mostly in Arab villages and cities where they are married to Arab Israelis. There are three groups of Egyptians living in Israel. The first group is the illegal ex-pats whose main objective to save as much money as they can before returning to Egypt. The second group consists of permanent residents that pay taxes and enjoy full rights and benefits such as health care, social security and participating in municipal elections. The only difference between them and Israeli citizens is that they cannot vote in Knesset elections. The third group is those who have Israeli citizenship.
Those that acquired Israeli citizenship were motivated to do so despite the stigma surrounding it, including a possible lifetime ban on returning to their native country, primarily due to the advantages of holding an Israeli passport compared to an Egyptian one. A secondary reason is the hardships they faced as non-citizens in returning to Israel after going to visit their families in Egypt.
The history of non-Jewish Egyptians living in Israel for work and family purposes dates back to the late 1960s. Some Egyptians who went to Israel looking for jobs ended up settling down and obtaining Israeli citizenship or permanent residency after marrying Arab Israeli women. Following the Yom Kippur War (1973), they were not able to return to Egypt until the peace agreement between the two countries was signed in 1979. After the treaty they were able to return to visit their families, but not without great difficulty. As a consequence of the peace agreement, the Egyptian tourism industry began to experience a flood of Jewish and Arab Israeli tourists. This movement opened the door for some Egyptians who worked at tourist sites to get to know Arab Israelis and even marry them. Some of the couples decided to stay in Egypt, but after certain period of time, the Egyptian authorities asked some of those who held Israeli citizenship to leave, for unclear reasons.
As one Egyptian who has been living in Israel for more than 20 years put it, “I have thought about this matter many times. Every household leader is responsible for the people he takes care of. I look at what benefits my family; staying here is better for them. This includes advantages they have here in Israeli society such as social security and health insurance. It is enough when the individual gets older, he wouldn’t have to wait for any of his children or family to help him. So I live in Israel and my heart visits Egypt all the time.”
Egyptians in Israel are not separated from what is happening in Egypt politically. One Egyptian resident of Nazareth said, “After the revolution of 2011, we used to walk proudly in the streets. Arab Israelis tend to brag about the democracy they are enjoying here, looking at other Arabs in the region as living in darkness and under dictatorships. The revolution restored our pride.” Hence, in times of presidential elections, those registered with the embassy go and cast their votes. However, the number of these is few in comparison to the total number of Egyptians living in Israel. This is mainly due to mistrust between them and the Egyptian government. Due to the hardships they encountered in their native country due their association with Israel, some chose not to contact the embassy.
One of the Egyptians I met said, “The most important thing for them is to count our numbers since we exist here. But we don’t know them and they never tried to sit with us and hear about the issues we face when it comes to traveling to Egypt.” Being be able to get back to Israel is one of the biggest struggles for Egyptians living in Israel. According to the Egyptian Immigration, Passports and Naturalization Authority, Israel is one of 16 countries Egyptians cannot travel to without a permit from national security authorities.
As I was told bitterly, “The obstacle is on our way back, when it comes to issuing travel permits. The authorities do not take into consideration that we have children, families, jobs that could be lost and monthly obligations that await us. It is very ironic that issuing a travel permit from the Palestinian Authority or Israel only takes half an hour from the [Palestinian] Interior Ministry, while in Egypt it takes a month or two and in some cases, you do not get it. Some of us found a pricey option that forced us to go to a country like Jordan or Europe and from there travel to Israel.” This mistreatment and restrictions of movement by the authorities is mainly due to the deep, inherited belief that Israel is a continuing major threat to Egypt’s national security, regardless of the peace agreement…
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
IN WAKE OF COUP ATTEMPT IN TURKEY,
LESSONS FOR THE U.S. FROM EGYPT’S MILITARY TAKEOVER Eric Trager
Wall Street Journal, July 22, 2016
In the wake of the Turkish military’s attempt to seize power, U.S. officials have urged President Recep Tayyip Erdogan not to use the incident as a pretext for a broad crackdown. “I think we’re all concerned…that this not fuel a reach well beyond those who engaged in the coup,” Secretary of State John Kerry said Sunday. So far, the Erdogan government has declared a state of emergency; banned all Turkish academics from traveling; fired more than 1,500 deans at state and private universities; and suspended or detained some 50,000 soldiers, police officers, teachers, judges and other civil servants. More than 10,000 people have been arrested.
Yet U.S. officials’ ability to moderate Mr. Erdogan’s domestic political behavior is limited. This was true before the coup, as the Turkish president arrested journalists, inhibited Internet and social media access, reassigned more than 3,700 judges and prosecutors, and sidelined political opponents. Since the coup attempt has substantiated Mr. Erdogan’s paranoia, it would be nearly impossible to influence his behavior—and trying to do so risks undermining the broader U.S.-Turkey relationship.
There’s a relevant, real-world example of the limits of U.S. power in this sort of situation and the potential results of U.S. missteps. In crafting its approach to Turkey, the administration could learn from its actions after the July 2013 ouster of Egypt’s first elected president, Mohammed Morsi. After Mr. Morsi was overthrown, President Barack Obama called on Egypt’s military “to move quickly and responsibly to return full authority back to a democratically elected civilian government as soon as possible through an inclusive and transparent process.” Meanwhile, however, over objections from some in Congress, the administration sought to maintain the $1.3 billion in military aid the U.S. sends to Egypt every year, as well as other aspects of the defense and intelligence relationship.
In trying to pursue U.S. values and interests simultaneously–encouraging our ally to end its repressive behavior while also continuing bilateral strategic coordination–the administration ultimately found that it could not walk and chew gum at the same time. The Egyptian government interpreted Washington’s call for inclusiveness as a call for re-empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which had sworn to avenge the overthrow of Mr. Morsi. Washington’s attempt to forge reconciliation between the military-backed government and the Brotherhood failed for the same reason. And when the Obama administration responded to the Egyptian military’s crackdown against Morsi supporters by suspending a portion of the military aid in October 2013 “pending credible progress toward an inclusive, democratically elected civilian government through free and fair elections,” it weakened bilateral relations in ways that are still apparent today.
U.S. aid to Egypt was fully restored in March 2015, but Egyptian officials continue to distrust the Obama administration. They view U.S. criticism of the Cairo regime’s dismal human rights record as supporting freedom for the Muslim Brotherhood, which it views as an existential enemy.
When it comes to Turkey, whose role on the global stage has grown in recent years thanks to its proximity to the conflict in neighboring Syria, Washington has even less leverage for shaping behavior: There is almost no military or economic aid to withhold. The Obama administration’s experience with Egypt suggests that even toothless calls for upholding human rights can be interpreted as acts of subversion when a government views repression as necessary for its own survival. Mr. Erdogan, already conspiracy-minded before last week’s takeover attempt, now sees himself in a kill-or-be-killed dynamic. He’s also in charge of a country whose cooperation is vital to the effort against Islamic State and that has taken in approximately 2.7 million Syrian refugees, which makes it all the more critical for the U.S. to not alienate Ankara, particularly not with statements that won’t change its behavior anyway.
A GLOOMY EGYPT SEES ITS INTERNATIONAL
Liam Stack
New York Times, Aug. 2, 2016
In a televised speech, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a general turned president, warned Egyptians that they lived in a broken country surrounded by enemies who would never leave them alone. “Take a good look at your country,” he said during the speech in May. “This is the semblance of a state, and not a real state.” Egypt needed law and order and strong institutions if it was to reverse its downward spiral and become “a state that respects itself and is respected by the world,” he said. While rare in its bluntness, Mr. Sisi’s assessment is widely shared by Egyptians.
After five years of political and economic turmoil, a sense of gloom hangs over the country. Traditionally a leader of the Arab world, politically and culturally, and home to a quarter of its population, Egypt has become inward-looking and politically marginalized in a way not seen for generations. “In the past, Nasser was deciding war or peace. Sadat was deciding peace or war,” said Nabil Fahmy, a former Egyptian ambassador to the United States, referring to two influential former presidents: Gamal Abdel Nasser, a Pan-Arab icon, and Anwar Sadat, who made peace with Israel. “The Arabs were running after us when we decided to do something.” But no more, said Mr. Fahmy, who was foreign minister after the 2013 military ouster of Egypt’s first elected president, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood. “Egypt is overwhelmed by our domestic situation.”
With searing regional crises in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, and the battle against the Islamic State, Egypt is seen as having little productive role to play. Saudi Arabia and Iran, fierce regional and sectarian rivals, have rushed to fill the void, launching into a potentially dangerous competition for regional dominance. For Egypt, it is a sharp reversal, with no immediate prospects of reclaiming the country’s former status. Since it made peace with Israel in 1979, Egypt has served as the fulcrum of American influence in the Arab world. The Egyptian and American militaries have cooperated closely for decades, and Egypt went to war against Saddam Hussein alongside United States forces in 1991. Cairo long served as an important mediator between Israel and the Palestinians (and among Palestinian factions), though it began to abdicate that role by backing Israel against Hamas in 2014.
But Egypt’s withdrawal from regional matters has diminished its value to the United States, which has provided it with over $76 billion in foreign aid since 1948. “Egypt is primarily seen in Washington as a problem and not as a source of solutions,” said Issandr El Amrani, the North Africa project director for the International Crisis Group. “If it wasn’t for the military relationship and the Pentagon’s preference for having things like fast access through the Suez Canal, it’s clear there are elements of the Obama administration that don’t care much for Sisi and his regime and its domestic pattern of repression and human rights abuses.”
Egypt’s influence was long a product of both its military and cultural might. It was a beacon of Arab unity after the tide of European colonialism ebbed in the 20th century, helping build up its neighbors and founding the Arab League, a pioneering effort at regional cooperation that today is seldom effective. Its writers, artists and filmmakers became iconic in the region. Its judges and clerics decided important matters of Islamic law. Amr Moussa, a former foreign minister and Arab League chief who ran for president in 2012, said he doubted there would be “any more foreign adventures,” given the “major problems we are facing.” That has to change, he added. “The role of Egypt is a must,” he said. “It is a necessity in order to build a balance with Iran and with Turkey.” But the only way to do that, he said, “is the reform of Egypt itself and rebuilding its soft power.”
Before it can rebuild, though, Egypt will have to address a long list of problems. It is at war with a local affiliate of the Islamic State in the Sinai Peninsula. The economy veers from one crisis to the next, hobbled by the collapse of tourism. The number of arriving tourists has dropped by 59.9 percent from last June, according to government figures. More than half the hotels in Sharm el Sheikh, a resort once favored by package tour operators and peacemakers alike, have closed, according to the tourism federation. Egypt has stayed afloat in part thanks to financial support from Persian Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia, which has given Cairo over $25 billion, though that lifeline is now threatened by plunging oil prices. Its alliance with the United States has been strained by disagreements over human rights abuses under Mr. Sisi and the removal of Mr. Morsi.
Mr. Fahmy, the former ambassador, said he considered quieting Western concerns over Mr. Morsi’s removal, portraying it as “defending the revolution,” to be one of the country’s foreign policy successes. Egypt’s relationship with Israel is also strong. But it has done little to respond to the growing list of regional crises. “At the top leadership level, Egypt just doesn’t have the bandwidth or the luxury of focusing on regional affairs,” Mr. Amrani said. Top officials are focused more on immediate threats, like lawlessness next door in Libya and the construction of a Nile dam in Ethiopia. In retrospect, Mr. Amrani added, Egypt may have played an outsize role in past years, as its close ties with the United States “boosted its role beyond its actual weight.”…
[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]
Egypt Rankled by Hamas’s Burgeoning Ties to Islamic State: Avi Issacharoff, Times of Israel, Aug. 1, 2016—Cairo is fuming over increasing cooperation between the Palestinian terror group Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, and Islamic State-affiliated forces in the neighboring Sinai Peninsula, The Times of Israel has learned, despite attempts in recent months to alleviate the tension between Egypt and Gaza.
ISIS in Sinai Threatens Jews, Israel and Rome in New Video: Jerusalem Post, Aug. 3, 2016—Islamic State-linked terrorists in the Sinai Peninsula apparently released a new video this week that includes threats against Israel and Jews among its belligerent messages.
Egypt and Turkey Following the Failed Coup: The Interrupted Thaw: Ofir Winter &, Gallia Lindenstrauss, INSS, Aug. 2, 2016—The stream of reports on the attempted – and failed – military coup in Turkey sent Egypt from euphoria to great embarrassment within a matter of hours. On the evening of July 15, 2016, the Egyptian media outlets affiliated with the regime were quick to celebrate the removal of the Turkish president, who had refused to recognize the legitimacy of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and allowed the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to turn Turkey into a base of operations.
Egypt’s Christians Lose Patience with Sisi as Attacks Spike: Heba Saleh, Financial Times, Aug. 2, 2016—When 11-year-old Susana Khalaf’s family started replacing the wooden roofs of their houses with concrete, a rumour spread around the village that they were converting the buildings into a church. The false claims sparked anger among local Muslim residents, who responded by torching the homes of the Coptic Christian Khalaf family in the middle of the night.
