PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, HAMAS & THE DANGERS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE Posted on August 17, 2017 Printer Friendly Weakening Palestinian Rejectionism: Prof. Daniel Pipes, Israel Hayom, Aug. 7, 2017— Polls show that some Palestinians have moved away from grand anti-Zionist ambitions and are not imbued with an infinite spirit of resistance. Like everyone else, they are prone to despair, a collapse of will, and defeat. This points to the utility of an Israel victory strategy that increases the pressure on Palestinians until their dictators in Ramallah and Gaza accede to this turn toward the practical and could potentially start the long process of ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Potentially Existential Threat to Israel from “Palestine”: Prof. Louis René Beres, BESA, Aug. 14, 2017— “Palestine” could present a far greater threat to Israel than a third intifada or persistent terrorism. This threat, which would further exacerbate the area’s correlation of forces, is potentially existential. Under certain circumstances, Palestinian statehood could meaningfully enlarge the prospects of both mega-terror attacks and regional nuclear war. Preparing For The Post-Abbas Era: Caroline B. Glick, The Jerusalem Post, August 8, 2017— The post-Abbas era will pose new threats and opportunities for Israel. It is up to Israel to ensure that the opportunities are maximized and the threats are neutralized as quickly as possible. The Palestinian Authority Is A Genocidal Terrorist Entity And Should Be Treated As Such: Dr. Guy Millière, Gatestone Institute, Aug. 17, 2017— The latest slaughter in the land of Israel took place in Halamish, Samaria, on July 21. A Palestinian stabbed to death a Jewish grandfather and two of his children. The grandmother was injured seriously. Countless similar attacks occurred in Israel in the recent and not-so-recent past. The murderer was praised by the PA and Hamas. On Topic Links Who Are the Palestinians?: Pinhas Inbari, JCPA, Aug. 7, 2017 A Day in Area ‘A’: Aviva Klompas, Times of Israel, Aug. 6, 2017 Abbas Congratulates North Korean Dictator On 'Liberation Day': Gary Willig, Arutz Sheva, Aug. 15, 2017 Security Forces Uncover Hamas Terrorist Payment Network: Yoav Zitun and Yishai Porat, YnetNews, August 15, 2017 WEAKENING PALESTINIAN REJECTIONISM Prof. Daniel Pipes Israel Hayom, Aug. 7, 2017 A recent poll showed that Israelis want a tougher policy toward the Palestinians. And Palestinians, beyond occasional rampaging and murdering Israelis, what do they want? Shalem College Executive Vice President Dr. Dan Polisar reviewed opinion polls taken of Palestinians in recent years, and found that they hold three main views of Israel: It lacks a historical or religious justification, it is by nature aggressive, and it will soon disappear. But attitudes might be changing slightly, judging by a recent poll that suggests a growing apathy toward the priorities of both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas. Conducted May 16-27 under the direction of the Washington Institute's David Pollock and implemented by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, the survey asked detailed questions of 1,540 Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and east Jerusalem. Only 12% of West Bank residents and 25% of Gazans said their priority was to "establish a Palestinian state," while 49% and 40% respectively said their priority was "a good family life." (Jerusalem results are not included here.) Only 12% and 25% respectively considered relocating the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem very important. On the subject of special financial benefits paid by the PA for "martyrs," 66% and 67% respectively said the PA "should give prisoners' families normal benefits, like everybody else." The Palestinians questioned in the poll appeared to be significantly more pragmatic than political in their attitudes toward Israel, with 63% and 70% respectively favoring employment opportunities within Israel, close to half seeking more employment by Israeli companies, 55% and 57% respectively approving increased direct personal contacts with Israelis, and 58% and 55% respectively liking the idea of Arab states offering both Israelis and Palestinians incentives "to take more moderate positions." They also realized that 1948 cannot be undone, with 60% and 46% respectively agreeing with the statement "Most Israeli settlers will probably stay where they are, and most Palestinian refugees will not return to the 1948 lands" and 41% and 51% respectively saying they would accept extra aid "to resettle Palestinian refugees in the West Bank or Gaza but not inside Israel." Two replies showed that an Israeli state is far more acceptable than is the Jewish people, with 75% and 62% respectively consenting permanently to end the war with Israel and create a Palestine based on the 1949 borders, but only 45% and 37% respectively agreeing to "Two states for two peoples — the Palestinian people and the Jewish people … if it might help to end to occupation." The discrepancies between the two responses point to a deep Palestinian reluctance to accept Israel as the Jewish state. Very few accept that "Jews have some rights to this land" and great majorities insist that, some day, "Palestinians will control almost all of Palestine." Ritualistic denial of Israel's legitimacy is standard; it is more noteworthy that such denial only partially interferes with recognizing Israel's inescapable existence. Confirming this point, note the dramatic change in attitudes over just two years. Asked if two states means the "end of the conflict" or whether it must continue "until all of historic Palestine is liberated," West Bank residents voted 35% to 55% in favor of continued conflict, while Gazans voted 47% to 44% in favor of resolution. Back in May 2015, West Bank residents voted almost as they did this year but Gazans 2-to-1 preferred continued conflict, prompting Pollock to note that, in the intervening two years, "many Gazans have probably come to regret the lasting damage of the disastrous 2014 war on their territory, and shifted their views in a relatively peaceful direction." More proof: Asked whether Hamas should maintain its cease-fire with Israel, the 55% and 80% affirmative replies point to the impact of many rounds of warfare in Gaza. When it comes to Washington, "pressure on Israel to make concessions" is not the Palestinians' priority. For West Bank residents, the priority is U.S. pressure on the PA to make it "more democratic and less corrupt"; for Gazans, it is "increased economic aid." These replies suggest that some Palestinians have moved away from grand anti-Zionist ambitions and that they are not imbued with an infinite spirit of resistance; they are not supermen. Like everyone else, they are prone to despair, a collapse of will, and defeat. This conclusion points to the utility of an Israel victory strategy that increases the pressure on Palestinians until their dictators in Ramallah and Gaza accede to this turn toward the practical. This could potentially start the long process of ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Contents THE POTENTIALLY EXISTENTIAL THREAT TO ISRAEL FROM “PALESTINE” Prof. Louis René Beres BESA, Aug. 14, 2017 The measure of danger posed to Israel by a future Palestinian state is not subject to casual reflection. It can be ascertained only through the disciplined examination of proper hypotheses – conceptually, systematically, and deductively, in the manner of a scientific investigation. An application of this process shows the threat to Israel of “Palestine” to be much greater than is typically alleged. The threat is so great, in fact, that it could ultimately prove existential. This is the case, moreover, despite the fact that the tangible threat posed by Palestine to Israel’s survival would be indirect. It’s a bit like the case of a person who won’t die as a direct result of some insignificant illness, but who will be sufficiently weakened by it to become susceptible to more terminal pathologies. It also remains conceivable, if unlikely, that the Palestinian state per se would pose lethal hazards to the Jewish state. These hazards would appear in increments, rather than in “bolt from the blue” military strikes. By definition, a state of Palestine – no matter how it is constituted – would be carved from the still-living body of Israel. It is similarly incontestable that Arab terror against the Jewish State would not subside following Palestinian statehood. This is because the leaders of any future Palestinian state – one with more formal juridical status than the current UN “nonmember observer state” designation – would continue to regard the now-diminished and more vulnerable Israel as “Occupied Palestine.” Why would they revise their original concept of “the Zionist enemy,” especially after they had become irrefutably more powerful? There is no way for analysts to assign a numerical probability to this prospect, but no other conclusion can plausibly be extrapolated from Palestinian platforms, maps, charters, and policy positions. Of further significance, especially as US President Donald Trump clings to the cliché of the “two-state solution”, Arab terror would likely expand even more quickly than if there had been no Palestinian state. This forecast also follows directly from all we know about Palestinian positions. A shallow political mantra, no matter how often it is repeated in Washington, London, Gaza, or Ramallah, is no substitute for reality. Should anyone still believe the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas would be content with a new state carved entirely from “Israeli occupied territory,” they need only be reminded that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964, three years before there were any “Israeli occupied territories.” Moreover, the State of Israel as it exists today is smaller than Lake Michigan. Even before the creation of Palestine, the Arab world of 22 states is 672 times the size of Israel. Much concern is being expressed at the possibility of a third intifada. For Israel, the rational remedy for such a prospect is not to encourage its adversaries to morph into a more organized and structured state enemy. Any juridically enhanced State of Palestine could magnify its cumulative adversarial capacity to inflict great harm on Israel. … [To read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.] Contents PREPARING FOR THE POST-ABBAS ERA Caroline B. Glick The Jerusalem Post, August 8, 2017 PLO chief and Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas scored a victory against Israel at the Temple Mount. But it was a Pyrrhic one. Days after the government bowed to his demand and voted to remove the metal detectors from the Temple Mount, Abbas checked into the hospital for tests. The 82-year-old dictator has heart disease and a series of other serious health issues. And he has refused to appoint a successor. It is widely assumed that once he exits the stage, the situation in the PA-ruled areas in Judea and Samaria – otherwise known as Areas A and B – will change in fundamental ways. This week, two prominent Palestinian advocates, Hussein Agha and Ahmad Samih Khalidi, published an article in The New Yorker entitled “The end of this road: The decline of the Palestinian national movement.” Among other things, they explained that Abbas’s death will mark the dissolution of the Palestinian national identity. That identity has already been supplanted in Judea and Samaria by local, tribal identities. In their words, “The powerful local ties made it impossible for a Hebronite to have a genuine popular base in Ramallah, or for a Gazan to have a credible say in the West Bank.” It will also be the end of the PLO and its largest faction, Fatah, founded by Yasser Arafat in 1958 and led by Abbas since Arafat’s death in 2004. Fatah, they explain, has “no new leaders, no convincing evidence of validation, no marked success in government, no progress toward peace, fragile links to its original setting abroad and a local environment buffeted by the crosswinds of petty quarrels and regional antagonisms.” One of the reasons the Palestinians have lost interest in being Palestinians is because they have lost their traditional political and financial supporters in the Arab world and the developing world. The Sunni Arab world, led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, is now willing to publicly extol Israel as a vital ally in its struggle against Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. The so-called Arab street is increasingly incensed at the Palestinians for monopolizing the world’s attention with their never ending list of grievances against Israel even as millions in the Arab world suffer from war, genocide, starvation and other forms of oppression and millions more have been forced to flee their homes. As for the developing world, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s refusal to visit with Abbas during his recent visit to Israel marked the official end of the Third World’s alliance with the PLO. After Abbas departs, Agha and Khalidi identify three key actors that will seek to fill the military and political void. First and foremost, the Palestinian security services (PSF) will raise its head. The PSF is heavily armed and has been trained by the US military. Agha and Khalidi argue reasonably that as the best armed and best organized group in the area aside from the IDF, the PSF will likely seize power in one form or another. The Palestinian forces pose a major threat to Israel. It isn’t simply that their members have often participated in murderous terrorist attacks against Israel. With their US military training they are capable of launching large-scale assaults on Israeli civilian communities and on IDF forces. To understand the nature of the threat, consider that last month, a lone terrorist armed with a knife sufficed to massacre the Salomon family in their home in Halamish before he was stopped by an off-duty soldier. Contemplate what a well-armed and trained platoon of Palestinian soldiers with no clear political constraints could do. The second force Agha and Khalidi identify as likely to step into the leadership vacuum is the Israeli Arab political leadership. As Agha and Khalidi note, since the PLO-controlled PA was established in 1994, the Israeli Arab community and the Palestinians of Judea and Samaria have become more familiar with one another. Due in large part to subversion by the PLO and Hamas and lavish funding of radical Israeli Arab groups and politicians by foreign governments and leftist donors, a generation of radical, anti-Israel Arab politicians has risen to power. At the same time, since the Arab Spring destabilized all of Israel’s neighbors, a cross current of Arab Zionism has captivated the Israeli Arab majority. Recognizing that Israel is their safe port in the storm, Israeli Arabs in increasing numbers are choosing to embrace their Israeli identity, learn Hebrew and join mainstream Israeli society. Agha and Khalidi signal clearly their hope that the integration of the Palestinians and Israel’s Arab minority will enable them to worth together to take over the Jewish state from within. Finally, Agha and Khalidi note that as support for the Palestinians has waned in the Arab world and the developing world, the West has emerged in recent years as their most stable and enthusiastic political support base. Ethnic Palestinians in the West are more committed to destroying Israel than Palestinians in Syria and Jordan. Western politicians and political activists who support the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement are much more committed to the political war against Israel than their counterparts in Asia and Africa. The Western forces now aligned against Israel in the name of the Palestinians will certainly seek to play a role in shaping events in a post-Abbas world. This then brings us to Israel and what it must do now and in the immediate aftermath of Abbas’s exit from the scene. The most important thing that Israel can and must do is send a send a clear message that it will not be walking away from Judea and Samaria. To do so, Israel should end the military government in Area C, where all the Israeli communities and border zones are located, and replace it with its legal code. Militarily, it is imperative that the IDF be ordered to disarm the PSF as quickly and quietly as possible. Since 2007, Abbas’s fear of Hamas has exceeded his hatred for Israel. As a consequence, during this time, the Palestinian security forces have cooperated with the IDF in anti-Hamas operations.There is every likelihood that the forces’ calculations in a post-Abbas world will be quite different. Israel cannot afford to have a well-armed force, steeped in antisemitic ideology, deployed footsteps from major Israeli population centers. As for the Israeli Arabs, Israel can empower moderate, integrationist forces to rise to power. To do so, it must enforce its laws against terrorism-sponsoring groups like the Islamic movement and enforce its land and welfare laws toward Arabs with the same vigor it enforces them toward Jews. It must provide support for integrationists to enter the political fray against their anti-Israel rivals. If Israel fails to take these actions, Agha and Khalidi’s dream that the Palestinian war against Israel is taken over by Israeli Arabs supported by the West will become a realistic prospect. This then brings us to the West. Economically, Israel has already begun to limit the capacity of anti-Israel forces in the West to wage economic war against it by deepening its economic ties with Asia. Politically, Israel must reform its legal system to limit the subversive power of the West in its Arab community and more generally in its political system. Foreign governments must be barred from funding political NGOs. Israel should wage a public campaign in the US to discredit foundations and other non-profits in the US that work through Israeli-registered NGOs to undermine its rule of law. By applying its laws in full to Area C, and by asserting sole security control throughout the areas, while empowering the Israeli Arab majority that wishes to embrace its Israeli identity, Israel will empower the Palestinians in Areas A and B to govern themselves autonomously in a manner that advances the interests of their constituents. As Agha and Khalidi note, the Palestinians have been in charge of their own governance since 1994. But under the corrupt authoritarianism of the PLO, their governance has been poor and unaccountable. As local identities have superseded the PLO’s brand of nationalism borne of terrorism and eternal war against Israel, the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria well positioned to embrace an opportunity to govern themselves under a liberal rule of law without fear of the PLO jackboot. The post-Abbas era will pose new threats and opportunities for Israel. It is up to Israel to ensure that the opportunities are maximized and the threats are neutralized as quickly as possible. Failing that, Israel can expect to contend with military threats in Judea and Samaria several orders of magnitude greater than what it has dealt with in the past. It can similarly expect to find itself under political assault from a combination of radicalized Israeli Arabs and Western governments that will challenge it in ways it has never been challenged before. Contents THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY IS A GENOCIDAL TERRORIST ENTITY AND SHOULD BE TREATED AS SUCH Dr. Guy Millière Gatestone Institute, Aug. 17, 2017 The latest slaughter in the land of Israel took place in Halamish, Samaria, on July 21. A Palestinian stabbed to death a Jewish grandfather and two of his children. The grandmother was injured seriously. Countless similar attacks occurred in Israel in the recent and not-so-recent past. Once again, thousands of Palestinian Arabs joyfully celebrated the murders. Some handed out candy. The murderer was praised by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas. If he had been shot to death, he would have instantly become a martyr of Islam. A street in Ramallah would be named after him. His picture would be posted in storefronts in the territories occupied by the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and his family would be rewarded with a high "salary" for life. The killer explained his crime by his willingness to "defend the al-Aqsa mosque" — which in fact was never attacked or even threatened by Israel. He did not hide his hatred for Jews. In his last Facebook post, he described them as monkeys and pigs. His mother showed her pride for her son and his actions. he murders followed Muslim riots after Israel installed metal detectors at the Temple Mount entrances, as exist in other mosques worldwide — in response to the murder of two Israeli policemen by Muslim terrorists who succeeded in bringing weapons to the site. The Israeli government did not prohibit access to the al-Aqsa mosque; it only wished to prevent further attacks. That a mosque could be used as a base for terrorist attacks seems to have been considered normal by the rioters. Since then, the Israeli government decided to remove the metal detectors, as well as surveillance cameras that had been added later. Although the rioting subsided, Israelis reacted negatively to their government's decision: polls showed that 77% of them strongly disapproved of the removal of the metal detectors, and thought that the Israeli government should not yield to threats and intimidation. The director of public affairs at the Bar-Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, David M. Weinberg, said that it is "urgent, through resolute Israeli action, to deprive the Palestinian leadership of its delusion that he can bully Israel into retreat." For now, Palestinian leaders have every reason to believe that there is no delusion, that terrorism and violence pay off. It would be hard to prove them wrong. When the Arab and Muslim world waged conventional wars to destroy the Jewish state, Israel, despite its smaller number of soldiers, won every time and acquired a reputation for courage and invincibility. In 1964, the Arab and Muslim world adopted a new strategy. It created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The war became a terror war. Unpredictable attacks were launched against Jews in Israel, Europe, and North and South America. The PLO presented itself as a "national liberation movement". A people was invented, the "Palestinians" — actually ordinary Arabs — that the PLO was supposed to "liberate". … [To read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.] Contents On Topic Links Who Are the Palestinians?: Pinhas Inbari, JCPA, August 7, 2017—The Palestinians’ Canaanite narrative is not new. Not a single Palestinian tribe identifies its roots in Canaan; instead, they all see themselves as proud Arabs descended from the most notable Arab tribes of the Hejaz, today’s Iraq, or Yemen. Even the Kanaan family of Nablus locates its origins in Syria. A Day in Area ‘A’: Aviva Klompas, Times of Israel, Aug. 6, 2017—As part of a work study tour, I spent a day in and around Ramallah. We visited a refugee camp, met with a high ranking Palestinian Authority minister, spoke to university students, and walked around downtown. So long as the Palestinian Authority’s cycle of incitement, terror, glorification, and reward continues unabated, Jerusalem and Ramallah will remain a world apart. Abbas Congratulates North Korean Dictator On 'Liberation Day': Gary Willig, Arutz Sheva, Aug. 15, 2017—Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman Mahmoud Abbas today sent congratulations to the ruler of North Korea, Kim Jong-Un, in honor of the country's Liberation Day. In the statement released by WAFA, the official PA news agency, Abbas wished Jong-un "all health and happiness." Security Forces Uncover Hamas Terrorist Payment Network: Yoav Zitun and Yishai Porat, YnetNews, August 15, 2017—Shin Bet and police forces uncover a Hamas payment network that provided financial assistance to the families of convicted terrorists, including the mother of a terrorist who carried out the kidnapping and murder of Sgt. Nachshon Wachsman in 1994; security forces raid homes of families, seize NIS 100,000 in cash.