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Contents:
Wars of the Zeitgeist: David M. Weinberg, Israel Hayom, Aug. 29, 2014— As silence falls over the battlefields of Gaza, wars of zeitgeist have begun.
Isolating Hamas Via a Diplomatic Move: Alex Mintz, Jerusalem Post, Aug. 27, 2014 — There are two key informal coalitions operating in the Middle East; one is the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis, which also includes Islamic Jihad, Hamas and parts of Iraq.
Wise Tactical Choices in Gaza: Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror, BESA, Aug. 26, 2014 — Over the past few weeks, some have argued that Israel should have launched Operation Protective Edge sooner, and that it should have taken the initiative before Hamas’ tunnels became an actual threat.
Did a ‘Soft Coup’ Just Happen in Pakistan?: Ishaan Tharoor, Washington Post, Aug. 29, 2014 — For much of Pakistan's independent existence, the country's politics have been dominated by its powerful military.
Hamas Was Defeated, Until the Next Time: Prof. Efraim Inbar, BESA, Sept. 1, 2014
Israeli Ambassador Daniel Taub’s Full Speech in Bradford: Jewish News, Aug. 20, 2014
Conduct of Operations in Limited Scale Conflicts: Maj. Gen. (res.) David Ivry, BESA, Aug. 31, 2014
Pakistan, Its Own Worst Enemy: New York Times, Aug. 29, 2014
David M. Weinberg
Israel Hayom, Aug. 29, 2014
As silence falls over the battlefields of Gaza, wars of zeitgeist have begun. Here are four fronts on which the struggle for Israel's legitimacy and the global mind set will be fought. First of all, the real story of Hamas has to be told, in U.N. committees and through every media and community forum. This includes Hamas executing Fatah members, children digging terror tunnels, concrete being redirected to building tunnels rather than hospitals and schools, the affluence of Hamas' leaders, who divert funding from the Palestinian public to their own personal accounts, Iranian weapons shipments, and the 4,500 war crimes (missile attacks) committed by Hamas over the past 50 days. This also includes a full account of the (overly) humanitarian Israeli method of warfare: targeting only clearly identifiable military targets, tip-toeing around civilians trapped purposefully by Hamas in the crossfire, supplying electricity and food to the enemy in the midst of battle, treating the enemy's wounded, and so on.
Secondly, a battle must be fought over Western public opinion and the understanding that a war of civilizations is underway between radical Islam and the Judeo-Christian world. Fatah is Hamas is the Muslim Brotherhood is al-Qaida is Boko Haram is ISIS is Iran, should be the message. For our purposes, there is little differentiation among these groups. They are all out to crush our way of life and reduce our state to rubble. None are "moderates." The fact that ISIS rapes and beheads its opponents by knife doesn't make the al-Qaida-associated Jabhat al-Nusra (Support Front for Syria) moderate. The fact that al-Nusra shoots its enemies with bullets doesn't make Katibat Ahrar Prat (Battalions for the Freedom of the Euphrates) moderate. That fact that Prat Battalions torture their enemies and then force them into battle against their own people doesn't make moderates out of Katibat Sawt al-Haq (Battalion of the Voice of Rights/Truth/God) and Katibat al-Ahrar al-Sham (Battalion for the Freedom of Greater Syria). The latter only force their captives to convert to Islam; then they are sold as slaves.
The same goes for Palestinian factions. The fact that Hamas digs terror tunnels doesn't make Islamic Jihad into moderates. That fact that Islamic Jihad fires Qassam missiles at Israel doesn't make the Arafat-founded al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades into moderates. The fact that al-Aqsa sponsors suicide bombers doesn't make the Salahadin Brigades into moderates. The fact that Salahadin fellows focus on firebombing and shooting settlers doesn't make the Izzedine al-Qassam group moderate. The fact that Izzedine al-Qassam specializes in kidnappings doesn't make the Tanzim moderate. The fact that the Fatah-funded Tanzim organizes violent demonstrations and Molotov-cocktail-throwing confrontations with Israeli troops doesn't make Fatah moderate. The fact that Fatah broadcasts blood-curdling calls to terrorism on its airwaves and through its newspapers and in its PA-sponsored schools, and glorifies suicide bombers and Qassam manufacturers, doesn't make Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas a moderate. The fact that Abbas denies Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state and refuses to renounce the so-called "right" of return doesn't make Salam Fayyad a moderate. The fact that Fayyad (remember him?) seeks only to boycott and divest from Israel doesn't make …. Well, you get the point.
This brings me to the third battleground, which is about Abbas. Left-wingers are seeking to re-empower Abbas, repeating hackneyed mantras from the Oslo era about his "reliability" as a peace partner — as if they were possessed, or perhaps they have been asleep over the past decade. The notion that Abbas and his Palestinian "Authority" can be Israel's diplomatic salvation has no evidentiary foundation. His regime is feeble and corrupt, and his security forces politicized and inert. Hamas and other Islamic jihadists blew him away in Gaza and would do so in the West Bank too, if not for IDF control of the territory. Abbas cannot guarantee Israel's security, neither in the Jordan Valley and the Samarian mountaintops overlooking Ben-Gurion Airport, nor in Beit Hanoun and the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Moreover, Abbas' rump regime is no partner for any real peace accord, as the failed U.S. diplomatic process proved for the umpteenth time. Abbas wants a state (in contours that Israel can never accept) without an end to the conflict. He wants state status in order to continue the conflict; in order to brow-beat Israel into dissolution through demonization and criminalization. That is why Abbas was last seen fleeing the scene of real negotiations, and this week announced that he was again taking to the international community to have it impose withdrawals upon Israel.
Finally, a battle has been enjoined over the legacy of Oslo, and this struggle will play itself out as Israel rolls forward to its next election. Does the "occupation" corrupt (as the Left has argued for decades), or do withdrawals corrupt and destroy more (as the Right should be arguing now)? Was Israel ever forced to bomb Palestinian high-rise apartment building from the air or to bombard civilian neighborhoods with heavy artillery before the withdrawals and disengagements began? So what has led to more suffering, death and destruction (for both Palestinians and Israelis): Israel's settling of Judea, Samaria and Gaza; or Israeli withdrawals from parts of Judea and Samaria and all of Gaza leading to PA and Hamas rule? What "corrupts" more: Israelis living alongside and working together with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza; or Israeli withdrawals and the subsequent emergence of Palestinian terrorist enclaves? Should Israel draw more borders and build more fences so that the Palestinians can dig under them and shoot over them; or should Israel erase the Green Line once and for all, and assert new models of autonomous coexistence for a better future?
ISOLATING HAMAS VIA A DIPLOMATIC MOVE
Alex Mintz
Jerusalem Post, Aug. 27, 2014
There are two key informal coalitions operating in the Middle East; one is the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis, which also includes Islamic Jihad, Hamas and parts of Iraq. Due to its policy vis a vis the Assad regime in Syria, Hamas was somewhat excluded from this coalition in recent years, but renewed contacts between Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, on the one hand, and between Mashaal and the Iranian leadership on the other have renewed vocal support for Hamas by both Hezbollah and Iran.
A counter-coalition is led by the US and consists of an informal group of moderates in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the Gulf States except for Qatar, and the Palestinian Authority. These all share common interests in Syria, Egypt, vis a vis Iran and radical Islam, and all want to see Hamas weakened, if not gone. In fact, due to these shared interests, the Saudi foreign minister has reportedly just announced readiness to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel. Other influential figures in Saudi Arabia have noted recently that the conflict in the Middle East is not between the Arab world and Israel, but between Israel and Iran.
If Israel wants to isolate and weaken Hamas and the Iran-led coalition in the Middle East that poses a serious threat to the security of the Jewish state, and to prevent new rounds of military conflict with Hamas, it is imperative for Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to declare that he accepts the Arab Peace Initiative, with reservations.
Netanyahu can not accept the plan as is. His coalition will fall apart if he does, as not only Bayit Yehudi but also many Likud Knesset members are against concessions demanded by the API. However, as a group of leading political science and international relations professors in Israel wrote to Netanyahu few days ago, the prime minister should declare that he accepts the plan with reservations with regard to the issues of 1) Palestinian refugees, 2) Jerusalem, 3) Land swaps and 4) disarmament of any Palestinian state, with the understanding that these issues will be negotiated in a peace summit to be held in Egypt, with the Arab League, the Saudis, representatives of the Palestinian Authority, Gulf States and of course, Israel and Egypt.
A declaration on the acceptance of the Saudi-initiated plan, with such reservations, could change the momentum in the region, and weaken Hamas and the Iranian coalition. Such a breakthrough is likely to encourage moderate Arab states, led by the Saudis and the Arab League itself, to agree to negotiate these terms. Successful negotiations could hopefully lead, down the road, to normalization of diplomatic and economic relations with Arab states and to a huge peace dividend for Israel and the region. This is not a dream. The Saudis have declared repeatedly their readiness to cut a deal. This is the right move for Israel at the right time. But the prime minister needs to be willing to take this bold step. I believe he should.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror
BESA, Aug. 26, 2014
Over the past few weeks, some have argued that Israel should have launched Operation Protective Edge sooner, and that it should have taken the initiative before Hamas’ tunnels became an actual threat. Others have argued that had Hamas agreed to the first cease-fire Israel offered, the enemies’ tunnel system would have remained intact and ready to be used for terror attacks in the future.
The first argument has no merit. Israel cannot launch a complex military operation every time a new threat is detected, and even when a threat is ascertained, the ramifications of a military operation must be carefully thought through, and various aspects – not just military ones – must be considered.
Imagine if we had launched a counter-tunnel operation a year ago. In all likelihood, it would have been very similar to the current military campaign. We may have had fewer casualties had we been the ones to surprise Hamas, but such a surprise attack would have surely resulted in a greater number of civilian Palestinian casualties. What would we have done had the IDF suffered dozens of casualties without the prelude of the abduction of the three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank? What would the world’s reaction have been to a large Israeli operation had it not been provoked? What would have been the reaction of the Arab world to the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians in Gaza?
Israel would have found itself accused of launching an unnecessary military operation, and it would have been unable to offer any explanation other than the images of half-dug tunnels. When fighting non-state entities, a country like Israel must secure international legitimacy from its allies, and it must also secure a consensus among Israeli society. This is why Israel does not strike targets in Lebanon, despite the fact that there is no doubt that the threat posed by Hezbollah missiles is much greater that the one posed by Gaza’s tunnels.
Countries rarely respond to threats in the making, and Israel itself has done so only during the 1956 Suez Crisis, by launching Operation Kadesh, and in the 1982 Lebanon War. Israel’s right to launch a pre-emptive strike is best reserved for dealing with existential threats in the region; and even then, this right cannot be taken for granted.
We would also be wise to remember that Israel has used this time to improve its own capabilities. For example, the Iron Dome’s interception rates are better than they were a year and a half ago. Upgrading the system would have taken some time, providing another reason to wait. It is likely that the ISF has also used this time to introduce improvements in other areas as well.
As for that first cease-fire that could have prevented Israel from dealing with the tunnels, it is now clear to all that Israel made a wise choice by agreeing to hold its fire, as it resulted in international legitimacy for the fighting that ensued, despite the devastation in Gaza. The move also bolstered the consensus within Israeli society that this was a defensive move Israel was forced to launch because the other side was clearly not interested in a cease-fire.
It is impossible to plan for all possible future scenarios during the decision-making process in these cases and more often than not one has to gamble on the result. A smart leader knows better than to take unnecessary risks that might result is bigger threats to his country, but then again, it is important to take calculated risks to mark significant achievements. As far as the tunnels are concerned, the gamble paid off. Hamas was likely to reject a cease-fire deal at that point, the military had yet to sustain casualties, and the worst case scenario entailed deferring the counter-tunnel operation for a while longer.
On the other hand, it was also clear that Israel’s willingness to call a truce despite Hamas fire would afford the IDF the leeway necessary to find and destroy the tunnels, making it a risk worth taking. Currently, the future of the Gaza campaign must be determined while keeping broader interests in mind, and while considering the needs of the Israeli public, the military campaign, and Israel’s diplomatic relationships.
DID A ‘SOFT COUP’ JUST HAPPEN IN PAKISTAN?
Ishaan Tharoor Washington Post, Aug. 29, 2014
For much of Pakistan's independent existence, the country's politics have been dominated by its powerful military. The generals have a long history of interrupting and meddling with civilian rule. The election last year of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif marked the first time in almost seven decades that Pakistan was able to carry out a peaceful transfer of power between civilian governments.
But the specter of the army now looms large once more. In order to placate heated protests against his rule, Sharif agreed this week to mediation by the army, an institution that is respected by a vast cross-section of society. Pakistan's army chief, Raheel Sharif (who is not related to the prime minister), conducted meetings with the two main protest leaders–the maverick politician Imran Khan and fiery preacher Tahirul Qadri, both of whom have led noisy protest movements this past month and are seeking the collapse of Sharif's government.
But, in return for its intervention, it appears the military has exacted a price from Prime Minister Sharif. According to reports, he has agreed to cede control of aspects of the country's security and foreign policy to the military. It's a difficult situation for Sharif: In 1999, then in his second term as prime minister, he was ousted by a military coup led by then Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Now, the military, in a sense, is once more showing the prime minister who is boss.
"If Nawaz Sharif survives, for the rest of his term, he will be a ceremonial prime minister—the world will not take him seriously," said Ayesha Siddiqa, an Islamabad-based analyst told the Wall Street Journal. "A soft coup has already taken place. The question is whether it will harden."
Since returning to power last year, Sharif's efforts to both punish Musharraf — who currently awaits trial — and entrench civilian power have angered members of the top brass. Sharif also sought to improve ties with India. The Pakistani military, a sprawling institution with its own business concerns and a half a million-strong standing army, finds something of a raison d'etre in its historic rivalry with India. The countries have fought four wars since their independence from Britain in 1947. "If Pakistan and India become normal neighbors," writes Pakistani analyst Mosharraf Zaidi, "the military's influence in Pakistan automatically decreases. The hawks clearly won't go easily."
There are many good reasons, as Zaidi points out, to criticize Sharif, particularly for the "rank incompetence" of his government's decision-making. "He is hamstrung by an obsession with surrounding himself with loyal but inept advisors and bureaucrats," writes Zaidi.
The protest movements led by Khan and Qadri…are products of political opportunism animated by genuine grievances with the status quo. Khan, a flashy former cricketer turned rabble-rousing politico, claims Sharif benefited from vote-rigging in the 2013 elections and wants the current government scrapped and new elections held. Most independent observers say what irregularities there were would not have likely changed the outcome. Qadri, meanwhile, who spends much of his time in Canada, has a devoted following at home that has embraced his call for a wholesale transformation of the nature of Pakistani democracy.
Khan and Qadri's supporters have massed in their thousands in Islamabad over the past two weeks. Despite their relatively small numbers and Khan's declining popularity, the protests have seemingly paralyzed the country's politics. Pakistani journalist and author Raza Rumi explains:
Such political instability is not new to Pakistan. A lack of consensus on how the country has to be governed has plagued Pakistan's history with cyclical patterns of military rule and weak civilian governments. With the current protests, such schisms have captured public imagination through a powerful electronic media where the very rationale of democracy is being debated often in an adverse manner. The protests are unique for they are being televised into the homes of millions of Pakistanis and thus creating a broader impact.
Sharif still commands a comfortable majority in parliament and decent levels of popular support as a prime minister. Yet his hold on power looks weak. Tim Craig, The Washington Post's Pakistan bureau chief, writes…:
Sharif may be paralyzed due to the lingering trauma he feels after he was dragged out of the prime minster’s residence by the army when Musharraf ousted him in a coup in 1999. Sharif was humiliated.
And to this day, he often appears too nervous and too cautious when confronted with crisis. If he had, for example, just allowed Khan and Qadri to hold a demonstration in front of parliament instead of initially stacking shipping containers to keep them away, there would have been no media drama last week when supporters of two men stormed past government defenses.
It would have just been another anti-government protest in country where such demonstrations are common.
But Sharif instead appeared defensive and isolated. He locked himself up in his house — without an effective public relations strategy for overcoming Khan’s charm or Qadri’s forcefulness. And now Sharif appears weak and ineffective. And a leader who appears weak in a country as tough as Pakistan is not likely to last long.
No one is really anticipating a fully military takeover, though. As Zaidi notes, the army may retain "a greater say in issues such as the country’s policy toward neighboring India or Afghanistan or the ongoing war against the Pakistani Taliban." But it has little desire to own the systemic problems that have led to popular discontent, such as Pakistan's woeful energy shortages and the challenges facing its stagnant economy.
"Pakistani democracy under Sharif will continue to muddle along as it has in the past," concludes Zaid. But "this crisis is unquestionably a setback for democrats."
Hamas Was Defeated, Until the Next Time: Prof. Efraim Inbar, BESA, Sept. 1, 2014—Hamas was clearly defeated by Israel in “Operation Protective Edge,’ but not destroyed.
Israeli Ambassador Daniel Taub’s Full Speech in Bradford: Jewish News, Aug. 20, 2014 —I am delighted to be here in this wonderful city today. And I am especially glad to be here at the invitation of people who want to give voice to the real Bradford.
Conduct of Operations in Limited Scale Conflicts: Maj. Gen. (res.) David Ivry, BESA, Aug. 31, 2014—Limited-scale, asymmetrical conflicts have become the norm.
Pakistan, Its Own Worst Enemy: New York Times, Aug. 29, 2014—Pakistan faces very big problems: a failing economy; a Taliban insurgency; and persistent tension with India, which has resulted again in exchanges of cross-border fire.
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