A New Policy for North Africa in the Trump Era?: Karim Mezran & Elissa Miller, Realclearworld, Jan. 23, 2017— There has been much speculation across the Middle East and North Africa regarding what U.S. foreign policy in the region will look like under the Trump administration.
Trump Emboldens Egypt's Sisi: Cynthia Farahat, The Hill, Dec. 29, 2016— The recent terror attacks in Berlin and Zurich highlight once again the danger that radical Islamism poses to the West.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia: The End of an Alliance?: Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 21, 2017— 2016 was not a good year for either Egypt or Saudi Arabia, the twin pillars of the Sunni Arab bloc of states.
On Mali, Proceed With Maximum Caution: Editorial, Globe & Mail, Jan. 23, 2017— François Hollande, the French President, visited Mali earlier this month, just a few days before Islamist terrorists carried out a particularly savage attack in that central African country.
Egypt Strengthens its Strategic Presence in the Red Sea: Dr. Shaul Shay, Israel Defense, Jan. 10, 2017
Russia Seeks Another Mediterranean Naval Base in Libya: Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall, JCPA, Jan. 22, 2017
In Middle East, Leaders Want Donald Trump to Be Their Friend: Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 2017
Obama’s Mid-East Legacy Is Tragic Failure: Alan Dershowitz, Algemeiner, Jan. 13, 217
A NEW POLICY FOR NORTH AFRICA IN THE TRUMP ERA?
Karim Mezran & Elissa Miller
Realclearworld, Jan. 23, 2017
There has been much speculation across the Middle East and North Africa regarding what U.S. foreign policy in the region will look like under the Trump administration. We can infer some insights from Trump’s comments during the 2016 campaign, from his character, and from the personalities of his recent cabinet appointments. For the Maghreb region of North Africa, the Trump administration will likely continue the same level of engagement as the previous administration, although it will emphasize different policy priorities.
Several of the new president’s cabinet appointments, such as retired generals Michael Flynn and James Mattis, have at times articulated a non-interventionist foreign policy, except in cases that directly involve U.S. national security interests. This worldview has parallels with the Obama administration, which had endeavored to pull the United States out of quagmires in the Middle East. However, this global outlook will likely be motivated by a strong security first emphasis that prioritizes the realization of order and stability in foreign countries over support for pluralism and democratization. It could also reflect Trump’s presumed preference for strongmen and authoritative personalities in the region and elsewhere.
Flynn, Trump’s choice for national security adviser, is an outspoken and well-documented critic not only of Muslim extremism, but also of the religion itself. In an August 2016 speech, the retired three-star general stated that Islam is not a religion but a political ideology, and that Islam is like a “malignant cancer.” Such rhetoric from Trump’s inner circle suggests that the new administration might paint international Islamist organizations with a much broader brush than previous administrations, and in policy terms this could lead to the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement as a foreign terrorist organization.
North Africa will certainly not be a regional priority for Trump. The only instances in which the real estate mogul mentioned the region during the campaign were in reference to Libya, and then only in regard to the fight against the Islamic State. Still, there is no doubt that the policies of the new administration will have consequences for the countries of the Maghreb.
Variation in policy toward Morocco and Algeria will probably be minimal. The Trump administration will likely maintain and strengthen U.S. ties with Rabat even though an Islamist party holds the majority in parliament. This favorable approach to the country is due to the stability of the Moroccan monarchy and the relatively wide consensus that it enjoys. The Trump administration may also strengthen relations with Algeria, which plays a critical role in the maintenance of security and counterterrorism operations in North Africa. President Trump’s focus on stability will be well received by leaders in both countries. For Algeria in particular, this will likely mean more support for cooperation on counterterrorism, which has been a longstanding priority for Algerian policymakers.
While U.S. support for Tunisia’s stability will continue in the political development and economic fields, it will be designed through a security lens rather than a focus on democratic development. A security-focused foreign policy will push Trump to emphasize support for the army and the security forces and to aid the country’s counterterrorism efforts. Therefore, even though there is a clear recognition of the importance of economic development for the country’s stability, security assistance will be the main avenue through which the latter is pursued.
This will not carry immediate consequences for the foreign policy of Tunisia, which has relied heavily on Western security support, especially since terror attacks in 2015. A strong relationship with the United States benefits the country’s standing in the region and in the international community overall. However, Trump’s policies could have an impact on Tunisian domestic policy. The U.S. administration’s anti-Islamist line may make it difficult for it to work with a Tunisian government in which an Islamist party, Ennahda, plays a strong role. But like in the case of the Moroccan Islamist party, Tunisia’s Ennahda has shown itself able to act in a pluralistic environment and respect the rules of the democratization process. At the same time, Ennahda could have a difficult time in dealing with an openly anti-Islamist administration, but it has made a number of critical compromises in recent years and the party’s leaders recognize the utility of a strong relationship with Trump’s administration.
Trump’s foreign policy will likely have the most critical effect on Libya. Trump’s stated support for strongmen and the administration’s anti-Islamist views will likely push the United States, and possibly its key European allies, to support Egypt and its proxy Gen. Khalifa Haftar, whose Libyan National Army has been waging a war against Islamists in Libya’s east. Trump has repeatedly expressed admiration for Egyptian leader Abdel Fattah el-Sissi and his counterterrorism efforts against Islamist extremists. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry recently met with Vice President Mike Pence to discuss shared U.S.-Egypt security efforts. Strong ties between Trump and Sissi could push the administration to throw its support behind Haftar and his anti-Islamist fight and to abandon support for the U.N.-backed process that produced a weak unity government.
This could have dire consequences for the situation in Libya. A shift by the international community, led by the United States, could empower and embolden Haftar to expand his authority throughout the country and pursue his hegemonic plans. This could divide the country into two or more zones of influence, or worse, leading to an all-out war between Haftar’s Libyan National Army and its western opponents. This would have a lasting and dangerous effect on the Libyan population, which is already reeling from an economic crisis and sustained turmoil.
Trump’s shift in emphasis toward stability and security, while not constituting a wholesale reordering of U.S. policy in the region, will be perceived differently by different stakeholders in each country. Civil society activists, human rights defenders, and democratization supporters will react negatively to what they will perceive as a pro-authoritarian shift, while the middle classes and entrepreneurs will likely welcome the U.S. administration’s support of their own governments’ stabilization efforts.
Cynthia Farahat
The Hill, Dec. 29, 2016
The recent terror attacks in Berlin and Zurich highlight once again the danger that radical Islamism poses to the West. While many are searching for ways to improve security and defeat the threat on the ground, few appear to appreciate that the decisive blow against Islamism can only be administered by leaders in the Middle East. President-elect Donald Trump pledged during his last major foreign policy speech before the election to "be a friend to all moderate Muslim reformers in the Middle East" and "amplify their voices."
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and most of the political and media establishment in Egypt warmly embraced this policy. After meeting with the Republican nominee in New York City in September, Sisi told CNN he had "no doubt" Trump would make a strong leader. Sisi was also the first Arab leader to telephone Trump after his election win. Egyptian affections for Trump are partly fueled by distaste for former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who many Egyptians believe conspired with the Muslim Brotherhood to help elect Islamist Muhammad Morsi as president in 2012 (after which she was greeted in Egypt with protestors hurling tomatoes).
However, the main attraction of Trump in the eyes of many Egyptians is his staunch anti-Islamism. Since coming to power in 2013, Sisi has spoken passionately about the need for an Islamic reformation. For Sisi, Islamism isn't merely a ruinously bad blueprint for modern governance and a chronic source of security threats, it is also a wedge fueling outside hostility to Muslims, both Islamists and non-Islamists alike. In a 2015 New Year's Day speech at al-Azhar University, the world's most prestigious seat of Sunni Islamic learning, Sisi warned that the "corpus of [Islamic] texts and ideas that we have sacralized over the years" are "antagonizing the entire world" and "caus[ing] the entire umma [Muslim world] to be a source of anxiety, danger, killing and destruction."
Not surprisingly, Sisi has faced opposition in the region, especially from Turkey, Qatar, and powerful figures in the Saudi royal family, who have opened their media to Brotherhood operatives to attack Sisi and even call for his assassination. One of the only Arab governments openly backing Sisi's uncompromising stance on Islamists is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which in 2014 designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization (along with two of its U.S.-based affiliates, the Council on American-Islamic Relations and the Muslim American Society).
Within Egypt, Sisi's calls for a religious revolution have made him extremely popular, but he has faced fierce resistance from Islamists, who still dominate many sectors of Egyptian civil society and exert influence in government, particularly the judiciary.
Sisi's supporters say the Obama administration's tolerance of Islamism and harsh criticism of Egypt's counter-terrorism efforts have been an enormous obstacle. In contrast, Trump's campaign expressed "strong support for Egypt's war on terrorism" and pledged that "under a Trump Administration, the United States of America will be a loyal friend, not simply an ally, that Egypt can count on in the days and years ahead." Walid Phares, a foreign policy advisor for the president-elect, stated in an interview that Trump will work to pass legislation designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.
Trump's election appears to have emboldened Sisi to step up his Islamic reformation campaign. Just days later, Sisi pardoned 82 prisoners, among them Islam Behery, a former TV host and prominent leader of a growing neo-Mu'tazilah-style movement that claims Islamic scriptures are man-made and should not overrule reason and critical thinking. Behery's movement has gained sweeping popularity as horrors committed by Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, and other Sunni jihadist groups have mounted in recent years.
Many across the Arab world, and Egyptians in particular, are hopeful that the election of Donald Trump will open a new page of cooperation between the United States and those who are seeking to challenge Islamic extremism in the war of ideas. Only together can we defeat the Islamists wreaking carnage on the streets in the West.
EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA: THE END OF AN ALLIANCE?
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman
Jerusalem Post, Jan. 21, 2017
2016 was not a good year for either Egypt or Saudi Arabia, the twin pillars of the Sunni Arab bloc of states. Three years after taking power, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s initial popularity has waned as Egypt’s intractable economic and social problems weighed more heavily on the populace, sparking criticism of the regime, even in the usually pro-government media.
Sisi’s call for the populace to tighten their belts and remain patient rang increasingly hollow, as Egyptians confronted acute shortages and high prices of staples such as sugar, rice and cooking oil, a cut in fuel subsidies and a devaluation of the Egyptian pound.
The armed forces’ failure to stamp out ISIS-affiliated insurgency in Sinai was disturbing enough, but then jihadist violence hit home on December 11 with the bloody bombing of a Coptic church, next to the main cathedral in central Cairo. The resulting anger against the authorities’ alleged laxness was palpable.
Saudi Arabia’s troubles were multiple as well. The precipitous drop in oil prices and lack of meaningful jobs for its youthful and increasingly educated population was calling into question the viability of the country’s traditional policies of providing heavily subsidized goods and services in return for strict political quiescence.
The regional outlook was especially bleak, as Shi’ite Iran’s assertiveness loomed large and the Saudi effort to counter it foundered. The US-led international agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear program was seen in Riyadh as a victory for Tehran; the Saudi-led war in Yemen against Iranian-backed Houthi rebels was stalemated, and faced increasingly strident international condemnation of the civilian casualties caused by indiscriminate Saudi air force bombings; and in Syria, Russian and Iranian support had conferred advantage to the Assad regime’s bitter battle against the Syrian rebel groups who are largely funded by the Saudis and other Gulf Arab states, highlighted by the successful siege of rebel-held areas of Aleppo.
Over the last quarter-century, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had broadly worked in tandem: Egypt had provided the crucial Arab participation in the Saudi-Western coalition against Saddam Hussain in 1990-91, while Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies had provided tens of billions of dollars in vital aid to Sisi’s regime. However, the Egyptian and Saudi leaderships did not draw closer together to jointly combat their difficulties. In fact, relations have deteriorated significantly in recent months, reaching a nadir not seen since the partial Arab boycott of Egypt during the 1980s, as punishment for Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel.
To be sure, the Egyptian-Saudi alliance had never been friction- free. Egypt’s self-view as the Arab world’s natural leader was increasingly at odds with its deep-seated internal problems and the financial might of the Saudis and smaller Gulf principalities. Mutual sensitivities burst forth this past April, when Sisi sought to transfer two small islands at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba to Saudi sovereignty as a gesture of thanks for Saudi support. The resulting public outcry and judicial intervention scuttled the move, to the Saudis’ extreme annoyance.
No less annoying was Egypt’s refusal to participate in the Saudi-led military operations in Yemen. And most significant of all was Egypt’s tilt in recent months toward the Assad regime in Syria and its Russian patron.
The simmering Egyptian-Saudi tension burst into full view in mid-October when Egypt voted in favor of Russia’s draft resolution in the Security Council that emphasized that the battle for Aleppo was a fight against “terrorism,” in line with the Assad regime’s master narrative. Saudi anger was palpable. The very next day, shipment of Saudi petrol products to Egypt was suspended, and the two countries’ medias unleashed blistering attacks against each other’s leaders. Matters have since escalated further, as Sisi openly declared his support for the Syrian army as the backbone of a unified Syrian state; Saudi Arabia feted a high-profile Ethiopian government delegation – a direct slap to Egypt, in light of the current tensions between Addis Ababa and Cairo over the completion of a new Ethiopian dam on the upper Nile; and a UAE effort to arrange a reconciliation meeting in Abu Dhabi between Sisi and Salman failed, owing to Saudi recalcitrance.
Strategically, the two countries continue to share an interest in counterbalancing Iranian power in the region, and Riyadh has a fundamental interest in helping Egypt cope with its economic difficulties. But Sisi’s expressed preference for a united “Arab” Syria and a strengthening of ties with Russia, as part of an effort to reassert Egyptian regional influence, clash sharply with Saudi priorities, particularly those of the young Deputy Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Salman. These differences and mutual sensitivities suggest that repairing the relationship won’t be a simple matter.
ON MALI, PROCEED WITH MAXIMUM CAUTION
Editorial
Globe & Mail, Jan. 23, 2017
François Hollande, the French President, visited Mali earlier this month, just a few days before Islamist terrorists carried out a particularly savage attack in that central African country.
That ought to be a vivid reminder of the risks that the Trudeau government may be taking before long in Mali, too. The Liberal Party promised in its election platform to revive Canadian peacekeeping, and it is now expected that the government will send as many as 600 troops to Mali this year to support a beleaguered United Nations mission there.
They will be walking into a war zone. The jihadi terrorist attack in the northern part of Mali killed more than 70 people at a camp housing pro-government forces. Last year, at least 17 UN peacekeepers were killed in terrorist attacks; 68 have been killed since the mission began in 2013.
The UN mission to Mali is not the peacekeeping of old, in which troops wearing blue helmets kept warring factions apart but were largely insulated from any fighting. In northern Mali, there are at least five terrorist groups in operation, and they are happy to target anyone they associate with the government.
As well, a chief aspect of the UN mission is to protect civilians, which means personnel are allowed to conduct pre-emptive strikes against militants. But few, if any, of the Canadians would be experienced in this semi-desert warfare – this country’s fraught mission to Afghanistan would be the closest equivalent.
President Hollande’s commitment to Mali is rooted in the former French empire in Africa. Canadian companies do have mining interests in Mali, but that has little or nothing to do with the notion of Canadian military personnel in that country.
Canada may be on the verge of putting many of our soldiers in harm’s way in a country where we don’t have an interest that would merit such a move. In fact, the only discernible motivation is Ottawa’s desire to re-establish Canada as a peacekeeping nation, after the previous government backed away from that role.
How many young Canadians will have to die or be injured in order to fulfill this election promise? Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan should exercise real caution, rather than getting too caught up in uplifting notions.
Egypt Strengthens its Strategic Presence in the Red Sea: Dr. Shaul Shay, Israel Defense, Jan. 10, 2017—Egypt's President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi inaugurated on January 4, 2017, the new headquarters of Egypt's southern naval fleet command in Safaga on the country's Red Sea coast during his visit to the Port of Safaga Development Project which cost EGP 510 million (approximately USD 28 million).
Russia Seeks Another Mediterranean Naval Base in Libya: Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall, JCPA, Jan. 22, 2017—In recent months, Russia has been ramping up its involvement in the Libyan sociopolitical crisis, which has been ongoing since the removal of its ruler, Muammar Qaddafi. Russia has been strengthening its ties with Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who heads the LNA (the Libyan National Army), one of the many military militias operating in Libya, and opposes the country’s official government.
In Middle East, Leaders Want Donald Trump to Be Their Friend: Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 2017—It is hard to find a Middle Eastern official betraying signs of anxiety over what President-elect Donald Trump will do once in office.
Obama’s Mid-East Legacy Is Tragic Failure: Alan Dershowitz, Algemeiner, Jan. 13, 2017 —The Middle East is a more dangerous place after eight years of the Obama Presidency than it was before. The eight disastrous Obama years follow eight disastrous Bush years during which that part of the world became more dangerous as well. So have many other international hot spots. In sum, the past 16 years have seen major foreign policy blunders all over the world, and most especially in the area between Libya and Iran, that includes Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey and the Gulf.
