Turkey: Erdogan's Grab for Absolute Power: Burak Bekdil, Gatestone Institute, Jan. 29, 2017— Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's one-man show goes on…
NATO’s Weak Link: Max Boot, Commentary, Jan. 17, 2017— NATO is in big trouble—and not just because of incoming President Donald Trump’s habit of calling it “obsolete.”
The Real Reason Erdoganists Still Love Trump Despite 'Muslim Ban': Mustafa Akyol, Al-Monitor, Jan. 31, 2017— The executive order by US President Donald Trump, banning the citizens of seven predominantly Muslim nations from entering the United States, has sparked major protests all across America.
Turkey’s Relentless Attack on the Press: Editorial, New York Times, Jan. 14, 2017— It should come as no surprise that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey would praise Donald Trump for refusing to talk to a CNN reporter at a news conference.
Israeli Tourists Flock to Turkey Amid Rapprochement: Times of Israel, Feb. 6, 2017
How Turkey’s Jewish Alliance Schools Have Become History: Uzay Bulut, Algemeiner, Feb. 7, 2017
Angela Merkel, Meeting With Erdogan in Turkey, Emphasizes Free Speech: New York Times, Feb. 2, 2017
Turkey’s Argentina Road: Editorial, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 2017
TURKEY: ERDOGAN'S GRAB FOR ABSOLUTE POWER
Burak Bekdil
Gatestone Institute, Jan. 29, 2017
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's one-man show goes on; he may soon progress from effectively having absolute authority to actually having absolute authority. He would apparently like to put an official seal on his increasingly autocratic regime. If a simple majority of Turks vote "yes" in a national referendum on proposed constitutional amendments in April, Erdogan will effectively consolidate the power of three legislative bodies into one powerful executive office: himself. He would then be installed as a leader with virtually unlimited authority.
Although the current constitution grants him largely symbolic powers, Erdogan has acted as the effective head of the executive branch since he became Turkey's first elected president in August 2014. He has explicitly — and, it appears, happily — violated the constitution by acting as an absolute head of government. In May 2016, he forced Ahmet Davutoglu, his own confidant and prime minister, out of office; Erdogan evidently suspected that the man was not working hard enough to push for the absolute executive presidential system Erdogan has evidently been craving. Only seven months ago, Davutoglu had won a parliamentary election with 49.5% of the national vote.
Erdogan replaced Davutoglu with Binali Yildirim, who has proven to be more enthusiastic about terminating the prime minister's office and transferring all powers to an all-powerful president. As Erdogan's (and Yildirim's) ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) lacked the parliamentary majority to put any constitutional amendment to public vote, the proposed changes therefore required support from the opposition benches. (A minimum of 330 votes is required in the country's 550-member assembly, as opposed to 317 seats controlled by the AKP.)
A year ago, that would have looked unimaginable. But a nationalist opposition party, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), made a U-turn from its public pledges of "never letting Erdogan become the executive president," and decided to support the reform bill. Political observers are still trying to figure out what may have pushed the MHP from one extreme to the other; there is not yet a clear explanation.
Erdogan's "Turkish-style presidency" is already a presidency with too much power held by one man. If approved in the referendum, the changes will make Erdogan head of government, head of state and head of the ruling party — all at the same time. Erdogan would have the power to appoint cabinet ministers without requiring a confidence vote from parliament, propose budgets and appoint more than half the members of the nation's highest judicial body. He would also have the power to dissolve parliament, impose states of emergency and issue decrees. Alarmingly, the proposed system lacks the safety mechanisms of checks and balances that exist in other countries such as the United States. It would transfer powers traditionally held by parliament to the presidency, thereby rendering the parliament merely a ceremonial, advisory body.
With support from MHP, the reform bill passed in parliament with 339 votes in favor — nine more than required to put it to a national vote. The way the Turkish parliament debated the bill looked like a prelude to the way Erdogan's totally autocratic presidency will fuel tensions in the months ahead. Several rounds of fist-fighting broke out. Brawls were daily scenes in parliamentary sessions. Screaming matches and physical altercations sent lawmakers to hospitals.
In one instance, an independent female lawmaker handcuffed herself to the microphone on the lectern for an hour to protest the presidential bill. Deputies from the government benches tried to remove her but opposition deputies sprang to her defense, while punches and kicks were exchanged. The assembly saw its first-ever brawl between female lawmakers who punched each other and pulled one another's hair. One female opposition deputy was thrown to the floor and her prosthetic artificial arm knocked off, injuring her severely.
Nevertheless, Erdogan is happy. He will soon launch his "yes" campaign together with the nationalists in the opposition (MHP). He is confident that he will win — he has not lost a single election or referendum since he came to power in November 2002. Observers expect that a clear majority of his party loyalists (around 40% of 50%) will vote "yes" in addition to around half of the nationalists in opposition (around 6% of 12%). That makes a combined 46% of the vote. Some of the splinter Islamist parties and non-AKP voters who favor a presidential system, too, are expected to vote "yes," lifting the pro-Erdogan vote to a range of 50% to 55%. There is a sizeable group of "undecided" whose preferences may be influenced by Erdogan's huge propaganda machinery or by the argument that a strong president would strengthen Turkey as it confronts a broad array of internal and external security threats.
The opposition (Kurds and secular and liberal Turks), on the other hand, looks fragmented and helpless in telling the masses that reforms would concentrate excessive powers in the hands of a leader who has increasingly displayed authoritarian tendencies. There are concerns that the opposition, under the state of emergency Erdogan's government declared in 2016, may find it too difficult effectively and freely to campaign against the proposed amendments.
Even in the unlikely event of a win for the "no" campaign it will not be the end of the world for Erdogan. He would be bruised, perhaps badly. But he would play another card: a snap election. He would win new parliamentary elections and push for similar amendments, once again trying his chances. He would have nothing to lose. He appears to rely on a popular support keeping him afloat.
From a policy-making point of view, however, a "yes" or a "no" vote will not fundamentally change the dynamics under which Turkey is being ruled. At the moment, Erdogan is effectively the absolute ruler. If he wins the vote, he becomes the absolute ruler. If he loses he remains effectively the absolute ruler until he tries again to become the absolute ruler.
Max Boot
Commentary, Jan. 17, 2017
NATO is in big trouble—and not just because of incoming President Donald Trump’s habit of calling it “obsolete.” Also deeply problematic is Turkey’s future as a NATO member. As summarized by Henri Barkley, director of the Middle East program at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Turkey’s strongman, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has been having a love-in recently with Russia’s strongman, Vladimir Putin, leaving the U.S. on the sidelines as a jilted suitor. Not even the Turkish shoot-down of a Russian jet in 2015 or the more recent murder of the Russian ambassador in Ankara has slowed down this rapprochement.
Turkey and Russia are now coordinating closely when it comes to Syria, with Erdogan having apparently given up hope of ousting Bashar Assad and becoming increasingly alarmed by the gains made in northern Syria by the U.S.-backed YPG militia. That Kurdish group has links to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has been waging a long-standing war against Ankara’s rule. Russia is even conducting air strikes in Syria in support of Turkish troops, which are there ostensibly to fight Islamic State but exist in reality to stop the Kurds from carving out their own state in northern Syria.
Along with the increased Russia-Turkey cooperation has come an intensification of the already-high level of anti-American invective from Erdogan. He and his minions, faithfully echoed by the government-controlled press, regularly blame the U.S. not only for staging a failed military coup last summer against Erdogan (a ridiculous accusation believed by as many as 79 percent of Turks) but also for supposedly supporting Islamic State. Turkey’s president said as recently as Dec. 27 that “it’s very clear” that the U.S. backs ISIS, an accusation rightly dubbed “ludicrous” by the State Department spokesman.
Meanwhile, Erdogan has been busy stamping out the last remnants of Turkish democracy, an affront to the common values that Turkey is supposed to share with other Atlantic Alliance members. Erdogan is filling his prisons with thousands of academics, journalists, military officers, judges, and other prominent citizens who are accused, based on spurious evidence, of being tools of Fethullah Gulen–the exiled Muslim preacher who has become for Erdogan what Trotsky was for Stalin, a convenient scapegoat.
Accounts abound of the Orwellian ordeals suffered by Turkey’s political prisoners as they try to figure out why they were jailed and how they can get out. A recent Wall Street Journal article detailing the arrest and imprisonment of a well-known Turkish judge was particularly infuriating and affecting. Significantly, the Erdogan regime even dared to lock up Wall Street Journal reporter Dion Nissenbaum for two and a half days, allowing him no contact with his wife or colleagues—a sign of how little Erdogan fears Washington’s wrath.
More concerned about cooperation about ISIS than progress on human rights, President Obama has largely given Erdogan a pass on his increasingly illiberal rule. President Trump is likely to continue and even intensify that trend. He might even extradite Gulen from Pennsylvania to face a kangaroo court in Turkey, as suggested by National Security Adviser Michael Flynn. And he might very well increase cooperation with Russia in Syria, which might put the U.S. and Turkey in greater sync even if neither Russia nor Turkey has shown much interest in fighting ISIS. But will Trump be willing to abandon U.S. support for the YPG, one of the few militias in Turkey that cannot be accused of being tainted by radical Islamist ideology?
Certainly, the U.S. and the rest of NATO can’t afford to simply write off Turkey, which is an important player in the Middle East with considerable military capacity and political influence. But it is harder than ever to claim that Turkey shares common interests, values, or an outlook with the rest of NATO, and that in turn puts yet another question mark over the alliance’s future.
THE REAL REASON ERDOGANISTS STILL
LOVE TRUMP DESPITE 'MUSLIM BAN'
Mustafa Akyol
Al-Monitor, Jan. 31, 2017
The executive order by US President Donald Trump, banning the citizens of seven predominantly Muslim nations from entering the United States, has sparked major protests all across America. Most Muslims, naturally, were happy to see this solidarity offered to them by Jews, Christians, atheists and many others who do not share their faith.
However, the same solidarity did not come from some of the Middle Eastern governments that often claim to be the defenders of the faith. These include, as noted in a recent article in The New York Times, key Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which seem to have political expectations from Trump that they do not want to spoil. Notably, they also include Turkey, which not only has political expectations from Trump but also has a political elite that has a curious adoration for the new American president.
In fact, to say that the Turkish government said nothing about the “Muslim ban” would be wrong. Prime Minister Binali Yildirim made a critical remark on the ban Jan. 28, noting, “Regional issues cannot be solved by closing the doors on people.” Yet he said this only when he was asked about it, and only in a tone that was conspicuously indirect and mild. Then, three days later, Deputy Prime Minister and government spokesman Numan Kurtulmus criticized the ban more openly, calling it “a discriminative decision,” which he hoped would be corrected.
Meanwhile, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the ultimate authority, has so far said nothing about the “Muslim ban.” Moreover, his propaganda machine, consisting of at least 10 national newspapers, several TV channels and thousands of social media trolls, has also been unusually silent about the issue. Daily Sabah, the flagship of the pro-media empire, has been absolutely silent on the ban. Daily Star, another key newspaper in the pro-Erdogan media, published only a small and neutral report. Daily Aksam did run a headline on the ban, but only with a subtitle: “He [Trump] must be given a chance.” With the possible exception of daily Yeni Safak, which has been criticized lately for not being Erdoganist enough, the pro-Erdogan media’s stance on the Muslim ban has been unmistakably cautious.
In fact, despite the ban, the pro-Erdogan media ran opinion pieces that kept praising Trump. According to one of them, Trump was a revolutionary who ended “the military coup era” in America, defeated “global capitalism” by the “national will” and formed a Cabinet of “the most intellectual generals in history.” According to another writer, Trump has been unfairly turned into a boogeyman by the conspiratorial forces of the CIA, George Soros, Hollywood and the music industry.
No pro-Trump opinion piece was as notable, however, as the one penned by Hilal Kaplan, a key pundit in the pro-Erdogan media. In her column in daily Sabah, Kaplan took great pains to explain why the “Muslim ban” did not matter much, why Trump is still a promising leader and why his liberal opponents are the real bad people. Accordingly, the American president who is responsible for destabilizing the seven banned Muslim nations was none other than former President Barack Obama. It was of course bad that American Muslims were in trouble, but what really mattered were “Muslims in our region.” (And Trump, somehow, would be better for them.) Ultimately, Kaplan explained, what really matters is Turkey’s interests: “Turkey is strong,” she argued. “The umma will also be strong.” (And Trump, somehow, would be better for Turkey.)
I have seen this pro-Trump spirit among Erdoganists on social media as well, when I tweeted about the irony at hand: “American liberals are defending the rights of Muslims. But our supposedly 'Islamist' media is applauding Trump against those liberals.” In return, the usual pro-Erdogan arguments in favor of Trump poured in: American liberals were protesting Trump not because they loved Islam, but because Trump threatened their dirty interests. In fact, all Americans were anti-Islam and Trump deserved respect because he was at least honest about it.
One wonders why all this persistent sympathy for Trump exists in Turkey’s pro-Erdogan universe. Erdogan, after all, often presents himself as the defender of all Muslims, and this should have normally required a clearer stance against the Western narratives and policies that offend Muslims. Why does Trump get so much leniency from a usually pro-Islamic political line?
There are two answers to this question. The first answer is pragmatic. Erdogan and his team have some important expectations from Trump. One is that he may help extradite Fethullah Gulen, who Turkey sees as the mastermind of the failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. The other one is that Trump may stop the Obama administration’s policy of supporting the Syrian Kurdish forces, who Turkey considers to be terrorists. It is in fact not clear whether the Trump administration would take such steps, but Ankara wants to see what it can get from Trump and does not want to offend him before any possible progress.
The second answer is ideological. Trump’s populism resonates with the populism of Erdogan, creating an affinity of worldviews. When Trump condemns the “mainstream media,” or his strategist Stephen Bannon says the media should “keep its mouth shut,” Erdoganists see a very familiar style of strongman politics that they admire. When Trump condemns the conspiracies of “internal bankers,” he says something that confirms the conspiracy theories of Turkey’s new ruling class. Basically, both Erdogan and Trump represent a nationalist, nativist, populist battle cry against the global liberal order, and this creates common ground between the two sides. The fact that Trump dislikes Islam while Erdogan champions it, apparently, is not important enough to disrupt this new transatlantic connection.
TURKEY’S RELENTLESS ATTACK ON THE PRESS
Editorial
New York Times, Jan. 14, 2017
It should come as no surprise that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey would praise Donald Trump for refusing to talk to a CNN reporter at a news conference. For years, Mr. Erdogan has been crushing independent voices as part of a broader effort to assert authoritarian control. Earlier this month, the Turkish police arrested the top legal adviser and a former chief executive of Dogan Holding, a conglomerate that owns the newspaper Hurriyet and CNN Turk. This followed the detention in mid-December of another company executive, Barbaros Muratoglu, reportedly accused of “aiding a terror group,” namely the organization of Muslim cleric Fethullah Gulen, who has lived in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania since 1999. The company has denied links to Mr. Gulen.
Once allies, Mr. Erdogan and Mr. Gulen are bitter rivals and Mr. Erdogan has charged Mr. Gulen with masterminding an aborted coup in July. Although the attempted overthrow was a legitimate threat, Mr. Erdogan has exploited the episode to cement his control. He has declared a state of emergency that greatly expands his executive powers, jailed thousands of soldiers, seized hundreds of companies and purged thousands more public officials, police officers, teachers, judges and prosecutors — most of whom were also accused of being followers of Mr. Gulen. Many have been placed in pretrial detention despite a lack of evidence.
Mr. Erdogan’s crackdown on the press has accelerated. Some 120 journalists have been jailed since the coup attempt and Turkey has now surpassed China as the world’s main jailer of journalists, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.
The family that owns Dogan Holding has long been influential in Turkey’s secular establishment and ran afoul of Mr. Erdogan’s Islamist-based A.K.P. Party in 2009. With the company targeted again and fearful of losing more assets, the newspaper Hurriyet is widely seen as pulling punches to appease Mr. Erdogan by firing journalists and quashing even mildly critical news stories.
There is little doubt that Mr. Gulen has tried to cause mischief in Turkey by calling attention to corruption and Mr. Erdogan’s efforts to undermine democracy. But so far Mr. Erdogan has not provided the kind of evidence needed to extradite Mr. Gulen. Mr. Erdogan undoubtedly believes that Mr. Trump may be more amenable to this demand.
Israeli Tourists Flock to Turkey Amid Rapprochement: Times of Israel, Feb. 6, 2017—Israeli tourism to Turkey increased by almost 80 percent over the past three years, rising from 164,917 visitors in 2013 to 293,988 visitors in 2016, according to a new report in the Turkish press.
How Turkey’s Jewish Alliance Schools Have Become History: Uzay Bulut, Algemeiner, Feb. 7, 2017—The Turkish website Avlaremoz, which reports on Jewish-related issues, recently covered the story of a Jewish school that used to be based in Istanbul. The Haskoy Alliance Girls’ School, which opened in 1874 and began to welcome boys in 1877, still carries the French inscription “Alliance Israélite Ecole des Garçons” (Jewish Alliance Boys’ School). Today, however, it serves as the student guesthouse of Kadir Has University. It was established under the Alliance Israélite Universelle, the first modern international Jewish organization.
Angela Merkel, Meeting With Erdogan in Turkey, Emphasizes Free Speech: New York Times, Feb. 2, 2017—Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany emphasized the importance of freedom of opinion in talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey on Thursday, during a visit meant to help improve frayed ties between the two NATO allies.
Turkey’s Argentina Road: Editorial, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 2017—Not too long ago Turkey was the economic star of the Middle East, and the boom years of the last decade helped Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his AK Party stay popular. But these days Turkey is a growth laggard trying to stop a run on its once-strong currency. This is what happens when the desire for political control trumps sound economic policy.
