Tag: PLO



Trump, the Pistol and the Olive Branch: Caroline Glick, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 16, 2017 — With a gun on his hip, on November 13, 1974, PLO chief Yasser Arafat stood before the UN General Assembly and

 made the West an offer that it didn’t refuse.

Understanding Israel’s Message on ISIS-Inspired Terror in Jerusalem: Dan Diker, JCPA, Jan. 12, 2017— Speculation over possible ISIS involvement was triggered by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s comment at the scene, “All signs point to the attacker being a supporter of the Islamic State.”

Fatah and Hamas Finally Agree on Something: Stephen M. Flatow, JNS, Jan. 12, 2017— Fatah and Hamas don’t always get along.

A Palestinian Defeat is Good for All: Daniel Pipes, Middle East Forum, Dec. 28, 2016— Israel's Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was photographed on Dec. 21 carrying a copy of Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History by John David Lewis (Princeton University Press, 2010).


On Topic Links


A Life of Degradation and Bitterness Under Fatah Rule: The Jerusalem Center, JCPA, Jan. 12, 2017

Palestinians: Glorifying Mass Murderers: Bassam Tawil, Gatestone Institute, Jan. 10, 2017

Hamas, ISIS Affiliates, See Opportunity in Terror Truck Attack: Yaakov Lappin, IPT, Jan. 11, 2017

The Cyber Bikini Intifada: Ruthie Blum, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 15, 2017




Caroline Glick

Jerusalem Post, Jan. 16, 2017


With a gun on his hip, on November 13, 1974, PLO chief Yasser Arafat stood before the UN General Assembly and made the West an offer that it didn’t refuse. At the end of a long speech in which he rewrote history to erase all connection between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel and criminalized the very notion of Jewish freedom, Arafat declared, “Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat: Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.”


Arafat’s offer has served since that time as the foundation of European relations with the Palestinians and the wider Islamic world. It has also been the basis of US-PLO relations for the better part of the past four decades. His trade was simple and clear. If you stand with the PLO in its war to annihilate Israel and deny Jewish freedom, then PLO terrorists and our Arab state supporters will leave you alone. If you refuse to join our war against the Jewish state, we will kill you.


Today, Arafat’s successor, Mahmoud Abbas, is reiterating Arafat’s offer. Speaking Saturday at the Vatican after the Holy See decided to recognize “Palestine,” Abbas said that if US President-elect Donald Trump goes ahead with his plan to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem, it will “fuel extremism in our region, as well as worldwide.” Abbas’s spokesman was more explicit. Saturday night, Osama Qawasmeh, spokesman for Abbas’s Fatah PLO faction and member of Fatah’s Revolutionary Council, said that if the US moves its embassy to Israel’s capital city, “The gates of hell will be opened in the region and the world.” Abbas and Qawasmeh also said that the PLO expects that members of the international community will make Trump see the light and abandon his plan.


French President Francois Hollande’s “peace conference” on Sunday was the international community’s way of fulfilling Abbas’s demand. As multiple commentators have noted, the conference’s purpose wasn’t to promote the prospects for peace. It was to constrain Trump’s policy options for handling the Palestinian war against Israel. By bringing together representatives of some 70 countries to insist that Israeli homeowners are the moral equivalent of Palestinian terrorists, Hollande and his comrades hoped to box Trump into their PLO-compliant policy.


Spelling out the demand Trump is required to accept, French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc-Ayrault parroted the Palestinian threats. Asked by the French media Sunday if moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem would provoke the Palestinians, Ayrault said, “Of course.” He then demeaned Trump’s plan to move the embassy as nothing but the regular bluster of American politicians. In his words, “I think he [Trump] would not be able to do it. It would have extremely serious consequences and it’s not the first time that it’s on the agenda of a US president, but none has let himself make that decision.”


Ayrault is correct about Trump’s predecessors. To one degree or another, since the early 1970s, successive US administrations have joined the Europeans in selling Israel down the river to prevent Arafat’s minions from pointing their guns at the American people. Like the Europeans, the Americans have upheld their side of this bargain even when the PLO failed to uphold its end. For instance, in 1973 Arafat ordered his terrorists to storm the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum and take US ambassador Cleo Noel, his deputy, George Curtis Moore, and Belgian diplomat Guy Eid hostage. Arafat then ordered his henchmen to murder the diplomats after then president Richard Nixon rejected his demand to release Robert F. Kennedy’s Palestinian murderer, Sirhan Sirhan, from prison. Instead of responding to the execution of US diplomats by siding with Israel against the PLO, the US covered up and denied the PLO’s responsibility for the attack for the next 33 years.


The US is still covering up for the PLO’s murder of US embassy personnel in Gaza in 2003. At the same time, it is providing the PLO with nearly three quarters of a billion dollars in direct and indirect annual aid, including the training and provision of its security forces. The Europeans for their part have egged the US along throughout the years. France has generally led European efforts to convince the Americans to side with Palestinian as well as Hezbollah terrorists in their war against Israel in the name of “peace.” Sunday morning, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed the Paris conference as a “futile” relic of a period that is about to end. Netanyahu said that the conference’s goal of boxing Israel into an untenable framework for dealing the Palestinians was nothing more than the “final palpitations of a yesterday’s world.” “Tomorrow,” he intoned, “will look a lot different. And tomorrow is very close.”…

[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]                




ON ISIS-INSPIRED TERROR IN JERUSALEM                                                               

Dan Diker                                                           

                              JCPA, Jan. 12, 2017


News headlines across Israel and the world reported that ISIS may have inspired the Palestinian terrorist who committed the deadly January 8, 2017, truck ramming attack in Jerusalem that killed four Israelis and injured 16. Speculation over possible ISIS involvement was triggered by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s comment at the scene, “All signs point to the attacker being a supporter of the Islamic State.” Referring to similar recent ISIS truck ramming attacks in Europe, Netanyahu added, “We know that we have here a series of attacks, and there could be a link between them, from France to Berlin, and now Jerusalem.”


Netanyahu’s announcement underscored an important and often overlooked principle: Radical Islamic terror in Europe and Israel are both motivated by radical and extremist ideologies and must be condemned equally. Israel has been subject to endless justifications and warnings by Western leaders and media that Palestinian terror is largely the result of “settlements,” “occupation,” “lack of peace,” and “lack of a two state solution.”


Netanyahu, Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, and the Israeli body politic criticized this frequent differentiation of “good terrorists and bad terrorists.” One recalls muscular Western condemnations of Salafist terror’s “psychopathic monsters” as U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had branded the ISIS terrorists who massacred 130 people and wounded hundreds in simultaneous Paris attacks in 2015. “Psychopathic,” ideologically and religiously motivated terrorists also live and work in Jerusalem. The “truck” terrorist, Fadi al-Qanbar, a father of four young children, lived in the neighborhood of Jabel Mukaber. He was not driven by socioeconomic deprivation or nationalist sentiment. He enjoyed complete freedom of movement and received the same social and economic benefits as Jews and other residents of Jerusalem.


Jabel Mukaber is also known as known as a hotbed of religious jihadi incitement. A neighborhood communal leader said that in the late 1980s the neighborhood became a hotbed of Islamism. Neighborhood children as young as eight and nine years old have declared their intentions to become “martyrs for Allah” according to interviews conducted in Jabel Mukaber by Islamic affairs expert Avi Issacharoff. Jabel Mukaber is also home to the jihadist terrorist cell that massacred Jewish worshipers in a synagogue in Jerusalem’s Har Nof neighborhood in 2014.  A sister of Fadi al-Qanbar, confirmed Jabel Mukaber’s growing reputation for radical Islamism. She told Israel’s YNET News, “Praise be to Allah that he (al-Qanbar) became a martyr. It is the most beautiful kind of saintly death. Allah chose him for this martyrdom. Thank God.”


It is true that UN officials and western leaders uncharacteristically and unconditionally condemned the Jerusalem truck ramming terror attack. However, one cannot ignore the context of the these condemnations as a collective expression of diplomatic discomfort in the aftermath of the politically-fueled and distorted resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council on December 23, 2016 that delegitimized Israel’s sovereignty and annulled its sui-generis 3,000 year connection to its capital, Jerusalem.


Khaled Abu Toameh reminds us in a recent analysis for Gatestone Institute that the resolution has also energized radical Islamic terror against Israel. Just days before the attack, Abu Toameh observed that the recent UNSC resolution served to ‘“Bolster the popular resistance’ against Israel – code for throwing stones and firebombs, and carrying out stabbing and car-ramming attacks against Israelis.” He added that the Gaza-based Hamas and Islamic Jihad see the resolution as another step toward their goal of replacing Israel with an Islamic empire. When Hamas talks about “resistance,” it means suicide bombings and rockets against Israel.


From a jihadi point of view, there is no difference between truck terror in Berlin, Nice, or Jerusalem. Palestinian jihadis and their fellow travelers in ISIS, al-Qaida, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham in Syria, Hamas, Iran’s IRGC and Hizbullah proxy have declared that Islamic terrorism against Europe and Israel stems from the same radical root and aims for the same extremist end: Exclusive Islamic sovereignty across the lands of the Near East and ultimately the entire world.


Hamas praised the Jerusalem truck terror attack as “heroic.” The Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated group features a charter that reminds us of the popular motivation of the Palestinian struggle. It declares, “For our struggle against the Jews is extremely wide-ranging and grave, so much so that it will need all the loyal efforts we can wield, to be followed by further steps and reinforced by successive battalions from the multifarious Arab and Islamic world, until the enemies are defeated and Allah’s victory prevails.”


Palestinian jihad in Jerusalem also enjoys PLO and Palestinian Authority financial and rhetorical support. Brigadier General Yossi Kuperwasser’s January 2017 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs report “Incentivizing Terrorism: Palestinian Authority Allocations to Terrorists and their Families” confirms that official Palestinian Authority legislation guarantees more than $310 million dollars in annual allocations to terrorists and their families. PA and PLO leadership have long incited Palestinians to murder Israelis. PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Hamas both claim Israel is destroying the al-Aqsa Mosque. This libel was also one of the central sources of incitement to terror in Jabal Mukaber, according to Issacharoff…

[To Read the Full Article Click the Following Link—Ed.]                                                                





Stephen M. Flatow

JNS, Jan. 12, 2017


Fatah and Hamas don’t always get along. Fatah, the largest faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, is chaired by Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas. Hamas is the Islamic fundamentalist Palestinian group that rules Gaza. Fatah and Hamas call each other names. They compete against each other in Palestinian elections (on the rare occasions that such elections are held). Sometimes, Fatah goons rough up a Hamas member, and vice versa. There were even armed clashes between the two factions in 2007, leaving more than 100 terrorists dead. But Fatah and Hamas have found at least one thing they agree on: Anyone who massacres Jews is a great guy.


January 5th was the 21st anniversary of the death of the most infamous Hamas bomb-maker of them all, Yahya Ayyash. He also shared his car-bombing techniques, explosive vests and other deadly innovations with Islamic Jihad, the terror group that murdered my daughter, Alisa, and seven other bus passengers near Kfar Darom in 1995. Last week, Hamas honored the “hero” Ayyash with a photo essay on its website, complete with images of the bodies of some of his victims. Ayyash had the blood of hundreds of Israelis and Americans on his hands. That’s why Hamas reveres him.


But guess what? The “moderate” Fatah admires the mass-murderer Ayyash just as much as the “extremist” Hamas. Fatah, too, celebrated Ayyash’s atrocities with a glowing feature about him on its website. “Today is the anniversary of (the death of) the martyr engineer Yahya Ayyash,” Abbas’ group declared. “Revolutionaries never die. The pact of Fatah will remain the pact of the martyrs. We are marching on the path of Yasser Arafat on the way to national unity.”


When Hamas and Fatah call Ayyash a “martyr,” they are not using the term casually. “Martyr,” shahid in Arabic, has a specific religious connotation in Islam. The title is bestowed on a Muslim who died in the course of waging jihad against infidels. According to Islam, the shahid is showered with divine rewards in the afterlife. That’s why there is an Ayyash Street in the PA capital of Ramallah, just as there is an Ayyash Street in Beit Lahia, which is in Hamas-ruled Gaza. You name a street after someone you admire. And there is no one whom both Fatah and Hamas admire more than the “martyr” Ayyash.


Ayyash’s handiwork included the August 1995 Jerusalem bus bombing in which five people were murdered — including Connecticut school teacher Joan Davenny — and more than 100 were wounded. The words “more than 100 wounded” don’t begin to do justice to what those innocent people endured. Behind the statistic are horrific stories of suffering that lasts for years, often for a lifetime. One was Yonah Peter Malina, who, while growing up in Switzerland, did not even know that he was Jewish. At age 27, Yonah discovered his Jewishness, embraced Zionism and immigrated to Israel. He had been there less than a year when Ayyash’s bomb blew up that bus. Severely injured, Yonah awoke from a coma to find himself paralyzed from the neck down. He spent the next 10 years on a 24-hour respirator until he passed away in May 2005.


Every time the United Nations tells us that Israel is the obstacle to peace, every time the Washington Post tries to convince us that Hamas and Fatah are enemies, every time J Street declares that Abbas is a “moderate” — let’s remember who maimed and ultimately murdered Yonah Peter Malina, and which groups call the killer a “hero” and a “martyr.” In the end, that really tells us all we need to know about the Palestinian cause.                                         





Daniel Pipes

Middle East Forum, Dec. 28, 2016


Israel's Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu was photographed on Dec. 21 carrying a copy of Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History by John David Lewis (Princeton University Press, 2010). In that book, Lewis looks at six case studies and argues that in them all "the tide of war turned when one side tasted defeat and its will to continue, rather than stiffening, collapsed."


That Netanyahu should in any way be thinking along these lines is particularly encouraging at this moment of flux, when Sunni Arab states focus as never before on a non-Israeli threat (namely the Iranian), Obama's leaving Israel in the lurch at the U.N. Security Council, and insurgent politics disrupt across the West. In other words, the timing's exactly right to apply Lewis' argument to the Palestinians. Actually, Israel successfully pursued a strategy of forcing the taste of defeat on its enemies through its first 45 years, so this would be a return to old ways.


That strategy starts by recognizing that, since the Balfour Declaration of 1917, Palestinians and Israelis have pursued static and opposite goals. The Palestinians adopted a policy of rejectionism with the intent to eliminate every vestige of Jewish presence in what is now the territory of Israel. Differences among Palestinians tend to be tactical: Talk to the Israelis to win concessions or stick to total rejectionism? The Palestinian Authority represents the first approach and Hamas the second.


On the Israeli side, nearly everyone agrees on the need to win acceptance by Palestinians (and other Arabs and Muslims); differences are again tactical. Show Palestinians what they can gain from Zionism or break the Palestinians' will? Labor and Likud argue this out. These two pursuits – rejectionism and acceptance – have remained basically unchanged for a century. Varying ideologies, objectives, tactics, strategies, and actors mean details have varied, even as fundamentals remain remarkably in place. Wars and treaties come and go, leading to only minor shifts.


Deterrence, that is, convincing Palestinians and the Arab states to accept Israel's existence by threatening painful retaliation, underlay Israel's formidable record in 1948-93 of strategic vision and tactical brilliance.

That said, deterrence did not finish the job; as Israelis built a modern, democratic, affluent, and powerful country, the fact that Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, and (increasingly) the left still rejected it became a source of mounting frustration. Israel's impatient, on-the-go populace grew weary with the slow-moving and passive aspects of deterrence.


That impatience led to the diplomatic process that culminated with the handshake confirming the signing of the Oslo Accords on the White House lawn in September 1993. Those accords, however, quickly disappointed both sides. Things went so wrong in part because Yasir Arafat, Mahmoud Abbas, and the rest of the Palestinian Authority leadership pretended to abandon rejectionism and accept Israel's existence but, in fact, they sought Israel's elimination in new, more sophisticated ways, replacing force with delegitimization.


In part, too, the Israelis made a profound mistake, having entered the Oslo process with a false premise that war can be concluded through goodwill and compromise. In fact, Israeli concessions aggravated Palestinian hostility. The Oslo exercise showed the futility of Israeli concessions to Palestinians when the latter fail to live up to their obligations. By signaling Israeli weakness, Oslo made a bad situation worse. What is conventionally called the "peace process" should more accurately be dubbed the "war process."


This brings us to my key concepts, victory and defeat. Victory means successfully imposing one's will on the enemy, compelling him through loss to give up his war ambitions. Wars end, the historical record shows, not through goodwill but through defeat. He who does not win loses. Thinkers and warriors through the ages concur on the importance of victory as the proper goal of warfare. For example, Aristotle wrote that "victory is the end of generalship" and Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that "In war, there is no substitute for victory." Technological advancement has not altered this enduring human truth.


Israel has just one option to win Palestinian acceptance: a return to its old policy of deterrence, punishing Palestinians when they aggress. Deterrence amounts to more than tough tactics, which every Israeli government pursues; it requires systemic policies that encourage Palestinians to accept Israel and discourage rejectionism. It requires a long-term strategy that breaks the will and promotes a change of heart. The goal here is not Palestinian love of Zion but closing down the apparatus of war: shuttering suicide factories, removing the demonization of Jews and Israel, recognizing Jewish ties to Jerusalem, and "normalizing" relations with Israelis. Palestinian acceptance of Israel will be achieved when, over a protracted period and with complete consistency, the violence ends, replaced by sharply worded démarches and letters to the editor.


Ironically, an Israeli victory liberates Palestinians by compelling them to come to terms with their irredentist fantasies and the empty rhetoric of revolution. Defeat also frees them to improve their own lives. Unleashed from a genocidal obsession against Israel, Palestinians can become a normal people and develop their polity, economy, society, and culture. That said, this change won't be easy or quick: Palestinians will have to pass through the bitter crucible of defeat, with all its deprivation, destruction, and despair. There is no shortcut.


For Washington to be helpful means supporting Israel taking tough steps. It means diplomatic support for Israel, such as undoing the "Palestine refugee" farce and rejecting the claim of Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy is premature until Palestinians accept the Jewish state. The central issues of the Oslo Accords cannot be usefully discussed so long as one party still rejects the other. But negotiations can re-open and take up anew the Oslo issues if and when Palestinians accept the Jewish state. That prospect, however, lies in the distant future. For now, Israel needs to win.




On Topic Links


A Life of Degradation and Bitterness Under Fatah Rule: The Jerusalem Center, JCPA, Jan. 12, 2017—The problem of governmental corruption is that it is not a personal matter but a public problem. The Palestinian Authority/Fatah has failed to learn any lessons from its embarrassing failure in the Legislative Council elections or its humiliating rout in the Gaza Strip.

Palestinians: Glorifying Mass Murderers: Bassam Tawil, Gatestone Institute, Jan. 10, 2017—Palestinian youths are being urged to follow in the footsteps of Yahya Ayyash, a Hamas mass murderer who masterminded a wave of suicide bombings that killed and wounded hundreds of Israelis. Ayyash's expertise in manufacturing explosive devices earned him the nickname "The Engineer" and turned him into a hero in the eyes of many Palestinians.

Hamas, ISIS Affiliates, See Opportunity in Terror Truck Attack: Yaakov Lappin, IPT, Jan. 11, 2017—Hamas launched a public relations campaign in recent days, aimed at capitalizing on a deadly truck attack in Jerusalem Sunday that killed four Israeli soldiers. The campaign sheds a light on Hamas's plans to encourage and launch jihadist atrocities, but also on its vulnerability to the arrival of ISIS as an ideology and movement.

The Cyber Bikini Intifada: Ruthie Blum, Jerusalem Post, Jan. 15, 2017—Along with bloodlust and brawn, Hamas proved last week that it also has brains, at least where its enemies’ weaknesses are concerned. But even though the terrorist organization that controls the Gaza Strip has grown quite proficient at using the Internet to incite violence against Jews, it clearly is still no match for Israel in the realm of cyberspace.









Two decades after the signing of the declaration of principles (DOP) by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the White House lawn, there is something unreasonable in the world's continued adherence to the Oslo paradigm, tattered and battered as it is by years of a bloody fiasco. The Palestinian Arab leadership has consistently and adamantly rejected the two-state solution since its first articulation in 1937 by the British Peel commission[1] and has, as consistently, advocated the destruction of the Jewish state. Still, it undertook a successful public relations campaign in the 1980s promoting the notion of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—"the occupied territories."


Twenty years of Oslo, filled with optimism and enthusiasm and adorned with Nobel prizes, like the ones held here by Arafat, Peres and Rabin (l-r) have delivered no peace for either side of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Firmly entrenched in its place, however, is a textbook example of cognitive dissonance written on a grand political scale, as the failed Oslo paradigm is revived again and again.


Over the years and especially in the wake of the DOP, the Palestinian demand for statehood has gained rapid political momentum and international acceptance. A succession of Israeli prime ministers—from Shimon Peres, to Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Binyamin Netanyahu—embraced the idea, as did U.S. presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama. The paradigm for a final peace includes among its primary components Israeli territorial withdrawal and Palestinian sovereignty, political separation with reconciliation, compromise, and coexistence.


Yet twenty years on, the two parties find themselves further apart despite years of diplomatic wrangling. It is thus past time to examine and invalidate the paradigm that has taken hold in the hope that a new and less sanguinary one will take root.

A History of Failure


The concept of a Palestinian state appears just and reasonable. It evolves from the notion of a right to national self-determination for the stateless Palestinian people and their demand to end an Israeli presence in the territories captured in 1967. The terminology of decolonization regarding Jews who have settled in those territories fits this narrative of thwarted native Palestinian rights; ending the "illegality" of Israeli rule over the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem is a global political stipulation for conflict-resolution. From the November 1988 resolution in Algiers that called for Palestinian independence to the extensive diplomatic campaign of September 2011 to promote Palestinian statehood at the United Nations, the PLO dramatically altered the political parameters of the conflict and its resolution. In sketching the two-state solution of Israel and Palestine as representing complementary rather than contradictory elements in the puzzle of peace-making, values of equality and freedom radiated from both sides.


The Palestinian state idea had been proposed repeatedly in the post-1967 era,[2] and its feasibility, viability, and desirability were analyzed and advocated again and again. The idea was central to the Arab-originated Fahd plan of 1981 and the Fez plan of 1982 and was reintroduced two decades later in 2002 by the Saudis as the Beirut peace plan. On the Jewish side, the nongovernmental Council for Peace and Security founded in 1988 was book-ended by the so-called Geneva initiative of 2003—headed by two failed politicians, Yossi Beilin and Amnon Lipkin-Shahak—with centrist Labor and leftist political parties contributing their own details along the way, all promoting a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The two-state solution emerged within PLO circles in 1988 when Bassam Abu Sharif, a political advisor to Arafat, presented a position paper on the theme.[3]


However, when the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO were signed in September 1993, there was no explicit mention that the peace process would culminate in a Palestinian state. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had in 1974 rejected the notion of a "third state" between Israel and Jordan,[4] had reiterated this position in an autobiographical work in 1979, contending that a Palestinian "mini-state" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would serve as a stage toward the "secular, democratic state of Palestine" that would rise "on the ruins of the state of Israel."[5] Four years before concluding the historic agreement with Arafat at the White House, Rabin asserted that a Palestinian state would be a time-bomb for chaos and warfare,[6] and even with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994, it remained Rabin's belief that the final version of the Palestinian entity must be less than a sovereign state.[7]


With that said, Palestinian sovereignty was, nevertheless, anticipated as the end-product of the Oslo process. Israel had acknowledged Palestinian peoplehood and rights in the 1978 Camp David-negotiated framework agreement for Middle East peace. It then recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993, agreed to the founding of the PA and its police force in 1994, and implemented territorial withdrawals from towns and rural areas in Judea-Samaria and Gaza in 1994-97. The International Donors' Committee provided billions of dollars in aid to the PA, which established institutions for what could be termed a state in formation. Binyamin Netanyahu, leader of the opposition Likud Party in 1993, said he would abrogate the Oslo accords, but as prime minister in 1996, he failed to do so.[8] The Hebron protocol of January 1997 and the Wye River memorandum of October 1998 demonstrated that Netanyahu operated within the Oslo paradigm for peace by relinquishing Israeli control over land, which was linked to explicit Palestinian obligations such as combating terrorist organizations and preventing incitement. Soon afterward, the Israeli government cancelled additional withdrawals because the PLO did not fulfill its commitments but not because Jerusalem dispensed with the Oslo idea.

Faith in Oslo did not dissolve even when failure struck over and over again. In July 2000 at the Camp David summit, Ehud Barak offered Arafat Palestinian statehood with control over approximately 92 percent of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and a political capital in the vicinity of Jerusalem. But Arafat spurned the offer, and a reign of terror and suicide-bombing ensued.


Despite the basic breakdown of diplomacy and although U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross admitted that Oslo had failed, he remained convinced—having written eight hundred pages of close text detailing the intricacies, efforts, obstacles, formulae, and setbacks regarding "the missing peace"—that "there is room for creative diplomacy."[9] Should failure not have brought about a reevaluation and some change in policy orientation?


In January 2002, President Bush called for an "end to occupation and [for] a peaceful democratic Palestinian state" as the prescription for peace, a formula endorsed a year later by the international "Quartet" (the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations). Another year later, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon also hitched onto the Palestinian state bandwagon as did his successors in Jerusalem—Olmert and Netanyahu—a few years hence. Yet negotiations, such as those between Olmert and PA president Mahmoud Abbas in the latter part of 2007, dragged on without results. The plethora of issues—from settlements and prisoners, to Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem, to the Fatah/Hamas split—preoccupied and confounded the Israeli-Palestinian discussions without any satisfactory conclusion.[10]

On May 19, 2011, President Barack Obama affixed his name to the distinguished roster of supporters of a Palestinian state by advocating that "the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps."[11] Netanyahu reacted sharply that the Palestinian state could not come at the "expense of Israeli existence," affirming that the 1967 borders were "indefensible."[12] This set the political stage for a dispute between Washington and Jerusalem and assured that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were not likely to renew soon. The Oslo paradigm was frozen: There were to be no negotiations, no Palestinian recognition of a Jewish state, and no peace in the offing. The three "nos" on Israel formulated at the 1967 Khartoum Arab summit—no negotiations, no recognition, and no peace—had been transformed and reformulated with their political core unchanged.[13]


Twenty years of the Oslo process filled with optimism and enthusiasm, adorned with Nobel prizes, grand summitry, and historic declarations that peace was "just around the corner" have delivered no peace. Firmly entrenched in its place, however, is a textbook example of cognitive dissonance written on a grand political scale. A final status agreement should have been consummated by 1999, five years following the "Gaza-Jericho First" stage in 1994, but neither Rabin's assassination in 1995 nor the murder of 1,084 Israelis from September 2000 to October 2010 (along with 250 from 1993 until July 2000)[14] could quash efforts at advancing the process. True believers continue to argue that once a Palestinian state in the territories is established, the Oslo paradigm will be validated. For those afflicted with "Osloitis," when the evidence counters their utopian paradigm, the bearer of bad news is defamed rather than commended for contributing to an alternative conceptual construct.

Oslo's Unaddressed Fallacies


At the heart of the failed Oslo paradigm are a core group of fallacies that have been promoted as truths: that the land can sustain two opposing population groups; that the Arab goal of destroying Israel can be appeased through "painful concessions" (rather than defeated by an Israeli victory); and that this is not a conflict based on something as elemental and incendiary as religion. Not one can withstand close scrutiny.


Geopolitical conflict is frequently a function of a dearth of resources and cannot be resolved by a mere wish for human harmony. In this case, both land and water are scarce, and the less than 40-mile width of the land from the Mediterranean coast to the Jordan River is insufficient to accommodate two rival states with expanding populations and vibrant national ambitions. While there are a few small states living cheek by jowl like the Netherlands and Luxembourg that are not at each others throats, they do not face the other factors that have contributed to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse.


There is, moreover, a great likelihood that a Palestinian state ensconced in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would evoke a powerful zeal for further land concessions, not only from the Arabs of Ramallah or Nablus, but also among many Israeli Arabs in the Galilee, for example, of whom opinion surveys indicate their belief that Jews are foreigners in the Middle East.[15] Such a state could easily foment an insurgency within Israel, bringing along further disruptions and destruction in its wake. Indeed, the Palestinian belief that Tiberias, Haifa, and Tel Aviv-Jaffa are lost cities of Arab Palestine fuels a deep-seated rejectionism, which is manifested in the leadership's adamant refusal to recognize Israel's very right to exist as a Jewish state.[16]

Finally, the war against Israel is little more than a modern application of Qur'anic hostility toward Jews, expressing the ethos of jihad and the religious definition of Palestine as a sacred waqf (Islamic religious endowment). Buoyed with this faith and ideology, Iran and Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Muslim elements dedicate themselves to destroying Israel once and for all. In this, they are only more obvious than the so-called moderate Fatah leadership, which makes use of religious imagery and imperatives whenever it suits its purpose. A two-state solution is, in essence, a betrayal of Islam although a Palestinian state could become the springboard for the ongoing campaign to undermine, overrun, and eradicate the Jewish state—fi Sabil Allah (in the path of God). All this is so because, as article 15 of the Hamas covenant declares, "the Palestinian problem is a religious problem."[17]


The irrefutable conclusion is that the Oslo process brought no discernible change in the Palestinian attitude toward Israel. It remains a state that has to be eliminated. In May 2013, Mahmoud Abbas repeated the PLO's position that the Palestinians would refuse, as they indeed have, to recognize Israel's legitimacy as a Jewish state.[18] Jibril Rajoub, Fatah Central Committee member, declared soon thereafter that the Palestinians were the enemies of Israel, adding that if the Palestinians had nuclear weapons they would use them.[19] No less acerbic was a remark by Jamal Zahalka, Arab member of Israel's Knesset, who on July 31, 2013, railed against his fellow-citizens and parliamentarians: "We [the Arabs] were here before you [the Jews], and we'll be here after you're gone."[20]


Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (l) and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu meet at a conference in Washington, D.C., on September 2, 2010. In May 2013, Abbas repeated the PLO's position that the Palestinians would refuse, as they indeed have, to recognize Israel's legitimacy as a Jewish state.


In addition, the Oslo paradigm founders on the twin rocks of Palestinian factionalism and extremism as Palestinian society is hopelessly fissured by traditional identities and loyalties with extended family and tribal ties enduring despite a narrative of nationalism. The rural-urban split, the settled-refugee dichotomy, and the Muslim-Christian differentiation all confound integral social cohesion. Such a political tapestry, barely holding together despite decades of trying, baffles national unity, complicating the viability of any Palestinian state project becoming sturdy or stable.


These divisions have become further concretized by geopolitical partition. In 2007, Hamas seized control of Gaza after Israel's disengagement-withdrawal from the strip two years earlier and the Islamists' electoral victory over Fatah in 2006. The 40-kilometer geographic separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, alongside the ideological and political enmity between Fatah-PA and Hamas, is a powerful obstacle to generating Palestinian unity. The conventional two-state proposal is a misnomer inasmuch as Gaza already constitutes a Palestinian "statelet," so that another Palestinian state based in the West Bank would actualize a three-state solution. The fathers of the Oslo accords could not imagine in their wildest dream such a bizarre turn of events.


Lastly, an ethic of extremism has been embedded in the culture of Palestinian politics for the last one hundred years, beginning with Hajj Amin Husseini (1897-1974) and continuing through the tenure of Yasser Arafat (1929-2004), with a slew of other noteworthy firebrands such as Izz al-Din al-Qassam (1882-1935) and Ahmad Yassin (1937-2004) throwing fuel on the blaze in between. Five days before the Oslo signing, Arafat told an Israeli journalist that one day there would be "a united state in which Israelis and Palestinians will live together" (without Israel)[21] while in 1996, after Oslo, he forecast Israel's collapse under the weight of an Arab return to the West Bank and Jerusalem, linked to psychological warfare that would convince the Israelis to emigrate.[22] The Arabs of Palestine have every reason to believe that the country is theirs alone because their leaders have been telling them that from the very beginnings of their own self-awareness as a people. For them, extremism is justified although this mental universe of self-delusion and fanaticism has not led them to a political victory.

Four Insurmountable Oslo Issues


Early in 1993, the Oslo negotiators concluded that a full and immediate resolution of the conflict was an impossible task, preferring instead to conceive of peace-making as a staged process rather than a single, decisive event. The major points of contention would be left to a later phase following the initial and practical launching of the accord. In the final status negotiations, peace would be achieved when the outstanding issues could be settled to the satisfaction of the Israelis and Palestinians alike.[23]


The religious-cum-political issue of the holy city of Jerusalem represented perhaps the most intractable problem to be resolved. Despite the Jewish people's millennial connections to Zion, Israel's June 1967 decision to apply its law and administration over the entire united city as its capital was rejected by the Palestinians and their abettors in the international community. At Camp David in July 2000, contorted and repeated efforts were made to formulate an agreement that would accord Palestinians sovereignty over the Arab-inhabited peripheral areas of Jerusalem, jurisdiction over the inner neighborhoods, and Palestinian governance over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City. In these plans, the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism, would be handed over to a Palestinian administration that claimed it as the al-Haram al-Sharif (sacred precinct). Prime Minister Barak's negotiating position, although it seemed to waver over the summit days, demanded Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem and the post-1967 Jewish neighborhoods around the city but also over the inner Arab-inhabited Jerusalem neighborhoods such as Sheikh Jarrah and Wadi Joz. He firmly rejected Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount while Arafat apparently called for Palestinian sovereignty over all of Jerusalem.[24] In the end, Arafat spurned the deal, and the world will never know if further Israeli concessions, like recognizing absolute Muslim control and Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif, would have perhaps elicited Arafat's agreement. Palestinian militancy regarding Jerusalem has continued over the years, leading to assaults upon Jews in the Old City area and stoning attacks on the Temple Mount. These attacks have occurred despite an Israeli policy to limit and sometimes prohibit Jewish prayer on the mount. Self-imposed Israeli renunciation of Jewish religious rights merges with and perhaps evokes Palestinian violence.


One of the most intractable issues that the Oslo accord was supposed to resolve revolved around the status of Jerusalem. Despite a number of good-faith efforts to share the city proposed by Israeli negotiators, the Palestinians have spurned all offers. In fact, lines have hardened as evidenced by the confrontation seen here between Palestinians and Israeli police over the presence of Jewish visitors to the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism.

An even greater sticking point is the final status of the so-called Palestinian refugees. The unyielding Palestinian demand that the "right of return" be acknowledged and implemented is a call for Palestinian "justice" that carries within it the seed for Israel's destruction. The "right of return" has become sacred dogma for Palestinians. Perhaps equally fixed is the Israeli rejection of the idea as suicidal for the Jewish state. A growing constituency of Arabs in Israel echoes the "return" theme.[25]


This Palestinian position, sustained by a contrived memory of forced dispossession and nurtured by political rigidity, has been met with an equally steadfast Israeli rejection although Barak was willing to concede a symbolic number of returning refugees in July 2000.[26] The refugee issue proves clearly that the Palestinian intent is to Arabize Israel and obliterate the Zionist enterprise. These are not the building blocks for the two-state solution envisaged by the Oslo negotiators.


Of late, the issue of the "settlements"—Jewish communities—has become the international community's bête noire. The Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria, numbering more than 120 localities with more than 330,000 people, may have begun in part as a perceived security imperative, but early on, it also expressed the immutable right of the Jewish people to live in and control the Land of Israel west of the Jordan River. For the Palestinians however, these communities were concrete evidence of Zionist expansionism and colonial occupation. The Palestinian position has become monolithic, demanding a dismantling of all Israeli communities and the expulsion of all their residents.


Meanwhile, Israeli governments forged a public consensus around those population blocks to be retained in any future agreement, a position endorsed by President Bush in 2004.[27] The Palestinian position hardened further in 2010 when Abbas, encouraged by President Obama, demanded a complete cessation of all construction activity, not only in the territories but also in post-1967 Jerusalem neighborhoods such as Har Homa and Ramat Shlomo, which are on the eastern side of the city.[28] In short, the settlement issue brought the sides to political wrangling that froze the already-stalled Oslo process. A Judenrein West Bank, recalling what Menachem Begin did in expelling Jews when handing over the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1982, and what Ariel Sharon similarly did in the Gaza Strip in 2005, was not the future that many Israelis had in mind when imagining the contours of peace.


The fourth intractable issue is one of borders. A final political map delineating the outline of a Palestinian state is tied to the Arab demand that Israel withdraw to the June 4, 1967 lines. No Israeli government ever agreed to such a total retreat, which runs counter to U.N. resolution 242, which established the land for peace formula in the wake of the 1967 war: Barak wavered between 88-93 percent of the West Barak while Sharon and Netanyahu considered withdrawal from perhaps 50 percent of the area.[29] Military control of the Jordan Valley remains of particular importance for Israel to prevent both future smuggling of weapons and terrorists through Jordan into Palestine and to constitute a defensive line for Israel's eastern front facing the Arab states across the river. Israel would have to evacuate 100,000 residents in the unlikely event that final borders would exclude many smaller Jewish localities dispersed throughout Judea and Samaria beyond the larger population centers such as Ariel, Maaleh Adumim, and the Etzion block.[30] This grim scenario alone would be sufficiently critical to hamper an agreement, considering the national trauma that resulted from the expulsion of 8,000 Gush Katif residents from Gaza in August 2005. This is not the kind of public atmosphere that would generate Israeli support, let alone enthusiasm, for any peace based on the Oslo parameters.



While Israelis consistently poll in support of a Palestinian state, the reasons for abandoning the idea have multiplied over time. Palestinian nationalism with its malignant and rogue features remains committed to destroying Zionism. The Fatah media and school curricula indoctrinate the Palestinian people and youth to disparage Jews as "evil" and Israel as a "cancer."[31] Palestinian military forces train for the possibility of future fighting with Israeli military forces,[32] and Palestinian diplomacy, like the recent failed attempt to get the U.N. to grant it unconditional statehood, remains the stuff of wily bazaar bargaining in a diplomatic war of attrition. It is clear that the Palestinian public has never really accepted the two-state solution as a final end to the conflict.[33] This was given vivid expression in the last interview by the late Faisal Husseini, the prominent PLO leader, who infamously compared the Oslo process to a Trojan horse that would bring about Israel's demise.[34] More recently, Abbas Zaki, Fatah Central Committee member, confessed that "it's not acceptable to say we want to wipe Israel out … It's not [acceptable] policy to say so. Don't say these things to the world. Keep it to yourself."[35]


Obstacles also exist in addressing the practical aspects and nitty-gritty details of a Palestinian state centered in the West Bank. Israel's security-related conditions regarding demilitarization and control of airspace and military monitoring stations on West Bank hilltops meet with unwavering Palestinian opposition on all counts.[36] A state of Palestine, founded in a moment of desperation and born in bitter acrimony, will lack the space to absorb millions of refugees should the expatriate Palestinian community opt for emigration and be fated for economic impoverishment (discounting the billions of dollars donated to the PA by the international community since 1994). Based on everything a dispassionate observer can testify to since the 1994 establishment of the Palestinian Authority, this Palestinian state, awkwardly sandwiched between Israel and Jordan, has all the likelihood of becoming a failed state—fragile, mismanaged, tending to disorder and civil war.[37]


As such, the two-state paradigm trumpeted by Oslo has been invalidated with the growth of the magnitude of dissonance. There is just no sound political basis for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. All basic final status issues escape resolution. Yet, there has never been an admission of error, let alone an apology by Peres or Bill Clinton, Bush, Sharon, Olmert, Obama, or Netanyahu in their advocacy of a two-state solution. Speaking of the predominant role played by Peres in the Oslo saga, the contemporary grand master of realpolitik, Henry Kissinger, once remarked that Peres had "the trait of French academics who tend to believe that the formulation of an idea is equivalent to its realization."[38] The same could be said of all those well-intentioned diplomats and politicians who have followed in Peres's footsteps. Small wonder that, notwithstanding the plan's abysmal failure and likely calamitous future, the intellectual brainwashing exercised by the Oslo paradigm has not yet loosened its grip over people's minds as evidenced most recently by John Kerry's heroic, but ultimately doomed, attempt to resuscitate the "peace process."[39]


    (Mordechai Nisan, CIJR Academic Fellow,  is a retired lecturer in Middle East Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at other academic institutions in Israel. His most recent book is Only Israel West of the River (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform).


[1] The Peel commission recommended the incorporation of the Arab part of western Palestine into Transjordan, ruled by Emir Abdullah ibn Hussein, rather than its constitution as an independent state.
[2] For example, Richard J. Ward, Don Peretz, and Evan M. Wilson, The Palestine State: A Rational Approach (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977); Mark A. Heller, A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge.: Harvard University Press, 1983).
[3] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2nd ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 535-8, 711-29.
[4] Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), July 26, 1974.
[5] Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sherut, vol. II (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1979), p. 583.
[6] Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), Feb. 10, 1989.
[7] David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord (Washington and Boulder: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Westview Press, 1996), p. 123.
[8] Yossi Beilin, "Oslo Kvar Betocheinu," Yisrael Hayom (Tel Aviv), July 27, 2011.
[9] Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), p. 800.
[10] "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Annapolis and After," Middle East Briefing, no. 22, International Crisis Group, Jerusalem/Washington/Brussels, Nov. 20, 2007.
[11] Barack Obama, remarks on the Middle East and North Africa, State Department, Washington, D.C., May 19, 2011.
[12] Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), May 19, 2011.
[13] "The Khartoum Resolutions," Sept. 1, 1967, The Jewish Virtual Library.
[14] Ross, The Missing Peace, p. 782.
[15] The Jerusalem Post, May 19, 2011.
[16] "My Country Palestine," Fatah PA TV, July 13, 2011, in MEMRI Bulletin, Middle East Media Research Institute, Washington, D.C., July 26, 2011; YNet News (Tel Aviv), Aug. 28, 2011.
[17] "Hamas Covenant 1988," Yale Law School Avalon Project, accessed Oct. 29, 2013.
[18] Al-Hayat al-Jadida (Ramallah), May 4, 2013, quoted by Palestinian Media Watch, Jerusalem.
[19] Al-Mayadeen TV (Beirut), in Palestinian Media Watch Bulletin, May 8, 2013.
[20] Israel Hayom, Aug. 1, 2013.
[21] Efraim Karsh, Arafat's War: The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest (New York: Grove Press, 2003), pp. 59-60; idem, "Arafat Lives," Commentary, Jan. 2005.
[22] The Jerusalem Post, Feb. 23, 1996; Yedidya Atlas, "Stockholm Revisited," Israel radio 7, May 10, 1996.
[23] Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO, chap. 2-3.
[24] Shlomo Ben-Ami, Hazit Le'lo O'ref: Masa el Gvulot Tahalich Hashalom (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2004), pp. 165-95; Ross, The Missing Peace, pp. 686-7.
[25] L. Barkan, "Israeli Arab Leadership Jockeys for Central Role in Palestinian Leadership," Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry & Analysis Series Report, no.721, Aug. 11, 2011.
[26] Ron Pundak, "From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong?" Survival, Autumn 2001, pp. 31-45.
[27] The Washington Post, Apr. 15, 2004.
[28] YNet News, Nov. 10, 2010.
[29] Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), Nov. 4, 2006; The Times of Israel (Jerusalem), Feb. 19, 2013; "Peace Negotiations in Name Only," DebkaFile (Jerusalem), Sept. 23, 2013.
[30] Giora Island, "The Future of the Two-State Solution," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Feb. 8, 17, 2009.
[31] Al-Aqsa TV (Gaza), July 13, 2008; "Religious War," Palestinian Media Watch, Jerusalem, July 3, 2013.
[32] Gal Luft, "The Palestinian Security Forces: Capabilities and Effects on the Arab-Israeli Military Balance," Ariel Center for Policy Research, Shaarei Tikva, Oct. 2001; CNS News, July 7, 2008.
[33] Benny Morris, "Eliminating Israel," The National Interest, July 19, 2011.
[34] Al-Arabi (Cairo), June 6, 2001.
[35] The Blaze (New York and Dallas), Oct. 3, 2011.
[36] Dore Gold, "Banging Square Pegs into Round Holes," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Dec. 2008.
[37] Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 7th ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999), p. 372.
[38] Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), p. 376.
[39] The New York Times, July 19, 2013.






Les Nations Unies ne devraient pas reconnaître
une Palestine d’Apartheid, Judenrein et islamique.

Alan M. Dershowitz
Israel-flash.com, 22 septembre 2011
Adaptation française: Marc Brzustowski


On demande aux Nations-Unies d’offrir aux Palestiniens le statut «d’État», dont on connaît, au moins, quelques objectifs. La question qui surgit, c’est de quel genre d’État s’agira t-il? Dans un effort de s’attirer le soutien occidental, l’Autorité Palestinienne prétend qu’elle deviendra un nouvel «État laïque et démocratique». Le Hamas, qui a remporté les dernières élections parlementaires, n’est pas d’accord du tout. La Palestine deviendra un État musulman gouverné par la Charia. 


Nous savons pertinemment ce que le cercle dirigeant palestinien est en train de dire à l’Occident. Maintenant, écoutons ce qu’il dit à son propre peuple, qui sera, après tout, l’ultime décisionnaire, si jamais, la Palestine devient une «démocratie».


La trame de la Constitution du nouvel État de Palestine declare que: «l’Islam est la religion officielle en Palestine». Il déclare, également, que la Charia sera «la source essentielle de la législation». Il est ironique que les mêmes cercles dirigeants palestiniens qui soutiennent ces concepts pour la Palestine, refusent de reconnaître qu’Israël est l’État-nation du peuple Juif. Israël, par opposition à l’État palestinien proposé, n’a pas de religion officielle d’État. Bien qu’il soit un État juif, cette description n’est pas religieuse, mais plutôt une définition nationale. Il accorde des droits égaux à l’Islam, à la Chrétienté et aux autres religions, autant qu’aux athées et aux agnostiques. Assurément, une très large proportion d’Israéliens se définit comme laïcs.


Le nouvel État palestinien interdirait à tout Juif d’en être citoyen, d’être propriétaire de terres ou, même de vivre dans l’État musulman de Palestine. On a demandé à l’Ambassadeur de l’OLP aux États-Unis, au cours d’une interview, si «tout Juif qui se trouve à l’intérieur des frontières de la Palestine devra partir»? Sa réponse: «Absolument!». Après l’ébauche d’une critique, l’Ambassadeur a essayé d’arrondir son propos, en expliquant que cela ne s’appliquait qu’aux Juifs «qui sont partie prenante de l’occupation». Quoi que cela puisse vouloir dire, une chose est claire: un grand nombre de Juifs ne seront pas les bienvenus ni admis en tant que citoyens égaux, s’ils restent en Palestine islamique. A l’inverse, Israël a une population arabe de plus d’un million de citoyens, dont la plupart sont musulmans. Ils sont égaux au regard de la loi, excepté qu’ils n’ont pas besoin de servir dans l’armée israélienne.


Pour résumer, le nouvel État palestinien sera un authentique État d’Apartheid. Il pratiquera ouvertement la discrimination ethnique et religieuse, il disposera d’une religion officielle et fondera ses lois sur les préceptes d’une seule religion. Imaginez ce que sera le statut social des Gays sous la Charia!


Les cercles dirigeants palestiniens accusent Israël d’avoir des routes dont l’accès soit limité aux Juifs. C’est totalement faux: un petit nombre de routes de la Bande Occidentale de Judée-Samarie sont restreintes aux Israéliens, mais elles sont ouvertes aussi bien aux Israéliens juifs, musulmans et chrétiens. La totalité de l’État de Palestine sera affublé d’un sigle: «Interdit aux Juifs».


Il est remarquable que ce soient, justement, les gens qui se plaignent le plus violemment de la Loi du retour en Israël et de son caractère d’État-nation du Peuple Juif, qui ne disent rien quand la même chose arrive dans le cas du nouvel État palestinien. Est-ce que cela veut dire que ces gens exigent plus des Juifs qu’ils n’en attendent des Musulmans? Si tel est le cas, n’est-ce pas là une forme flagrante de racisme?


A quoi ressembleraient les frontières d’un État palestinien, si les Palestiniens poursuivent leur chemin sans nécessité de négocier avec Israël? Les Palestiniens obtiendraient, pour point de départ, toutes les terres antérieurement occupées par la Jordanie, avant la guerre de 1967, lorsque la Jordanie [et d’autres] a attaqué Israël. Ce retour au statuquo ante, qui a conduit à la Guerre des Six Jours, est incompatible avec les intentions de la Résolution 242 du Conseil de Sécurité, qui envisageait des changements territoriaux.


Les nouvelles limites de cet État palestinien inclurait le lieu le plus saint du Judaïsme, le Mur Occidental (Kotel). Il comprendrait également les routes d’accès à l’Université hébraïque, que la Jordanie utilisait pour fermer cette grande institution du savoir fondée par les Juifs il y a plus de 100 ans. Le nouvel État palestinien incorporerait également le Quartier Juif de Jérusalem, dans lequel les Juifs ont vécu depuis 3000 ans, excepté durant ces périodes de temps au cours desquelles ils en ont été expulsés par la force.


Il est envisagé, évidemment, qu’Israël pourrait regagner ces secteurs comme faisant partie d’un échange de territoires avec les Palestiniens. Mais, il n’y a aucune certitude que les Palestiniens acceptent un échange raisonnable de terres. Les dirigeants palestiniens ont déjà fait savoir qu’ils détiendraient en otage ces sites importants et sacrés pour les échanger contre des exigences déraisonnables. Par exemple, le Mur Occidental ne s’étend que sur quelques acres, mais le cercle dirigeant palestinien a indiqué que ces acres seraient parmi ceux qui ont le plus de valeur au monde, et si Israël voulaient les regagner, il devrait concéder des milliers d’acres en échange. La même chose doit se produite pour la route d’accès à l’Université hébraïque et le Quartier Juif.


Quand la Jordanie contrôlait ces zones, le Gouvernement jordanien les a rendues Judenrein – les Juifs ne pouvaient pas prier au Mur Occidental, ni visiter le Quartier Juif, ni avoir accès à l’Université Hébraïque. Il n’y a aucune raison de croire qu’un État palestinien traiterait différemment les Juifs s’ils maintenaient le moindre contrôle sur ces secteurs.


Une Palestine islamique, Judenrein, d’Apartheid sur les frontières de 1967 est une ordonnance pour le désastre. C’est pourquoi un État palestinien raisonnable doit être le produit de négociations avec Israël, et non le résultat d’un vote irréfléchi aux Nations Unies.


Les dirigeants palestiniens et israéliens sont, actuellement, à New-York. Le Premier Ministre israélien Benyamin Netanyahou a proposé de s’assoir pour négocier, sans préconditions, une paix réaliste fondée sur une solution à deux États. Le Président Abbas devrait accepter cette offre, qui permette aux Palestiniens d’obtenir un État viable, plutôt qu’une victoire sur le papier à pas cher, qui fera monter les attentes, mais chuter les perspectives de paix.


Israël doit briser le piège construit à Oslo
Guy Millière
drzz.fr, 22 septembre 2011


Il peut sembler insensé que tant de temps soit consacré à l’échelle planétaire à faire des courbettes à un terroriste non repenti, qui prétend poser en chef d’État, alors qu’il n’est qu’un chef de bande. C’est pourtant ce qui est en train de se passer.


L’un des premiers à adopter la posture du tapis de prière tourné vers la mosquée al Aqsa a été Nicolas Sarkozy: les élections approchent. Il y a cinq millions de musulmans en France et seulement cinq cent mille Juifs, les calculs sont très simples à effectuer quand on est sans scrupules. Outre les élections, il y a le lavage de cerveau généralisé qui fait que des millions de Français embrassent la cause palestinienne avec autant d’enthousiasme que leurs grands parents chantaient les louanges du maréchal Pétain. Un politicien suit les enthousiasmes: on sait depuis longtemps qu’on a affaire, là, à un politicien.


Barack Obama, j’en suis sûr, rêverait de prier dans la même direction que Nicolas Sarkozy, qu’il vient d’aider à installer des islamistes «modérés» au pouvoir en Libye, et il l’a montré tout au long des trente mois qui viennent de s’écouler, mais pour lui aussi les élections approchent, et s’il se comportait comme Nicolas Sarkozy, ce ne sont pas seulement les Républicains qui le critiqueraient, mais aussi un nombre certain de démocrates, qui veulent éviter que novembre 2012 soit, pour leur parti, une débâcle absolue. Obama est donc obligé de se modérer et de jouer provisoirement, contraint et forcé, le rôle de l’ami d’Israël. 


On voit là ce qui sépare les États-Unis de la France: les calculs électoraux aux États-Unis impliquent qu’on ne crache pas sur Israël. Le lavage de cerveau n’a pas touché autant d’individus qu’en France et en Europe. Et un politicien sans scrupules aux États-Unis, s’il veut partir à la pêche aux voix, doit faire l’inverse de ce que fait Nicolas Sarkozy.


Dans les jours qui viennent, d’autres discours se feront entendre. Celui de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sera sans doute égal aux discours précédents du même personnage.


Un voix de décence se fera entendre, celle de Binyamin Netanyahu. Une autre voix de décence s’est fait entendre la veille des discours de Nicolas Sarkozy et de Barack Obama: celle de Rick Perry. Il a dit tout ce qu’il y avait à dire concernant la politique anti-israélienne d’Obama, concernant Israël, et concernant la question palestinienne. Comme son discours ne sera nulle part dans les médias français, je vais le traduire et le mettre en ligne sur drzz.fr. Il serait temps, de fait, qu’un Américain qui aime l’Amérique et ses valeurs, et qui aime Israël, soit à la Maison Blanche.


Pour l’heure, je suis consterné d’avoir à constater ce que devient la France, car ceux qui pourraient remplacer Nicolas Sarkozy seraient pire. Je suis consterné d’avoir à lire ce que la presse française écrit sur ce dossier comme sur tant d’autres, tout comme je suis consterné des effets du lavage de cerveau subi par la population française, comme par tant de populations européennes. Je suis consterné de voir les États-Unis placés dans la position où les place Barack Obama, et de voir ce que devient le monde depuis que Barack Obama est au pouvoir.


Je n’aurais pu imaginer un Président des États-Unis supplier un terroriste non repenti, et lui demander de ne pas présenter un texte aux Nations Unies. Il a fallu un Barack Obama pour voir ce spectacle indigne. 


Tout comme il serait temps que revienne à la Maison Blanche un Président américain digne de ce nom, il serait temps aussi qu’Israël brise le piège qui a été construit à Oslo il y a maintenant dix huit ans. 


A l’époque, le terroriste non repenti Mahmoud Abbas était à des milliers de kilomètres du Proche-Orient, en compagnie de son maître Yasser Arafat. L’organisation criminelle et terroriste appelée OLP était à Tunis. En acceptant les accords d’Oslo, les dirigeants israéliens ont permis le retour de l’organisation criminelle et terroriste en Judée-Samarie. La suite est connue, et s’écrit en lettres de sang: combien d’attentats? combien de morts, de mutilés, de blessés?


Et il faudrait récompenser ceux qui ont fait cela en leur donnant un État? Qui dira aux Français et aux autres Occidentaux qu’à Ramallah, on ne cesse de faire l’éloge du terrorisme? Qui dira que l’Autorité Palestinienne est une dictature crapuleuse, aux intentions génocidaires pas même dissimulées. Qui leur dira que dans les couloirs de l’ONU, les terroristes déguisés en diplomates de l’Autorité Palestinienne, distribuaient des papiers sur lesquels est tracée la carte de la Palestine qu’ils veulent: Israël n’y existe pas. L’Autorité Palestinienne est une imposture qui ne tient debout que grâce à l’argent occidental. Dans un article du Jerusalem Post paru ce jour, Michael Freund écrit que tout pays qui se déclare en faveur d’un État palestinien aujourd’hui, est un pays qui se déclare en faveur de l’anéantissement d’Israël et du peuple juif. Il a raison. 


Il y a vingt deux pays arabes aujourd’hui. La plupart d’entre eux sont vides de toute présence juive, et imprégnés d’antisémitisme. Les dirigeants occidentaux actuels peuvent dire qu’ils n’y sont pour rien. Quand des dirigeants occidentaux acceptent l’idée de donner un État à Mahmoud Abbas, ils acceptent en réalité la création d’une entité au projet génocidaire, et qui proclame officiellement qu’elle sera judenrein


Au rythme où on en est eu Europe, on peut poser la question: Mein Kampf figurera-t-il au programme scolaire dans quelques années ? 


Michael Freund écrit ceci dans son article, et je reprends ses mots: «Pendant 2.000 ans, les pays du monde ont dit aux Juifs qu’ils n’étaient pas les bienvenus, et de rentrer chez eux. C’est ce qu’ils ont fait. Maintenant, ils entendent dire aux Juifs qu’ils doivent disparaître de leurs propres terres. Nous n’accepterons pas…. Nous devons tracer une ligne sur le sable, et envoyer au monde un message clair: le peuple juif a retrouvé Jérusalem et les collines de Judée. Il y restera. Vous devrez en prendre acte».


© Guy Millière pour www.Drzz.fr


Le journaliste égyptien Muhammad Abbas:
«Quiconque a immigré en Israël
sans autorisation légale des musulmans
doit retourner d'où il vient ou être exterminé»

Memri.org, 21 septembre 2011


Ci-dessous des extraits d'une interview de Muhammad Abbas, journaliste et écrivain égyptien, diffusée sur Al-Hekma TV le 4 septembre 2011:


Muhammad Abbas: Si l'armée égyptienne était capable d'effacer Israël, j'espère qu'elle le ferait. J'exige que l'armée fasse tout son possible, mais les circonstances présentes ne sont pas appropriées. Nous ne disposons pas encore des systèmes, politiciens et intellectuels nécessaires pour cela, de ceux qui représentent la nation et ont peur pour elle. Aujourd'hui, tout le monde essaie de poser des problèmes à l'armée. Je crains que l'armée ait des problèmes. Ô armée, fais ce que tu peux! Si tu es capable de tuer 70 d'entre eux pour chacun de nos martyrs, vas-y! J'exige que l'armée fasse de son mieux, mais elle ne devrait pas aller trop loin, afin qu'ils ne nous détruisent pas. Souvenez-vous de la défaite de 1967.  (…)


Si seulement nous pouvions nous venger. Si nous le pouvions, nous les détruirions intégralement, sans en laisser un seul vivant. Quiconque a immigré en Israël sans autorisation légale des musulmans doit retourner d'où il vient où être exterminé. "Et la pierre dira: Il y a un Juif derrière moi"… Mais je crains que notre enthousiasme ne nous cause du tort. J'ai toujours été contre Israël, et je suis sûr qu'il [Israël] connaîtra sa fin. Et ce sera le cas.


Si vous me dites que 10 millions d'Égyptiens trouveront le martyre en échange de la destruction d'Israël, je suis pour. Mais qu'on ait 10 millions de martyre Égyptiens, et qu'Israël occupe ensuite le Sinaï et le Caire, pas question. Nous devons planifier les choses correctement.


Quand Patrick Lagacé se permet de critiquer
le livre de Djemila Benhabib

postedeveille.ca, 20 septembre 2011


Ci-dessous des extraits d'une interview de Muhammad Abbas, journaliste et écrivain égyptien, diffusée sur Al-Hekma TV le 4 septembre 2011:


Muhammad Abbas: Si l'armée égyptienne était capable d'effacer Israël, j'espère qu'elle le ferait. J'exige que l'armée fasse tout son possible, mais les circonstances présentes ne sont pas appropriées. Nous ne disposons pas encore des systèmes, politiciens et intellectuels nécessaires pour cela, de ceux qui représentent la nation et ont peur pour elle. Aujourd'hui, tout le monde essaie de poser des problèmes à l'armée. Je crains que l'armée ait des problèmes. Ô armée, fais ce que tu peux! Si tu es capable de tuer 70 d'entre eux pour chacun de nos martyrs, vas-y! J'exige que l'armée fasse de son mieux, mais elle ne devrait pas aller trop loin, afin qu'ils ne nous détruisent pas. Souvenez-vous de la défaite de 1967.  (…)


Si seulement nous pouvions nous venger. Si nous le pouvions, nous les détruirions intégralement, sans en laisser un seul vivant. Quiconque a immigré en Israël sans autorisation légale des musulmans doit retourner d'où il vient où être exterminé. "Et la pierre dira: Il y a un Juif derrière moi"… Mais je crains que notre enthousiasme ne nous cause du tort. J'ai toujours été contre Israël, et je suis sûr qu'il [Israël] connaîtra sa fin. Et ce sera le cas.


Si vous me dites que 10 millions d'Égyptiens trouveront le martyre en échange de la destruction d'Israël, je suis pour. Mais qu'on ait 10 millions de martyre Égyptiens, et qu'Israël occupe ensuite le Sinaï et le Caire, pas question. Nous devons planifier les choses correctement.





The Canadian Institute for Jewish Research cordially invites you to its

23rd Anniversary Gala

Wednesday, June 15, 2011
Congregation Shaar Hashomayim
450 Avenue Kensington, Westmount, Quebec, Canada



Former Israeli Defense Minister and Ambassador to the U.S.


Also Featuring

Prof. Barry Rubin

Outstanding internationally-renowned Middle East analyst


Tax receipts will be issued for the maximum allowable amount


For additional information. or to register for the 23rd Anniversary Gala,
please call Yvonne at 514-486-5544 or contact us by e-mail at yvonne@isranet.org





“Palestinian Ambassador to Russia Fayyad Mustafa said that a deal to release kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Schalit will soon be finalized.… ‘The negotiations between Israel and Hamas, ongoing in Cairo with Egyptian mediation, are close to completion,’ Mustafa said, without providing further details. Commander of Hamas’s military wing in the Gaza Strip Ahmed Jabri [is currently] in Cairo to discuss the release of Schalit with senior Egyptian officials.… According to Palestinian sources, Defense Ministry Diplomatic-Security Bureau Amos Gilad [is] also in Cairo participating in discussions.… Former Egyptian ambassador to Israel Muhammad Bassiouni was quoted in Egyptian paper Al Masry Al Youm on Thursday as saying that an agreement to release Schalit could be reached within hours.…” (Jerusalem Post, June3.)




Janice Arnold
Canadian Jewish News, June 2, 2011


Moshe Arens, Israel’s Defence and Foreign Affairs minister in the 1980s and ‘90s, will make a rare public appearance in North America to speak in Montreal. Now 85, Arens will be the keynote speaker at a dinner benefiting the Canadian Institute for Jewish Research (CIJR) June 15 at Congregation Shaar Hashomayim.

The independent Israel advocacy organization was thrilled when Arens accepted its invitation. “I think it’s a clear endorsement of the efforts of CIJR,” said associate director David Pariser.…

First elected to the Knesset in 1974, Arens chaired its committee on foreign affairs and security from 1977 to 1982. He was then ambassador to Washington for a year before entering the cabinet. Born in Lithuania, he spent his youth in the United States before making aliyah in 1948.…

[Mideast analyst Barry Rubin, the Gala’s other guest speaker], is director of Israel’s Gloria Center, edits Middle East Review of International Affairs and has written a number of books, including his most recent, Lebanon: Liberation, Conflict and Crisis. He’s a frequent commentator in newspapers and on U.S. and British TV.…

The CIJR, founded 23 years ago by Concordia University professor Frederick Krantz, runs activities aimed at defending Israel and the Jewish People against delegitimization and keeping the Zionist spirit alive.…

The gala is usually held in August, but the CIJR decided June might be better because fewer people are away. The daytime conference that usually precedes it will be held separately this year, in November, on combating the delegitimization of Israel.

The evening will introduce CIJR’s new national chair, Joseph Shier of Toronto, who succeeds Irwin Beutel. With its first-ever non-Montreal lay leader, the CIJR hopes to increase its presence in Toronto and across Canada.

Charles Bybelezer, who joined the CIJR last year, is responsible for its publishing activities: the e-mailed Daily Briefing, a digest of articles related to Israel or the Middle East, as well as Israfax and Israzine, and the student periodical Dateline: Middle East.

He and volunteer Baruch Cohen comb through 75 to 100 articles a day for the Briefing and for a databank. Now available online, the databank contains thousands of articles on the Mideast and Jewish issues.

Among the CIJR’s new projects is retooling its website to include a weekly interactive blog and live streaming of regular roundtable discussions. Another is training students to counter anti-Israel activity on campus. Its Student Israel Advocacy Seminar, a training series given by volunteer professors from Montreal universities, will be revamped and hopefully become a credit course through Concordia.

The CIJR also hopes to raise funds to appoint a resident Israel studies professor, a paid position that would oversee its academic program.


Moshe Arens

Haaretz, May 31, 2011


It’s been a long time since these words were spoken by an Israeli prime minister. “In Judea and Samaria, the Jewish people are not foreign occupiers,” Benjamin Netanyahu said in his address to both houses of the U.S. Congress, and the representatives of the American people rose and cheered. Former Israeli prime ministers passively accepted the slurs hurled at Israel over the years at home and abroad that Israel was an “occupier” in the areas beyond the 1949 armistice lines. Even Ariel Sharon in his last years in office began referring to the Israeli presence in Judea and Samaria as the “occupation.”

This false role that Israeli prime ministers regretfully assumed in the name of the people of Israel, causing inestimable damage to Israel’s image throughout the world, helped embed the concept that this “occupation” was an evil that had to be eliminated. It was no mean feat that Netanyahu had the courage to deny the falsehood of the “occupation” in speaking to Congress.…

The many disappointed Israeli commentators who had hoped that Netanyahu would herald the end of the “occupation” had no difficulty finding excuses for the rousing reception his words received in Washington. One went so far as to write that even if Netanyahu had been reading from the telephone book he would have received standing ovations. Others remarked that no significance should be attached to the enthusiastic reception his words received in Congress, reminding the reader that all Israeli prime ministers had been greeted by standing ovations when addressing Congress.

But they just forgot to mention that those former Israeli prime ministers addressed Congress on occasions when their policy was completely coordinated with the White House. This time it was different. Netanyahu spoke to Congress after he had made it clear that he did not agree with Barack Obama’s call for Israel to withdraw to the “1967 lines,” and he reiterated that position in his speech.

So now come the self-anointed Israeli experts on the American system of government and explain to their readers that in the United States, foreign policy is made by the president and Congress plays no part. So it really doesn’t matter if the present Congress is especially friendly and supportive of Israel and the positions of the democratically elected government of Israel if it has no voice in making foreign policy.

But these “experts” are only displaying their ignorance of the checks and balances in the United States between the president and Congress, a system that extends to foreign policy. While executive authority rests with the president, he is limited in pursuing a foreign policy that runs counter to the position of the majority in Congress.

In any case, even these “experts” must understand that Netanyahu’s reception in Congress was an impressive demonstration of the strong bond between the people of America and the people of Israel. They might also take a look at the Washington Post headline the day after Netanyahu’s appearance in Congress, which stated that senior Democrats had criticized the president. When a few days later Obama took part in the G8 meeting in Europe, he was probably surprised when the prime minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, objected to the inclusion of the “1967 lines” in the G8’s resolution on the Middle East. North of the U.S. border there is another great friend of Israel who seems to agree with Netanyahu.

Obama probably realizes by now that he made a mistake when he said the “1967 lines” should serve as the baseline for territorial negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Somebody should have told him that for most Israelis the “1967 lines,” those that Abba Eban in his famous UN speech referred to as the “Auschwitz borders,” are like a red rag to a bull.

Another person probably made a mistake on this occasion. The leader of the Israeli opposition, Tzipi Livni, without giving it a moment’s thought, used the opportunity to criticize the prime minister, announcing that Netanyahu should have accepted Obama’s proposal. She is likely to discover that withdrawal to the “1967 lines” is going to make for an unpopular Kadima platform in the next election.

(Mr. Arens is Israel’s former Defense Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister, and Ambassador to Washington. He will be the keynote speaker at CIJR’s upcoming Gala, scheduled for June 15.)


Louis Rene Beres

FrontPage, June 3, 2011


Mr. President, the “two-state” approach to peace between Israel and “Palestine,” strongly reaffirmed in your recent meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, accepts the position of an Israeli “occupation.” Yet, even the most cursory look at pertinent world history would reveal several compelling reasons to reject any such position. Organized Arab terrorism against Israel began on the very first hour of Israel’s independence, in May 1948. Indeed, virulent anti-Jewish terrorism in the British Mandate period had even taken place many years before Israel’s statehood.

What about the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)? It was founded in 1964, three years before Israel came to control the West Bank (Judea/Samaria) and Gaza. Mr. President, what was the PLO planning to “liberate” between 1964 and 1967? The answer, of course, must be all of Israel within the “green” armistice lines” of 1949. These are precisely the 1967-borders that you have recently identified as the appropriate starting point for current peace negotiations.

What should we now know about the PLO? Significantly, it was declared a “terrorist organization” in a number of U.S. federal court decisions, including Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic (1984).

More than five years ago, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, seeking peace with the always-recalcitrant Palestinians, forcibly expelled over 10,000 Jews from Gaza and northern Samaria. Immediately, these areas were transformed by Hamas from productive growing and living areas to terrorist rocket launching sites. Today, in obvious synergy with a new regime in Cairo—a military governing council soon to be intimate with powerful elements of the Muslim Brotherhood—Egypt’s newly reopened Rafah border is creating an unobstructed terrorist path directly into Israel.

Mr. President, why aren’t the Palestinians reasonably expected to cease deliberate and random violence against Israeli civilians before being admitted into the community of nations? Isn’t it already clear that they seek something other than an “end to occupation.” Isn’t it already very likely that both Fatah and Hamas still regard all of Israel as “occupied” territory. After all, their official maps, long familiar in Washington, still include all of Israel as part of “Palestine.”

Mr. President, without an alleged “occupation,” there could remain no possible legal or moral justification for Palestinian policies of relentless terror. Nonetheless, the fact that “occupation” is a contrived legal fiction has had little or no impact upon your own administration’s position on Palestinian statehood. Nor, somehow, has it occurred to your administration that both Hamas and Fatah still find their common ideological mentors in Hitler and Goebbels, two figures for whom the prospective rulers of a nascent “Palestine” are ardent objects of unhidden admiration.

Mr. President, at its core, your policy toward Israel and “Palestine” reveals certain incremental bewitchments of language. Over the years, Arab patience in building an expanding Palestinian state upon mountains of Israeli corpses has been achieved systematically by linguistic victories. However untrue, the ritualistic canard of an Israeli “occupation” has been repeated so often that it is now generally taken as irrefutable fact.

Mr. President, why is it simply disregarded that Israeli “occupation” followed the multistate Arab aggression of 1967. Egypt, Syria and Jordan (now in the throes of a so-called “Arab Spring”) have never even denied this aggression. And who bothers to recall that these very same Arab states were also the principal aggressors in the explicitly genocidal Arab attacks that began on May 15, 1948, literally moments after the new Jewish State’s UN-backed declaration of independent statehood.

Mr. President, please recall that a sovereign state of Palestine did not exist before 1967, or before 1948. Nor did UN Security Council Resolution 242 ever promise a state of Palestine. A state of Palestine has never existed. Never.

Even as a non-state legal entity, “Palestine” ceased to exist in 1948, when Great Britain relinquished its League of Nations mandate. During the 1948-49 Israeli War of Independence, West Bank and Gaza came under incontestably illegal control of Jordan and Egypt respectively. These Arab conquests did not put an end to an already-existing state or to an ongoing trust territory. What these aggressions did accomplish was the intentional prevention of any Arab state of Palestine.

From the Biblical Period (ca. 1350 BCE to 586 BCE) to the British Mandate (1918—1948), the land named vengefully by the Romans after the ancient Philistines was controlled only by non-Palestinian elements. A continuous chain of Jewish possession of the land was legally recognized after World War I. At the San Remo Peace Conference in April 1920, a binding treaty was signed in which Great Britain was given mandatory authority over “Palestine.” This authority was based on the expectation that Britain would prepare the area to become the “national home for the Jewish People.” Previously, since 1516, the Ottoman Turks had ruled the area cruelly, as an undesirable provincial backwater.

Palestine, according to the Treaty, comprised territories encompassing what are now the states of Jordan and Israel, including the West Bank and Gaza. Present day Israel, Mr. President, comprises only twenty-two percent of Palestine as defined and ratified at the San Remo Peace Conference.

In 1922, Great Britain, unilaterally and without any lawful authority, split off seventy-eight percent of the lands promised to the Jews, all of Palestine east of the Jordan River, and gave it to Abdullah, the non-Palestinian son of the Sharif of Mecca. Eastern Palestine now took the name “Transjordan,” which it retained until April 1949, when it was renamed “Jordan.” From the moment of its creation, Transjordan was closed to all Jewish migration and settlement, a clear betrayal of the British promise in the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and a patent contravention of its Mandatory obligations under international law.

On July 20, 1951, a Palestinian Arab assassinated King Abdullah in reprisal for the latter’s hostility to Palestinian aspirations and concerns. Regarding these aspirations, Jordan’s “moderate” King Hussein, nineteen years later, during September 1970, murdered thousands of Palestinians under his jurisdiction.

In 1947, several years prior to Abdullah’s killing, the newly formed United Nations, rather than designate the entire land west of the Jordan River as the long-promised Jewish national homeland, enacted a second partition. Ironically, because this second fission again gave complete advantage to Arab interests, Jewish leaders reluctantly accepted the painful and unjust division. The Arab states did not. On May 15, 1948, exactly twenty-four hours after the State of Israel came into existence, Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, declared to a tiny new country founded upon the still-glowing ashes of the Holocaust: “This will be a war of extermination, and a momentous massacre.”

This declaration has been at the very heart of all subsequent Arab/Islamist (now including Iranian) orientations toward Israel, including those of the “moderate” and U.S.-supported Fatah. Even by the strict legal standards of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Arab actions and attitudes toward the microscopic Jewish state in their midst have remained authentically genocidal. Jurisprudentially, what they have in mind for Israel is formally called crimes against humanity.

In 1967, the Jewish State, as a result of its unexpected military victory over Arab aggressor states, gained unintended control over West Bank and Gaza. Although the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war is codified in the UN Charter, there still existed no authoritative sovereign to whom the Territories could possibly be “returned.” Israel could hardly have been expected to transfer them back to Jordan and Egypt, which had exercised unauthorized and terribly harsh control since the Arab-initiated “war of extermination” in 1948-49. Moreover, the idea of Palestinian “self-determination” had only just begun to emerge after the Six Day War; it had not even been included in UN Security Council Resolution 242, which was adopted on November 22, 1967.

The Arab states convened a summit in Khartoum in August 1967, concluding: “No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it[.]” The Palestine Liberation Organization had been formed three years earlier, in 1964, before there were any “Israeli Occupied Territories.”

Mr. President, your proposed two-state solution derives from an historical misunderstanding of Israel and “Palestine.” Even if Prime Minister Netanyahu were to agree to a complete cessation of all so-called “settlement” activity, no quid pro quo of any kind would be forthcoming from any quarter of the Arab/Islamic world. On the contrary, for Israel, any two-state solution would conclusively codify another Final Solution.

(Louis Rene Beres [Ph.D., Princeton, 1971] is the author of many books
and articles dealing with military affairs and international law.


Fouad Ajami
Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2011


It had been quite a scramble, the prelude to the vote on Nov. 29, 1947, on the question of the partition of Palestine. The United Nations itself was only two years old and had just 56 member states; the Cold War was gathering force, and no one was exactly sure how the two pre-eminent powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, would vote. The Arab and Muslim states were of course unalterably opposed, for partition was a warrant for a Jewish state.

In the end, the vote broke for partition, the U.S. backed the resolution, and two days later the Soviet Union followed suit. It was a close call: 10 states had abstained, 13 had voted against, 33 were in favor, only two votes over the required two-thirds majority.

Now, some six decades later, the Palestinians are calling for a vote in the next session of the General Assembly, in September, to ratify a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. In part, this is an appropriation by the Palestinians of the narrative of Zionism. The vote in 1947 was viewed as Israel’s basic title to independence and statehood. The Palestinians and the Arab powers had rejected partition and chosen the path of war. Their choice was to prove calamitous.

By the time the guns had fallen silent, the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine, had held its ground against the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. Its forces stood on the shores of the Red Sea in the south, and at the foot of the Golan Heights in the north. Palestinian society had collapsed under the pressure of war. The elites had made their way to neighboring lands. Rural communities had been left atomized and leaderless. The cities had fought, and fallen, alone.

Palestine had become a great Arab shame. Few Arabs were willing to tell the story truthfully, to face its harsh verdict. Henceforth the Palestinians would live on a vague idea of restoration and return. No leader had the courage to tell the refugees who had left Acre and Jaffa and Haifa that they could not recover the homes and orchards of their imagination.

Some had taken the keys to their houses with them to Syria and Lebanon and across the river to Jordan. They were no more likely to find political satisfaction than the Jews who had been banished from Baghdad and Beirut and Cairo, and Casablanca and Fez, but the idea of return, enshrined into a “right of return,” would persist. (Wadi Abu Jamil, the Jewish quarter of the Beirut of my boyhood, is now a Hezbollah stronghold, and no narrative exalts or recalls that old presence.)

History hadn’t stood still. The world was remade. In 1947-48, when the Zionists had secured their statehood, empires were coming apart, borders were fluid, the international system of states as we know it quite new. India and Pakistan had emerged as independent, hostile states out of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, and Israel had secured its place in the order of nations a year later. Many of the Arab states were still in their infancy.

But the world is a vastly different place today. The odds might favor the Palestinians in the General Assembly, but any victory would be hollow.

The Palestinians have misread what transpired at the General Assembly in 1947. True, the cause of Jewish statehood had been served by the vote on partition, but the Zionist project had already prevailed on the ground. Jewish statehood was a fait accompli perhaps a decade before that vote. All the ingredients had been secured by Labor Zionism. There was a military formation powerful enough to defeat the Arab armies, there were political institutions in place, and there were gifted leaders, David Ben-Gurion pre-eminent among them, who knew what can be had in the world of nations.

The vote at the General Assembly was of immense help, but it wasn’t the decisive factor in the founding of the Jewish state. The hard work had been done in the three decades between the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the vote on partition. Realism had guided the Zionist project. We will take a state even if it is the size of a tablecloth, said Chaim Weizmann, one of the founding fathers of the Zionist endeavor.

Sadly, the Palestinian national movement has known a different kind of leadership, unique in its mix of maximalism and sense of entitlement, in its refusal to accept what can and can’t be had in the world of nations. Leadership is often about luck, the kind of individuals a people’s history brings forth. It was the distinct misfortune of the Palestinians that when it truly mattered, and for nearly four decades, they were led by a juggler, Yasser Arafat, a man fated to waste his people’s chances.

Arafat was neither a Ben-Gurion leading his people to statehood, nor an Anwar Sadat accepting the logic of peace and compromise. He had been an enemy of Israel, but Israel had reached an accord with him in 1993, made room for him, and for a regime of his choice in Gaza. He had warred against the United States, but American diplomacy had fallen under his spell, and the years of the Clinton presidency were devoted to the delusion that the man could summon the courage to accept a practical peace.

But Arafat would do nothing of the kind. Until his death in 2004, he refrained from telling the Palestinians the harsh truths they needed to hear about the urgency of practicality and compromise. Instead, he held out the illusion that the Palestinians can have it all, from the River Jordan to the Mediterranean. His real constituents were in the refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria and Jordan, and among the Palestinians in Kuwait. So he peddled the dream that history’s verdict could be overturned, that the “right of return” was theirs.

There was hope that the Arafat legacy would go with him to the grave.The new Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas had been a lieutenant of Arafat’s, but there were hints of a break with the Arafat legacy. The alliance between Fatah and Hamas that Mr. Abbas has opted for put these hopes to rest. And the illusion that the U.N. can break the stalemate in the Holy Land is vintage Arafat. It was Arafat who turned up at the General Assembly in 1974 with a holster on his hip, and who proclaimed that he had come bearing a freedom fighter’s gun and an olive branch, and that it was up to the U.N. not to let the olive branch fall from his hand.

For the Palestinians there can be no escape from negotiations with Israel. The other Arabs shall not redeem Palestinian rights. They have their own burdens to bear. In this Arab Spring, this season of popular uprisings, little has been said in Tunis and Cairo and Damascus and Sanaa about Palestine.

The General Assembly may, in September, vote to ratify a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. But true Palestinian statehood requires convincing a decisive Israeli majority that statehood is a herald for normalcy in that contested land, for Arabs and Jews alike.

(Mr. Ajami is a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies
and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.)